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ABSTRACT
The International Relations of the French
Communist and Socialist Parties : 1968-1975
May, 198 2
Richard Goldberg, B.A. Indiana University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Peter J. Fliess
Collaborations between the two large parties of the Left
in France have generally collapsed because of outstanding differ-
ences in international politics. So it was in 1939 and again after
the war in 19M-7 . This work examines the years 1968 — 1975, when Commu-
nists and Socialists were once again joined in collaboration, con-
structing a Union de la Gauche . Drawing upon data from those years,
it is argued that the central factor is the particular power-bloc
identities of the respective alliance partners. This factor is
seen to be the ultimate determinant of the success or failure of the
domestic alliance, since each of the two Parties is identified with
its own world movement. The thesis explores the international pol-
icies of the PCF and PS - regarding defense, European integration
and the Third World - to establish the viability of their alliance.
The idea is developed that because each of the Parties identifies
with - and has internalized the value system of - a rival power bloc,
the long-term viability of the Left coalition is problematic. How-
ever, domestic factors of compelling force do suggest that the two
Parties will remain allied for the short term, muting their more
abrasive differences.
viii
Abstract: continued
French Communists early in their development transferred
their revolutionary elan to a new international, or foreign, iden-
tity. Today, there is much evidence that they continue to con-
ceptualize in internationalist categories within the overall frame-
work of bloc interests, namely the anti-imperialist "camp of peace
and socialism." Paradoxically, Communists continue to hold them-
selves forth as a national, even patriotic, entity, carriers of a
Jacobin legacy reaching back to 1789. Whether or not this contra-
diction or double identity can be resolved, remains to be seen. It
is shown here, however, that without links to its world movement,
the Communists lose much of their force. They and the world move-
ment have reciprocal needs for each other. Since 1958 the PCF has,
however, established a critical distance from its historic model in
the East. Furthermore, it remains independent of other European
Parties, rejecting any regional identity or Eurocommunist designation,
This has put it at odds with some of the more autonomist Southern
axis Parties of the Continent. Without seeking to establish a mis-
leading symmetry, the idea is further developed that French Soc-
ialists are also asserting their own critical distance from
classical European social democracy.
Exploring foreign policy behavior of the two Parties, the
thesis identifies some significant role reversals from earlier
periods. Thus the pre-war Socialists, embedded in pacifism and
neutralism, have since the war, reversed this perspective. And in
ix
Abstract: continued
recent years they have become articulate advocates of a formid-
able national defense policy. Communists, who rallied to the
bourgeois Republic in the inter-war years, urging rearmament, to-
day insist upon an independent France outside the blocs. They
are even begimingto lead an embryonic disarmament campaign. It
is shown that these reversals from long-held positions can be
explained by the respective bloc identities of the two Parties.
The PCF, despite Soviet actions in Afgnanistan, Prague, con-
sistently denies an aggressive intent to the USSR. For the Soc-
ialists, a bloc identity with a more social democratic Europe
has legitimated for them the construction of Europe. Communists,
who once heralded internationalism in their outlook, reject
this construction. The thesis develops the idea that the PCF
has not yielded its revolutionary elan. Rather, the realities of
power-bloc politics have imposed themselves over earlier nine-
teenth century categories of class struggle.
X
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the international policies of France's
two major "socialist parties" from 1958 to 1975. Any study of Parti
communiste frangais
,
(PCF) and Parti, socialiste franqais (PS)
international behavior is at the same time an exploration of the link
between domestic and international policies. Hence, from time-to-time
the discussion here will cross the line between domestic politics and
international relations. The two major opposition parties considered
here are, after all, intimately involved in electoral and alliance
strategies, while simultaneously entwined in complex international
links. Thus the PCF continues to maintain ties to the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the world Communist movement. The
Socialists, too, have maintained some relationship to the Soviet Commu-
nists, but retain their basic affiliation with the Internationale
socialiste
. These interactions persisted during an era when the PS
and PCF were themselves seeking an alliance. Thus the two parties
engaged in their domestic role while simultaneously confronting the
international environment. This raised questions regarding defense,
Europe, national sovereignty, the world Com.munist movement, events in
Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Chile and the Middle East, to cite only a few.
1
2The Communist Parties of Western Europe have been largely
excluded from participation in government for over thirty years. But
by the nineteen seventies one could no longer assume that they would
remain on the margins of power, or that they would always be in an
opposition-party-role. Donald Blackmer, for example"'', considered it
unlikely, but hardly impossible that they would one day return to
participate. This would surely project their views and actions into
significance for policymakers. It was an outcome which was not un-
thinkable if America's role in Europe declined, if Soviet influence
were to grow on the Continent, or, if detente were to be reestablished.
As Blackmer notes, the Communists of Italy and France have been
active for well over half a century, and it is as yet undetermined
where their ultimate allegiance lies., In some ways, "they are without
question European parties, well rooted in their native soil and remark-
ably well adapted to the political and social context in which they
2
operate." In other respects, they have often behaved like foreign
bodies whose heritage, organization and ideological loyalties have
reflected the duality of their Leninist and Stalinist origins on the
Blackmer, "The International Strategy of the Italian Commu-
nist Party", in Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, The International Role of
the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Cambridge, MasSo : Center
of International Affairs, Harvard University, 1975), p. 3. And six
years later the PCF held several ministries in the Mitterrand Govern-
ment that arrived in the Spring, 1981.
2
Ibid
. , p . 3
.
3one hand, and native roots on the other. This ambivalent behavior will
be seen througout the analysis here.
Given the scope of the subject, what can be learned from a
study such as this? It is perhaps Interesting to know PCF views towards
nuclear defense, a supranational Europe and the German question. Or
it is useful to know how the Socialists respond to European integration
or issues concerning the Third World. But these policy investigations
alone are not sufficient to understand the broader directions of the
two Parties and their possible ability to govern jointly. Broadly
stated, I shall seek to explain the foreign policies, attitudes and
strategies of the respective parties, in order to determine the origins
and rationale of their international behavior. I will seek to estab-
lish the historical givens that have shaped party attitudes and caused
the current stresses and forces that have led to significant trans-
formations in their international orientations.
The French Socialists, of course, operate as an independent
entity. While they have their international affiliations, they have
never been subject to a centrist organization abroad that could impose
discipline and determ.ine policies. The Communists present a different
problem. Yet if it was once reasonable to assume that the European
Communist Parties were mere extensions of Soviet diplomacy, such was
no longer the case by the end of the 1960s. Too many intervening
4variables have upset old relationships of earlier decades: de-Stalini-
zation, the relaxation of East-West confrontation in Europe, the Sino-
Soviet dispute, and the economic resurgence of Europe, to cite only a
few. All of these factors have compelled the European Parties to re-
think old positions and loyalties to the original center in Moscow.
These are aspects to be explored.
Significance of the Study :
1) There is an intrinsic value in locating and contrasting
the world views of the mass social democratic and Leninist parties
operating on the Continent. These are parties which intend, or put
forth the pretension, to achieve power and enact political trans-
formations.
2) The two parties are major forces in the French polity.
During the eight years examined here, the PCF and PS formed an elec-
toral alliance, and later a governmental program, under a unity of the
left strategy, which by 1978 brought them close to a narrow margin of
electoral success. In other words. Western European communism nearly
emerged from its post-war opposition status into a governmental role.
3) Even in opposition, the two parties strongly influence the
international environment.
5The PCF throughout its history has tended to assign primacy to
questions of foreign policy. Yet some have argued that despite this
priority, French Communism has essentially failed in its efforts to
influence and determine the major international issues of this
century. Jacques Fauvet, in an anniversary essay marking the 50th
birthday of the PCF on Christmas, 1920, presents the case.^ He cites
a list of historical political circumstances in which PCF positions
were unable to prevail. Thus the Communists, despite widespread efforts,
were unable to halt the Rif colonial war in North Africa in the 1920s.
They were unsuccessful in preventing France's occupation of the Ruhr
following World VJar I, an internationalist position they maintained in
support of the German Communists of that time. The PCF could not
prevent France's participation in the Munich accords; nor was it able
to reverse the non-intervention policy of the Blum Government during
the Spanish Civil War. All these were high priority goals of PCF inter-
national policy during the interwar years. Fauvet' s list continues:
Following the Second World War, the PCF failed in such major objectives
as blocking French participation in the MarshaU Plan, the Atlantic
Alliance and the EEC. They could not prevent France's wars in Indo-
China and Algeria, nor could they reverse her ultimate support for the
rearming of Germany.
"^Le Monde, December 25, 1970, pp. 1 and 11.
5Do these historical failings justify Fauvet's conclusion that
the French Communists have been mere marginal bystanders unable to
influence foreign policy? Have they been constantly defeated on the
salient international questions that have arisen for France in this
century? This will be a central inquiry of this dissertation.
Generally, it will be argued here that the French Communists
have a significant policy influence that must be reckoned with. In
fact, one could cite an equally long list of postwar PCF international
goals which have ultimately been realized. If the PCF was unable to
prevent the rearming of Germany, its actions did contribute significantly
to the defeat of the European Defense Community in the 19 50s.
Throughout the 19 50s and 1950s the PCF sought such goals as a
French rapprochement v;ith the USSR, establishment of ties with China,
withdrawal from NATO, a slowdown in the construction of a united Europe,
recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), destruction of the
Franco, Salazar and Greek-Colonels' regimes in Southern Europe, a Commu-
nist victory in Indo-China. If these were idle dreams and wishful
thoughts in the 1960s, they had become reality by 1975. The point is
not that the PCF necessarily brought about all these results (clearly
the policies of Gaullism were significant). But they were influential.
These were tangible policies repeatedly and often urgently demanded
7over the years in the pages of L' Human ite and in the resolutions of
the Communist Party apparatus itself—all of which were ultimately
realized. The point is a simple one: if much of the international
political framework which French Communists once sought ultimately
became reality by the 1970s, then it would be imprudent to dismiss
lightly the international programs and aspirations urged by Communists
today. This does not mean that the international framework envisaged
by the PCF today foreshadows outcomes in coming decades. The point
is that their policies bear watching.
One can note certain attributes of non-ruling European CPs which
endow them with special significance and distinguish them from other
parties in Western Europe: for example their access channels to certain
power centers. Thus in 1968 the de Gaulle Government was powerless in
urging the Soviet Union not to invade Czechoslovakia. (In fact it was
a frequent Gaullist complaint that France was never in a strong enough
position to influence the policies of the superpowers.) But the French
Communist Party (and the other CPs of Europe) are at times positioned
where they have leverage unavailable to the government parties of their
respective states. It will be shown that the PCF and the Italian
Communists (PCI) initiated powerful efforts in the summer of 1968 to
discourage the Soviet invasion. Even though they failed, one cannot
deny the force and significance of their efforts. It is the ability of
8European CPs to invoke leverage such as this, coupled with their
privileged access to Soviet policymakers, which helps to explain the
force of the ties that continue to bind them to the CPSU.^
It is even simpler to make the case for the influence of the
Socialists: they have been an active government party at various times
since the 1930s and during the post-war years up until the early years
of the Fifth Republic. In electoral strength, they were the leading
party on the left during the period reviewed here.
Methodology
. The task of gathering data and information for
this inquiry has been essentially one of determining policy positions,
decisions and outcomes sought by the two parties in question. Do the
Communists accept a forward defense strategy in Europe and the emplace-
ment of Pluton missiles? Have they derived any conclusions from the
failure of the peaceful road to socialism in Chile? Will the Socialists
accept a tout azimut nuclear defense? Have they particular views on
the role of U.S. multinational corporations in Europe? Answers to
questions such as these will constitute much of the data here. The
span of the inquiry is the respective positions of the two parties (or
possible factions within them) on the hundreds of policy questions
arising in the eight -year period. I will confine the inquiry to a
'^This access role is further shown by the ability of the PCI's
Sergio Segre to facilitate the several years of discussions that
occurred between Willy Brandt's delegation from the SPD and that of the
SED (the Communists of the GDR). See Le Monde , October 28, 1970, p. 3.
9finite, workable number of policy areas. This inquiry can not provide
an exhaustive compendium of the positions of the two parties on all
conceivable foreign policy areas; this would present a staggering and
unmanageable bulk of data. The criteria in determining critical policy
areas are my own. I identified those policy areas which appeared
important, because of the heat and debate they generated, or because
of the attention they received in party publications and Central
Committee resolutions. The international questions I shall address
concern defense, Europe, relations with the super powers, relations
with respective international movements and policies regarding the
Third World (particularly Africa, where France continues to be engaged
politically and economically).
Given the nature of the data, most of the sources used were
official party sources, resolutions, programs, national congresses, and
the party press, such as L' Humanite , Cahiers du Communisme and others,
all of which are detailed in my bibliography. Of particular value has
been Le Monde, since it provides a chronicle of the major policy issues
and debates that have surfaced in French public life . I have sought to
gain a deeper understanding through interviews with officials of the
respective parties, US and French journalists who covered these parties.
Embassy people, and a half a dozen scholars and authors in the fiijld who
have provided me with insights on two European political parties which.
10
at the outset, were rather arcane to me. The interviews I obtained in
Paris with officials of the Communist and Socialist Parties were invalu-
able not so much for the substantive information they provided (it is
unlikely that such persons will deviate significantly from official
policy), but for the opportunity to discuss, probe and debate. This
highlighted certain aspects, emphases and passions often unobtainable
from the printed pages of party resolutions.
The PS is a lively, democratic political party, fraught with
factions and tendencies that often present a morass of policies. At an
earlier stage of this inquiry I asked a Socialist official his party's
policy on an issue of national defense. His reply: "Which Socialist
Party?"
When dealing with the Communists it is easier to find a definite
line, but attempts to derive PCF beliefs exclusively from their resolu-
tions, texts and party press can be misleading. It is an oversimplifica-
tion to attribute views to a party leadership that is conceived as
monolithic or of one mind on major issues. However, simplifications
are necessary to ascertain the world view of the PCF. Nevertheless, the
world view that the PCF projects is a coherent one, that is.it is general-
ly consistent during a particular period,. It is this consistency which
allows limited generalizations. Views of Party intellectuals, historians
and others in Party forums and journals will be treated as essentially
11
valid reflections of official thinking, since even minor divergencies
from orthodoxy are rare when dealing with Communist Parties.
CHAPTER II
FRENCH SOCIALISM: ITS INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES SINCE 1870
The early Third Republic, although occupied with domestic
issues, such as the Dreyfus Affair and the clerical problem, faced
two major international questions:
.
Relations with an assertive and now unified Germany.
. Attitudes towards expansion of the French Empire.
These foreign policy issues compelled the newly formed socialist
groupings and parties to design international strategies and perspectives
going beyond earlier exhortations of working class brotherhood."^
The next section will briefly survey and explain the inter-
national behavior of the various French socialist movem.ents and factions
during v^^hat Robert Wohl has termed the "muddy waters of the pre-war
period
.
"''The revolutionaries of that era could not isolate themselves
from international currents. French and European socialists were part
of (or loosely affiliated with) an international organization, the
Second International, lending them a niore worldly perspective.
2
VJohl, French Communism in the Making, 191^-1924 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1956), p. VI.
12
13
Early Socialist Formations and Parties
Before the formation of the Section francgaise de I'interna-
tionale ouvriere (SFIO) in 1905, France lacked a single, disciplined
Socialist Party, such as existed across the Rhine (or would later form
in Britain). Rather, a variety of contending movements had emerged
out of the chaos of the Paris Commune.
French working class parties, unlike the British Labour Party,
for example, did not grow out of the unions. Trade unions were not le-
gal until 1884- in France, well after the various socialist groups were
functioning. This contrasts with Britain, where unions appeared first,
and themselves helped form the Labour Party. In France, many workers
had grown alienated from traditional party politics and distrusted their
socialist politicians. Many turned towards syndicalism, which urged
direct economic action in the workplace itself, rather than political or
parliamentary methods. The General Strike was their strategy for both
gaining reforms and ultimately seizing power for social transformation.
The historic dispute between anarcho-syndicalists and Marxists,
then, was largely over whether the class struggle should be expressed
through insurrectionary trade unions or through political parties. The
^See David Thompson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 48-49. He contrasts the Confedera-
tion Generale du travail and British trade unions. German workers or-
ganizations were well controlled by the Social Democratic Party.
14
latter, around whom were grouped Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue, had
organized the Parti ouvrier in 18 83, a faction oriented towards tradi-
tional class strusele.
Socialists believing in parliamentary action were further split
over the question of ministerial participation. Should the working class
parties owe allegiance to the existing Radical (that is non-socialist)
ministries? The more reformist factions urged cooperation with bour-
geois ministries. The more doctrinaire Guesdists rejected such arrange-
ments.
Jean Jaures, a more reformist-minded leader of the left, would
ultimately issue his passionate call for a "defense of the Republic"
strategy, particularly when the events surrounding the Dreyfus affair
appeared to endanger the Republic itself. When the reformist Socialist,
Millerand, actually joined the Radical Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau,
many on the left interpreted this as a betrayal.
The dispute over ministerialism split the Jaures and Guesde blocs
and remained an obstacle to the elusive unity sought by Jaures.
Wohl, French Communism in the Making
,
p. 11c Guesdists and
Blanquists went on to form their own party, the Parti socialiste de
France, while Jaures formed his Parti socialiste frangais . For a
discussion of syndicalism, see G.D.Ho Cole, Socialist Thought: The
Second International , vol. Ill (London: MacMillan and Co., 1967),
pT). 382-388. Syndicalists assimilated George Sorel^s notions of heroic
class war. It is often termed the direct heir of the unfulfilled egali-
tarianism promised by the Revolution of 1789, evoking a strain later
co-opted by the French Communists.
15
Jaures, a towering figure of the socialist movement, argued for the
conversion of capitalist property relations into social property, but
he advocated a transformation within France's humanistic and democratic
tradition. Socialism could not be installed by a minority. Guesde, also
a major figure in French socialism, adhered to a more rigid, Marxian
approach: working class politics should not seek gains through employer
bargaining, but should actually seize the means of production and the
state. He visualized a party organizationally similar to the German
Social Democrats, centralized and strictly disciplined,^
In 1904, the Second International supported Guesde on the issue
of ministerialism and instructed the various factions of French socialism
to seek unity. A year later, at the Congress of Unity in Paris, the
Parti Socialiste (SFIO) was formed, marking an alliance of Guesdist revo-
lutionaries and Jauresian reformists.
Yet there remained basic differences with deep theoretical roots
tracing back to the rival Jacobin conceptions of democracy that had
Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaures (Madison, Wis.: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1952), pp. 242 and 251, The German Social
Democrats had immense prestige in the years before World War I. By
1914, they had a membership ten-times larger than the SFIO. See Wohl
,
p. 19. Jaures was not overwhelmed by the prestige of these Social
Democrats: they lacked the democratic revolutionary tradition of France.
Because they "never conquered universal suffrage on the barricades,"
they could not comprehend the collaborationist strategies of French
Socialists in their "defense of the Republic" position, p. 328.
16
emerged from the French Revolution. These contending notions continue
to haunt the relationship between French Marxists. Ronald Tiersky iden-
tifies one segment of French marxism which developed with Jacobin roots.
It based itself on a General Will theory of democracy—volonte du peuple!
Any political group representing this general will would attempt to in-
voke its inherent rectitude. And, such a group saw no need for an inter-
nal structural opposition. Any embodiment of this will could overrule
all opposition. This form of one-party conception clearly clashed with
classical bourgeois democracy deriving .from the British Liberals and
Montesquieu, who argued that tyranny would inevitably follow from arran-
gements lacking a structural opposition. Disputes arising from these
rival conceptions form a recurring motif among left parties.
Early Socialist International
Perspectives
Described thus far is a brief background on different Socialist
groups. After 1905 the earlier disputes over Millerandism and syndi-
calism declined in significance. If Guesde first appears to be the
victor at the Congress of Unity, it is ultimately Jaures who emerges
as the dominant force in French Socialism between 1905 and World War I.
During that decade, a new issue surfaces: national defense. On one le-
vel, the argument over defense repeated in another form the issues raised
^Ronald Tiersky, French Communism: 1920-1972 (New York: Columbia
Univeristy Press, 1974), pp, 8 and 9.
17
Millerandism. It posed the question of what obligations, if any, the
working classes had to support bourgeois regimes. At the same time, it
confronted the Socialists with their national and international identities,
Socialism's classical outlook had been internationalist. The
very lives of the uprooted intellectuals of post- 1848 Europe, exiled
from one country to another, fostered an internationalist perspective.
For these revolutionaries the struggle for socialism implied an interna-
tional proletariat whose components had stronger ties to each other than
to any national entity. In Schumpeter's glib formulation, "having no
country himself, Marx readily convinced himself that the proletariat had
.7
Despite these internationalist perspectives, many of the leaders
accepted the reality and force of national identity, Harvey Goldberg has
pointed out that Jaures "accepted the nationstate as the basic unit in
world politics, and neither as socialist nor as internationalist did he
g
anticipate that it would soon wither away.
In the present state of humanity, where our only
organization is on the basis of nationality, social
property will take the form of national property.
But the action of the proletariat will assume more
and more an international character. ... but for a
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 312,
'Goldberg, op. cit
. , p. 3 04,
18
long time to come the nation as such will furnish
the historical setting of socialism: it will be
the mould in which the new justice will be cast.^
The German question
.
Much of the French foreign policy debate in the
1890s focused on Germany. Revanchards urged the repossession of Alsace-
Lorraine by force. Various Republican ministries sought Russia as an
ally to balance German power. The Socialists, however, had doubts about
an alliance with Tsarism. Guesde thought it risky for France to throw
herself into the arms of Russia in order to purchase security from Germany.
Jaures at first invoked "defense of the Republic" as the rationale for
a flirtation with Russia. But as his parliamentary career matured, he,
along with other Socialists, sought an accommodation with Germany, rather
than a revanchiste solution. Alsace-Lorraine was not to be recovered by
force; this violated Jaures' deep commitment to peaceful solutions of
international problems.
Jaures now looked across the Rhine to the militants
of German socialism. Here, he felt was the real
hope for the future of Franco-German relations; for
once the Social Democrats had won power, he predicted,
old disputes would be resolved and the damage of 1870
repaired . ''"'^
The Confederation generale du travail (CGT), too, which we have
9 \
Jean Jaures, Studies in Socialism (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1905),
. 8. Jaures, despite a basic pacifism, affirmed Marx's view that the
might be precede(
Goldberg, p. 199.
P
revolution eded by decades of strife
10
19
seen was quite independent of political parties, had strong feelings
about a rapprochement with Germany, as the war threat mounted. Its
hope was that the concerted actions of French and German workers, acting
through their unions, could thwart any efforts of the European ruling
11
classes to launch a war. However, the syndicalists of the CGT could
not enlist the cooperation of their counterparts in the German unions.
German unions lacked the political independence of the CGT. Such inter-
national coordination, they insisted, had to be arranged on a party-to-
party level.
While important segments of French public life, from conserva-
tives to Radicals, were eager to settle the score with Germany, the
socialists of all factions were largely immune from this national obses-
sion. Most envisioned a reconciliation with Germany, looking to the
growing success of the working class parties across the Rhine and a pos-
12
sible entente of friendly proletarian states in Western Europe.
Colonial expansion and the parties of the left . The early socialists
13
were often ambivalent regarding the question of imperialism. One might
11
Cole, op. cit. p. 363.
12
Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Baltimore: .John Hopkins
Press, 1962), p. 380.
13
Marx himself had at first viewed colonialism as a progressive
historical force, since it would raise the level of productive forces in
the backward lands. Later, as in his writings on India, he would reverse
this position.
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say that the response of the various socialist factions towards France's
expansion into the realms of Equatorial Africa, Morocco, Madagascar and
Indo-China varied from a kind of benign indifference in the 1870s and 1880s
to one of opposition thirty years later. As late as the 1890s,
Jaures did not oppose colonial ventures. His position had reformist
overtones: he would oppose further expansion; at the same time he would
campaign to improve conditions in the existing colonies."''^ The Socialist
leader did not speak out on the Moroccan venture until late in 1903,
when he attacked the military groups and the colons who sought to seize
forcibly large slices of North Africa. But opposition was not absolute.
As Goldberg notes, "he accepted as valid both a French interest and a
French mission in North Africa. It was important 'to police the Sud-
Oronais vigorously and vigilantly,' and then to carry to Morocco the
benefits of Western Civilization." Jaures apparently had some belief in
15
France's ennobling, civilizing mission.
It was only by 1907 that various socialists opposed expansion
into Morocco. But the impetus was not a basic anti-colonialist commit-
ment to self-determination. Rather, it was a fear that such adventures
could lead to a general European war. If there was any moral revulsion,
^'"^Goldberg, p. 340.
15 ...
Ibid., pp. 343-344 and 203. Jaures and other socialists, m
their desire for Franco-German reconciliation, were prepared to tolerate
colonial ventures. Empire building was legitimate if done with German
approval: as quid pro quo for France's having yielded Alsace-Lorraine.
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it stemmed from occasional shared notions of injustice. Note Jaures'
address to the Chamber on June 28, 1912, at a time when France was consol-
idating its protectorate over Morocco:
All of those peoples, who have seemed inert ...
and sunk deep in an eternal sleep, are now awaken-
ing, demanding their rights, flexing their muscles.
The races of Africa and Asia, the peoples of Japan,
China, and India, now linked to the rest of the
world through railroads, are stirring
The Revolutionary Syndicalists took a more anti-colonial line
than other parties: this derived more from their basic anti-militarism.
They saw little gain from adventures into African expansion. To support
such ventures only enmeshed political parties in the schemes of the
bourgeois state.
The question of national defense
. The issues that surfaced over colonial
expansion foreshadowed many of the disputes that later arose among
socialists regarding the question of war and national defense—which
were to haunt the socialists until the outbreak of war in 1914. The
syndicalists took the most extreme stand against defense. Their Mani-
festo of 1902 urged army conscripts either to desert or to propagandize
against war directly in the barracks. In 1908 the syndicalists of the
CGT committed themselves to a general strike if war were to ' break out.
But such strategies were extreme in the view of many socialists. Even
1 c
Cited in Goldberg, p. 427.
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Jaures held that socialism required an essential loyalty to the nation
as well as to the brotherhood of man. After all, the nationstate was
still the basic unit claiming attention. Furthermore, the nationstate
would remain even after the revolution: men still derived their basic
identities from language, culture, and common historical experiences.
Therefore, even the working class stood to lose if its nation were con-
quered. It was not a realistic policy merely to oppose invading armies
from abroad with general strikes and insurrections, as Gustave Herve was
17
urging.
These disputes gathered force as the threat of war grew in Europe.
The Socialists were arguing among themselves a key strategic-ideological
question of priorities: should they expend energies to prevent a war--
or should they direct their actions towards the social revolution? Fear
of an all-European war gradually nudged Jaures into the camp of the in-
ternationalists. He believed that the Second International should in-
creasingly divert its efforts to the preservation of peace. Such a view
directly conflicted with other factions within the SFIO in the years pre-
ceeding World War I. Herve, of course, articulated the sentiments of
the most radical of the "anti-patriots" within the recently merged party:
17
Paradoxically, Jaures was capable of uttering the rhetoric of
proletarian internationalism. Thus at the Stuttgart Congress in 1911:
"II n'y a ni socialisme frangais, ni socialisme allemand, ni socialisme
beige: il y a un socialisme ouvrier, un socialisme proletarien commun a
tous los pays ou la civilisation industrielle developpee a marque nette -
ment I'antagonisme des classes." Annie Kriegel, Aux Origines du Commu-
nisme Franqais: 191^-1920 (Paris: Mouton, 19B4), p. 41.
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outbreak of war would be the signal to change the social system.
Guesde took a third position. He dismissed the Herve stance as
anarchistic, that could only lead to a futile, romantic insurrection.
He also characterized Jaures' campaign against war and imperialism as a
waste of effort. Operating within his own narrow framework (a kind of
crude Marxism), he quite logically pointed out that since war and imper-
ialism were endemic to capitalism, they would disappear only when cap-
italism did. Thus anti-militarism was a diversion. Working class par-
ties should devote themselves to opposing capitalism.
Given these disagreements, Jaures could only seek to bridge the
gaps in the socialist movement. His was a struggle to reconcile a
profound wish for peace with an inherent instinct of patriotism. By
1905 at the SFIO's Congress of Limoges,' he, along with Edouard Vaillant,
set forth a resolution that foreshadowed ideas that would later be
expressed in his L'Armee Nouvelle
. It pledged patriotic working class
support of a defensive war, but not of an aggressive war launched by
Herve 's position was one of total anti-patriotism and anti-
militarism: the "workers would lose nothing if their nation were con-
quered." is how Goldberg formulates it. op. cit
. , p. 351. Those who had
the greatest love affair with revolutionary violence, seemed to be the
most passionately anti-military. Herve 's appeal was to those most under
the influence of Sorel, who appeared to want to drown every rationalist
advance from the Enlightenment onward in a revolution of violence.
Vaillant was a veteran of the Paris Commune; thus he endowed
Jaures' position with solid revolutionary credentials.
2H
France. The latter would be opposed by all means: parlianientary action,
protests and even insurrectionary strikes.
A year later, European socialists gathered at the Stuttgart
Congress to formulate a position on the recurring question of war and
revolution. Did a fundamentally anti-capitalist position free the
socialists of Europe from the responsibility to defend their respective
nations? A celebrated compromise resolution was devised, incorporating
the collective wisdom of some of Europe's leading revolutionaries. While
it did not go so far as to endorse the extremist Herve line of anti-
? 0patriotism, it did not reject the general strike.
Jaures and L'Armee Nouvelle
. Anti-militarism had been an instinct of
left politicians and Republican thinking generally. The army was suspect
2
1
since it represented basically authoritarian aspects of France. The
Dreyfus Affair heightened these instincts. Yet defenders of the Republic
could not realistically ignore the ultimate need for a defensive arm to
contend with the latent threat of war with Germany. This was Jaures'
dilemma. Much of his intellectual and political effortwas an attempt to
20
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg insisted on a clause to the effect
that if war nevertheless arrived, the duty of the working class was to
convert the ensuing chaos into an all-out assault on capitalism. See
Goldberg, p. 383 and Cole, pp. 59-59.
2
1
"Every sou spent on increasing France's military power seemed
to strengthen the social classes most dangerous to the survival of the
Republic," according to David Thompson, op. cit_. , p. 129„ Note, however,
that the Radical Party of the late ninteenth century largely renounced
its earlier Republican anti-militarism„ Many radical ministries actively
supported aggressive overseas expansion policies.
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bridge the gap between patriotism and opposition to war within the
socialist movement, certainly a prerequisite to any form of unity.
Hence in his celebrated book of 1911, L'Armee Nouvelle
, he envisioned
the formation of a popular army to replace the standing army. Such a
people's militia, rallied in times of national defense, could not serve
as an instrument of aggressive wars. The threat to France was from Ger-
many, whose forces would launch a quick, decisive, offensive war. Hence,
the existing professional army on the frontiers would be of little value.
Rather, France required a vast, popular army of trained reserves with
genuine ties to the people. It did not need a military sect, remote
from the people. Jaures' plan had the further advantage that the defense
22force could not be used for repression against the people.
Jaures' conception had deep historical roots. The notion of
"every citizen a soldier" reached back to the Revolution, when it had
been invoked to assure the defense of a free nation. In theory, all the
sons of France were to be enrolled in her defense. The "nation in arms"
concept is Jacobin in origin, since by suppressing the permanent armies,
it represented a genuine arming of the people. It has been argued by
some that acceptance by the socialists of the "nation in arms" concept
22
G.D.H. Cole claims that Jaures' proposal was unworkable m
isolation, but had to be part of a world-wide socialist arrangement
(which presupposed the victory of socialism in Europe), France's uni-
lateral creation of a people's militia would have been an impotent step
given the scale of great power defensive preparations in the year's
following 1911. Ibid., pp. 375-377.
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could only have occurred when the party was starting to grow reformist.
Richard Challener points out that class solidarity was starting to wane
and socialists were beginning to distinguish between nations. In many
ways Jaures' book derived from his earlier views. Recall that he had
inspired the view that all French workers indeed had a patrie.^"
Today, it is interesting to note. Communist historians of that
period embrace Jaures' conception. Louis Baillot states that when the
Jaures book first appeared, "Anarcho-syndicalist currents and anti-mili-
tarist conceptions prevailed within the working class impregnating
it with bourgeois ideas. But it was Jaures who courageously restored
ideas of patrie and an armed nation."
Socialist doctrine and war
. In reviewing the pre -World War I
period, one would have to acknowledge that the Jauresian synthesis tri-
umphed in its major domestic objectives: it prevailed in the Republican
23
See Richard D. Challener , The French Theory of the Nation in
Arms: 1866-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 70-71.
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Louis Baillot, "L'Armee et la Voie democratique au socialism,"
Cahiers du Ccmmunisme, March 1976, p. 187. The French Communists by 1920
would reject the "nation in arms", opposing all militarism and conscrip-
tion. See Challener, p. 165. Today, the Jaures concept can be reinvoked
because it corresponds to current Communist views on defense:
Far from seeking to destroy the army, as our enemies
pretend, we wish to give the nation the army it needs
and to assure to it the mission, structure, weapons
and working conditions which will free it from the
impasse that the policies of the current regime have
placed.it, Cahiers du Communisme, p. 190.
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struggles over church and army, in winning labor's right to organize
legally. But in the realm of international politics the Socialists were
not destined to triumph. It was not they who were defining France's new
world role. And it was international politics that would now dominate
Europe on the eve of war and revolution.
The relationship of war to revolution has historically been am-
biguous in the Marxian framework. Classical socialists viewed war as a
carnage which would only decimate the working class, and the workers
had little at stake in such battles because of their essential alienation
from the bourgeois state. Later strategists of revolution perceived
that war might perhaps have a certain instrumental value. Might it not
lead to the social breakdown so vital to revolutionaries? On the eve of
war, European Socialists manifested a range of attitudes towards war.
For example, classical Leninists sought to resolve any ambiguity
on the issue. They refused to allow any "defense of the nation" doc-
trine to be confused by non-historical abstractions that could justify
any kind of participation. Leninists would decide whether or not to
join in a defense de la pattie by forming a judgment on the war's effi-
cacy in furthering the revolutionary moment. In other words, they would
attempt to apply class notions of the just war, inquiring about the
nature of the political relations between the warring states. Was an
oppressor fighting an oppressed state? Or was it a war of imperialist
spoils between two equally oppressive
would be a duty to exploit the chaos,
^. 25ary situation.
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states? In the latter case there
converting it into a revolution-
European Socialists in the years before 1914 agitated against
war and the alliances likely to unleash it. The Second International
in 1907 attributed war to capitalism and its "rivalry for world mar-
kets". But if capitalism were to launch a war, the proletariat would
unleash a revolutionary struggle to conquer peace. The aim, Annie Krie-
gel suggests, was to bind the bourgeoisie in a dilemma: while the pro-
letariat hardly needed a war to reach socialism, the outbreak of war
2 5
would only hasten the conditions bringing about the revolution.
Jaures' position on war was not free from contradictions. As
usual, he merged the rhetoric of revolution with reformism; interna-
tionalism with patriotism. But the essence of his thinking amounted to
a kind of "just war" doctrine: that offensive and defensive wars could
be distinguished. Socialists had a duty to revolt if France launched
the former. But if attacked, the working class would rally to the
Republic as described in his L'Armee Nouvelle .
2 5
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The syndicalist-minded CGT had its own point of view. It would
oppose any war, regardless of cause, invoking familiar notions of the
general strike and the fact that the workers had no country. Guesde
very logically rebutted such an argument, pointing out that it would
simply condemn the nation with the more advanced working class movement
to a defeat by the one with the more backward.
World War I, Bolshevism and the Left
The foregoing represents the range of views held by Socialists;
and these views were guaranteed to generate lively debates at party
gatherings. But events were to overtake these debates. War intervened.
Jaures was assassinated, and Socialist deputies voted unanimously for
war credits. The Jauressian synthesis, hammered out in the 1905 Congress
of Unity, was shattered. Its two major underpinnings were scrapped:
1) Anti-Ministerialism
. Socialists now entered
bourgeois government, with Guesde and Marcel
Sembat joining Poincare's national union
cabinet.
2 ) Internat ional ism . This doctrine was dead for
the duration. The SFIO severed all ties with
the Socialist Parties of the Central Powers.
"Fifteen years of anti-militarism and talk of insurrection swept
27
away m a few mad hours Perhaps this behavior is less aston-
ishing if one accepts the implications of Kriegel's argument that
27
VJohl, pp. 52 and 54.
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Guesde, Vaillant and Jaures were in reality patriots all along. French
working class patriotism was hardly born in 1914, but reached back to
the Jacobin stirrings of 1792. The point is that these dormant passions
were resurfacing in 1914, as the Socialists joined the Union sacree
.
Bolshevism confronts the French left . As the carnage of trench war
wore on, anti-war sentiment began to surge, particularly among the dis-
illusioned remnants of class conscious socialists and syndicalists.
It was their leaders who travelled to Zimmerwald in September, 1915,
the first wartime gathering of Europe's revolutionary socialists.
Zimmerwald was significant in that it defied the established leaderships
of Europe's Socialist Parties. Even more important, Zimmerwald marked
the first step on the road to the creation of the Third International.
In fact, this war-time conference in Switzerland marked Lenin's debut
on the world political stage. It was there that he implored the French
delegates to launch a massive opposition to the war.
Zimraerwaldist opposition spread to the SFIO and CGT; links were
established with Trotsky and other Russian exiles in France, who were
urging a Bolshevik-style "revolutionary defeatism" on the French left.
Most of the left rejected these extremist calls. Yet the Union sacree
was beginning to loom as a terrible tragedy. More moderate Socialists
rall;gd to Wilson's call for a negotiated non-annexationist peace with
Germany. Socialists within the government coalition were for the first
31
time articulating different war aims from France's other political
parties.
Russia's 1917 Revolution offered further ambiguities to the
moderate leftists. While it was a defeat for autocracy (legitimating
Russia as a democratic ally), it threatened a military collapse on the
Russian front. SFIO Majoritaires
,
Pierre Renaudel and Albert Thomas
(the two pro-war Socialists in the Cabinet) wanted Russia to remain in
the war, urging her acceptance of Wilsonian war aims, rather than
signing a separate peace. But Poincare refused to allow Socialist dele-
gates to meet with their Russian and German counterparts in Stockholm,
placing further strains on the Union sacree.
The October Revolution split the French left even further.
Lenin's famous call for general peace talks (made over the heads of
governments) galvanized the anti-war Socialists. But the Majoritaires
,
dreading an imminent Bolshevik separate peace (freeing countless new
German divisions to fight France), gave their support to French inter-
vention against Lenin's revolution. Minoritaires , on the other hand,
hailed the Revolution and increasingly fell under the sway of Lenin and
Trotsky.
Few seemed to notice it, Wohl notes, but an historical corner had
been turned; "the mystique of the Russian Revolution had become a weapon
32
,^28in the irternal politics of the French working class movement „'
But Bolshevism was more than a mystique. Lenin and Trotsky were
setting forth their own priorities for a new international political
order to prevail in Europe:
1) Formation of a new International, break with social
democracy.
2) An end to Allied intervention in Russia.
3) Revolutionary seizure of power by socialists in Eiorope.
This summons had a key effect on the French left. In 1919 there
was a surge of popular sympathy for the Russian Bolsheviks. This senti-
ment must be examined, since it led to the historic "grafting of Bolshe-
vik theory and practice into the several powerful and often contradic-
30
tory traditions of French socialism". Here is how the various factions
reacted to the Bolshevik summons:
Majoritaires : The Right Wing of the SFIO clustered
around Leon Blum. It opposed the 21 conditions for
adherence to the Third International. As social
democrats they denied that Bolshevism had any
universal value: it was
28
Wohl, p. 86. The Bolsheviks inspired admiration on the left,
fear on the right. Many now saw two enemies - the national enemy, Ger-
many, and the new social enemy, the Third International, in Moscow.
See Thompson, p. 194-195.
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The Russians were optimistic about their international politi-
cal prospects: European-wide revolution seemed likely in the advanced
countries, and was in fact spreading from Budapest to Bavaria. See
Kriegel, pp. 268-259.
Tiersky, p. 13.
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irreconcilable with France's democratic heritage.
Minorita ires : These were traditional style Social-
ists, VTrestling with Jaures' old dilemma of
reconciling patriotism and internationalism.
Many of the more democratic and Jacobin elements
were quite sympathetic to the Bolshevik seizure
of power, but in the long run they probably
preferred the ideas of Wilson or the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, rather than any serious
attempts to universalize the Bolshevik Revolution.
Zimmerwaldists
: They derived largely from the pre-
war left wing. Well-grounded in syndicalism
,
they could easily transfer much of their passion
to the new Russian reality. They represented
tendencies that would be drawn to the new Commu-
nist Party to be formed in 1920.
Wohl and George Lichtheim offer interesting psychological inter-
pretations for the left's allegiance to the soviet patrie: according to
them, French sympathizers were not admiring the Russian reality so much,
"but their own revolution, the one they had failed to make in 1919-
39
1920."
The international prospects for France's once unified Socialists
were now in disarray. The policy of war socialism had failed. And when
the Communists won a majority of delegates at the Tours Congress in 1920,
it aligned a large segment of the left with Russian policies.
^^Wohl, p. 127
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Reformism, which had sacrificed so much in the Union sacree
,
had received little in return. In fact, none of the international and
foreign policy objectives that the SFIO had sought in the Union sacree
were met by Clemenceau:
1) Socialists were unable to moderate French war
aims. Their dream of a non-annexat ionist peace
was doomed
.
2) Socialists were powerless to prevent interven-
tion in Russia.
In sum, moderate social democracy emerged from the war with no
voice in French foreign policy. It again posed the classic Socialist
dilemma of collaboration with a bourgeois state. This time collaboration
yielded no dividends. The logic of SFIO policies led to the Union sacree
,
but class collaboration came tied in a nationalist foreign policy. As
Wohl notes, one could not be had without the other. Many on the left
wanted to return to an earlier Jauressian synthesis, wrapped in Wilsonian
trimmings of a new international order. But the intervention of the
Bolshevik Revolution unleashed new historical variables, and conferred a
mistaken, but powerful prestige on the more extremist and undemocratic
portions of French socialism.
The French Left between the Wars
French Communism, despite national roots, was an international
creation. Lenin and Trotsky, having concluded that the SFIO was reformist
hardly a structure to make a revolution, were resolved from the start
to split the French left, to drive out the rightists. And after the
split at Tours, they would continue to shape the Party towards Bolshevik
requirements, despite their changed perceptions on the likelihood of
revolution. France, after all, was important to the Russians; it held
world power status^^ and had been a natural ally since Tsarist times in
the event that an anti-German alliance was needed. Hence, there would
always be a special interest in the Part^ communis te francais
. And when
the Russian Bolsheviks went through their own bureaucratization, they
would impose their organizational maxims on other sections of the Interna-
tional, including the PCF. By 1924, one could describe a PCF that was:
•
More proletarian in its values, composition and
behavior
.
.
More centralist
,
in that its various sections
lost initiative to the center.
.
More internationalist
,
in that its leaders would
yield to the requirements of the Soviet Union
(or the International).
The French Communists were more persuaded than ever of their
inherent rectitude, or what Tiersky terms their self-assigned role of the
vanguard. Whether inherited from the Bolsheviks or acquired by histori-
cal osmosis, the claim was asserted that the pre-1914 mandate to repre-
sent the people was given over by history to the Communist Parties: that
33
Lenin and Trotsky had always taken a special interest in the
young PCF^ France was one of the centers of world imperialism, and they
recognized her status as a world power. Compare this with the contempt
the Soviets held for post World War II France.
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a latent revolutionary legitimacy derived from the Party's vanguard
and tribune roles in French life.^^
Given the structural changes in the PCF and its special rela-
tionship to the world movement, it will be helpful to examine certain
foreign policy positions in these early years.
German Policy. The PCF opposed the Versailles settlement for three
reasons
:
1) Anti-colonialism : Poincare's slogan "make the
Germans pay" and his later occupation of the
Rhineland were construed as a kind of colonial-
ism imposed on the vanquished by the Allies.
2) Revolutionary politics : Comintern policy was now
urging solidarity with the German workers. While
prospects for revolution had cooled in France, the
young PCF would seek to prevent any French inter-
vention against Germany's revolution.
3) Internationalism : The Russians, eager to emerge
from postwar isolation, were reaching out to Ger-
many, as evidenced by the ties established at
Rapallo. The argument has been made that the PCF
was for the first time serving Comintern policies
and furthering Soviet diplomatic interests (a
recurring argument in nearly all examinations
of PCF behavior).
Colonialism
. Opposition to imperialism was not a central policy issue
of either the PCF or the SFIO in the 1920s. The pre-war SFIO, we
Tiersky, French Communism
, p. 84,
35
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saw, came to oppose colonial adventures. But this was more from a fear
of war than from a fundamental opposition. The PCF, despite its inter-
nationalization of the Leninist stand on imperialism, also gave the
issue a low priority.
To understand PCF behavior, one must understand that the colo-
nies of the French Empire had their own embryonic, and often weak fed-
stations of socialists. They often had a different perspective from
that of the Comintern. Algerian Socialists, for example, although affil-
iated with the Third International, went so far as to reject the idea
of a colonial liberation movement. In their analysis, Algeria's social
revolution was derivative; it was tied to the success of the social revo-
37lution in France. Hence it was futile to struggle for a Communist
Algeria (Tunisia or Morocco) until France fulfilled its own revolution.
It can be said that the PCF was lax on colonial issues because
the problem had not ripened fully and would not until after 194-5. When
the issue did surface, the Party took an anti-colonial stand, as shown
in the 1923 struggle for Moroccan independence: the Rif War. Because
the SFIO took a weak stand, only the PCF could claim to champion
3 6
Ho Chi Minh was himself present at the Tours Congress.
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Marx himself m earlier writings justified colonialism, such
as a British rule in India, as a progressive stage, since it raised
the level of productive forces towards capitalist levels.
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colonial self-determination 38
Some broader perspectives
.
Before examining the Popular Front
period, some general conclusions about the international context within
which the two leftist parties were operating may be useful.
>
The Communist Parties of Europe, despite the abandonment of the
world revolutionary doctrine, nevertheless comprised a functioning in-
ternational movement. By contT'ast, the Socialists (and this surely
applies to the SFIO) lacked any universal or world appeal. The latter
were urging the parliamentary road to power, implying a model that
could advance only on a nation state-by-nation state basis. For example,
when the chips were down for the German Social Democrats in 1932-33,
they had no allies abroad to call upon. There simply was no mechanism
or organization that could summon forth
. the aid of working classes in
other countries.
Such was not the case with the Communist Parties. They at least
had the pretense (and quite often the substance) of a world movement be-
hind them, even if it was increasingly rallied to promote Soviet inter-
ests. This distinction between the two parties of the Left is important:
Communists conceived of themselves as sections or detachments in a world-
3 8
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wide movement
.
Social democracy not only lacked a movement as such, but it also
lacked a world creed. Its strategies and solutions were, in the final
analysis, designed for Western states, especially those with well
-deve-
loped institutions of bourgeois democracy, ^^at universal appeal had it
to offer the colonial world? Could the parliamentary road have any
meaning to states that had not yet evolved parliaments?
And to pursue this line of reasoning, one could equally ask whe-
ther The Soviet model had any meaning to a well-developed bourgeois demo-
cracy? It appears that despite the cross fertilization between European
revolutionaries in the years 1915-1921, some basic misundertandings per-
sisted: the post-war Bolsheviks misread the revolutionary potential of
France. They may have ignited what Kriegel calls a "revolutionary elan",
but they could not transform such an elan into a revolutionary situation.
And clearly, such revolutionaries as Pierre Monatte, Boris Souvarine and
Rappaport misread Lenin's revolution and its applicability to a bourgeois
republic.
What I am suggesting is that the historic split at Tours spawned
an SFIO that was essentially irrelevant to the underdeveloped world and
a PCF condemned to inevitable frustration in a parliamentary democracy.
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Tlje_^ular Front era. In theory, the post-war years were to usher in
a new system of order in international relations: the League of Nations
was to replace the pre-1914 world order of alliances and balance of
power. Under new collective security arrangements, the aggression by
any one nation would be opposed by all. In France, however, collective
responsibilities were not taken that seriously. Germany, a potentially
powerful and revisionist neighbor, continued to be the obsession of
most politicians. In fact, the motive of most mainstream parties in
having France join the League was chiefly to obtain protection against
Germany and to insure that the Versailles settlement be strictly enforced,
France, (like most states in the League) felt little duty to protect
39other nations from aggression.
The parties of the left were not bedeviled by the same obsessions,
The PCF had launched few initiatives in foreign policy before 1934-
,
years
of relative isolation. The rift of Tours had hardened. The class-
against-class tactic targeted social democracy as the number one enemy.
The Popular Front was a response to new international exigencies,
new international forces tugging at the PCF, shaping policies and beha-
vior. Fascism had advanced to the frontier as close as Germany and
Italy: by 193 6 the frontier with Shain would be in the shadows.
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This argument is forcefully presented by Arnold Wolfers in
Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962). See
his discussion on pp. 253-252.
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It has been said that the Popular Front imbued the Communist,
with a new vision in the 1930s: it superimposed the conflict of de:
cy-fascism over the conventional Marxian dichotomy of capitalism-
socialism. Destruction of one no longer entailed eradication of the
other. This is the view of Annie Kriegel, who points out that the
German crisis of 1933 and the destruction of the German Communist Party
(KPD) compelled the International and its sections to set new, inter-
mediate stages and objectives. "A revolutionary no longer lived for th
future; new conceptions of international politics were formed".
The far left has traditionally criticized the alliance, terming
It the PCF's first step towards reformism, a collaboration with the
government that reversed the Party's opposition to bourgeois rule.
Tiersky, however, claims the Communists throughout this period retained
both their intent and capacity for revolutionary action. The alliance
was a policy designed to preserve the Third Republic in order to disput
xt later on.
The broad goals of the PCF during this period were
.
Protection for France against a German threat.
. Support for Soviet interests.
'+0
.
Kriegel, The French Communists
,
trans. Elaine P. Halpern
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 110.
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.
Tiersky. See his discussion on pp. 71, 93 and 372.
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Specifically, the goal was a Franco-Soviet alliance, going
beyond the Laval-Stalin Pact of 1934.^^
French Communism was finally reconciled with its patriotic
aspect, its Jacobin identity with la patrie : the Party was no longer
taking unpopular anti-national stands. To put it differently, inter-
national policy was not only aligned with Soviet foreign policy inter-
ests, but for the first time, it was aligned with the PCF's own domes-
43
tic alliance structure.
If the PCF was attempting a defense de la Republique strategy,
where was the SFIO? Like much of European social democracy, it equi-
vocated during the inter-war years: Socialist and Labor Parties did
not view the rise of Nazism as an international danger in the same
sense that Communists did. While fascism may have been a domestic
threat endangering basic democratic structures and trade unions, it was
not viewed as a threat to peace and world order by Clement Attlee, Leon
42
The Pact was not a binding agreement since it lacked a formal
military convention. See Adam Ulam's discussion in Expansion and Co-
existence (New York: Praeger 1974), pp. 223-225.
43
This type of alignment is rare in PCF history. It would only
recur during the war years, 1941-4 5 and in the Tripartite era. See
Tiersky's discussion, pp. 372-374.
43
Blum or Paul Faure.^^
European Socialists were not urging policies of national re-
armament against aggression. In France, the SFIO continued its tradi-
tional struggle against the danger of militarists in the government.
Socialist pacifism outweighed any resistance to dangers from abroad.
The PCF had also opposed military credits from 1920 to 1934, but rever-
sed itself in 1934 when Stalin signalled to Laval his appreciation of
France's need for defense.
The SFIO under Blum also hewed a pacifist line towards Spain,
fearing any actions that might provoke Germany against France. The
PCF, however, cautiously urged military aid to the Republic, and then
a more open intervention after Germany and Italy had joined in. The
PCF also took a far stronger stand in the French Parliament against the
Munich Pact than did SFIO deputies. The ironies are obvious. The PCF
44
See Adolf Sturmthal, The Tragedy of European Labor (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1943). Especially note his chapters on
France. His book is a critique of European social democracry between
the wars. It argues that democratic socialists stubbornly behaved as
narrow pressure groups in protecting the interests of labor during the
crisis of the thirties, but had no broad national vision. Blum's paci-
fist leadership of the SFIO is also criticized. Although Blum sought
close links to Britain after the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland,
it was clear he would do little to thwart aggressions in Ethiopia and
Spain. He also accepted the Munich settlement.
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The PCF did not actually support a vigorous defense effort unt
admonished by Stalin. See Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 228.
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and SFIO were playing out an intriguing role
-reversal
. Leninist doc-
trine had historically rejected national defense as a legitimate goal
under a capitalist regiiBe. Yet the PCF was invoking a quasi-Jacobin
patriotism, affirming its lineage from Jaures.
World War II and its Aftermath
The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its trauma to the PCF has often been
recounted. For our purposes, the famous reversal it launched in the
Party confirmed the reflexive acquiescence by French Communism in fur-
thering internationalist goals so utterly opposed to French interests,
Since the drole de guerre was a war of rival imperialisms, it called
for old-style revolutionary defeatism. Tiersky terms such behavior:
a voluntary allegiance bestowed by the French
Communists upon a political leadership and
national myth not their own.^^
Yet it was also behavior which reaffirmed the radical nature and
capacity of the Party: it could pursue its radical ideal "through the
vehicle of Soviet foreign policy". Only when Germany invaded the USSR
in the Summer of 1941 did the PCF enter the war, joining the resistance
with what Stanley Hoffmann termed an "extraordinary nationalist fervor
which transcended a mere tactical shift, but took on more of a moral
45
French Communism
,
see pp. 94-100 for a discussion of this
period
.
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fervor and expiation for the dishonor of the years 1939-4 1".'^^
The PCF, emerging from the war with immense prestige and its
patriotic image restored, joined de Gaulle's Tripartite regime. Domes-
tically, it behaved with moderation, urging full production and acquies-
cing in de Gaulle's order to disarm Communist-led resistance groups in
1945.
Why did the powerful PCF, encompassing a quarter of the electo-
rate, not move for an insurrection? Surely there are many domestic
reasons. Yet the focus here is on the international reasons responsible
for the inaction. It is a question that will recur and will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. Later, it will be shown that there were
fundamental limits set by the international system itself which deter-
mined what armed Communists could and could not do in liberated France.
At Yalta, the Big Three had carved out de factD spheres on the Continent.
It was understood that West European Communists could not upset this
balance. The presence of U.S. and British troops in Western Europe
dashed any hopes for a successful insurrectionary takeover. Instead,
the PCF had to forego such plans in favor of helping the USSR consoli-
4 8date the already realized gains for socialism in Eastern Europe.
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Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community"
Hoffmann et al., I n Search of France (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
pp. 35-36.
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French Communism, see Tiersky's discussion on pp. 227-228,
274 and 374.
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Nothing was to be done that Mght provoke the West into reconsidering
the Yalta understanding. Stalin described the situation candidly:
This war is not as in the past; whoever occu-
pxes a territory also imposes on it his own
social system. Everybody imposes his own
system as far as his army can reach. It
cannot be otherwise.
During the Tripartite years, de Gaulle had his own vision:
France as a link between East and West, as an arbiter between Soviets
and Anglo-Saxons. This, however, was not to be the case. Instead, a
Europe of blocs congealed, creating an entirely new post-war reality,
destined to affect the relationship between the PCF and SFIO.
During the Popular Front, Communists and Socialists at least
agreed on foreign policy essentials: fascism was the adversary. But
with the onset of the cold war, such congruence was out of the question.
The two rival parties of the Left now seemed to have their feet planted
in different blocs. When the cold war tugged France into the Western
camp, the Socialists tilted towai-ds "Third Force" conceptions and a pro-
US orientation in international affairs. Leaders such as Leon Blum were
now anathema to the PCF,^° not only because of their pre-war behavior
49
.
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Milovan Dallas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1962), p. 114.
50
Alexander Werth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955),
p. 295. Werth holds that it was Blum's mission to the U.S. in 1946 that
marked one of the key steps in France's integration into the American
sphere. This was towards the end of Tripartisme
,
when the PCF was being
removed from the French Government.
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regarding Spain and Munich, but because they were insisting on their
democratic model of socialism, a Jaures-inspired Marxism. This was at
a time when Social Democrats everywhere had been severely shocked by the
fate of the Socialist Parties in the countries under Red Army domination.
By 1947 the PCF was headed for a complete rift with its SFIO
and MRP allies. There were important foreign policy differences over
colonial issues. The SFIO was not supporting decolonization in Indo-
China. In fact, Leon Blum was Premier when the Indo-China War broke
out in October, 1946, Communists were also in the Cabinet. The PCF
first equivocated on the Indo-China issue (ostensibly because it did not
51
want to disrupt Tripartisme ) . Ultimately, the Party did come out in
support of the Ho Chi Minh forces (and in Africa it backed a suppressed
uprising in Madagascar). These positions helped bring about the expul-
52
sion of PCF ministers by Paul Ramadier in May, 1954.
With the collapse of Tripartisme, the PCF entered its years of
exile, while the SFIO extended its centrist, "Third Force" role. Once
There is no secret about this embarrassing episode in PCF colo-
nial policy. For example see Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New
York: Random house. Vintage Books, 1972), p. 87. She notes that both the
"French Communists and Socialists defected to the imperialist cause ...."
5 2
These were the important disputes on foreign policy among the
left during Tripartisme. On Germany there was no dispute. The PCF sup-
ported Internationalization of the Ruhr. This was a national policy, at
odds with that of the German Communists and Moscow.
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again. French Communists were caught in an international system over
Which they had little control. As in 1920, 1934, 1939 and 1941, power-
ful events of an international nature would intervene and compel a re-
casting of Communist strategy, doctrine and behavior.
Since the 192 0s, as has been shown here, the USSR had looked
upon the PCF as an instrumentality to be projected into Western
society. And this was very much the role the Party again played when it
was assigned the tasks of agitating against the Marshall Plan or cam-
paigning for "peaceful coexistence". Soviet leaders stressed that US
economic penetration of Europe would soon be followed by military domina-
tion. A major PCF priority, then, was its campaign to reduce US influ-
ence in Europe. Thus the Marshall Plan was the "Trojan Horse" of US
imperialism.
_Germ_any and issues of European defense
. French foreign policy during
the early Fourth Republic clung to many old pre-war patterns. Germany
was the major potential adversary; she was to be suppressed by the same
pre-war alliance policy of concert with Russia (which had worked so often
since the 1890s). But the cold war shattered old patterns. Soviet
Russia now appeared as the major threat to France. It was not in France's
interests to have the Red Army too close if there was a danger of a
53_
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This policy was aligned with early Gaullist policy as well.
De Gaulle had signed a 20-year alliance with Stalin in 1944. See Roy
Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. •
Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 81.
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Co^nist takeover, as .any thought in those years. Many now felt that
Germany had to be integrated into the defensive alliance syste. of the
West. For Frenchmen, it called for so.e agonizing soul searching.
France no longer had a capacity for fully independent self-defense.^^
The logic of this reappraisal gave birth to the European
Defense Community (EDC) proposal. Communists opposed all forms of Ger-
man re-armament. The SFIO, however, like most segments of French opin-
ion, divided on this issue. Ultimately, ir came out in favor of German
re-armament, clothed in the slogan of "Europe". This seemed preferable
to a revived "Wehrrre^ as the dilemma was posed in those days. Hence
the Socialists, their leading newspaper, Le Populaire, and many of their
outstanding leaders, such as Guy Mollet, Andre Philip and Maurice Faure,
supported EDC. But National Assembly opposition mounted between 1953 and
1954. Such leaders as Daniel Mayer and Jules Moch remained firm Anti-
cedistes within SFIO.^^
54^
Many m France (including Gaullists) had a moment of truth
regarding traditional alliance strategy. Agreements with the USSR nolonger assured France a reliable partner. At Yalta the USSR had beenhostile to certain French wishes, especially regarding Germany. Many
segments of opinion felt that the danger to France no longer came from
Germany, but from the USSR, particularly since there was a fear of a
Communist takeover in that period.
55^ . .
It IS interesting that German Socialists (the SPD) opposed
EDC. Ties between the SPD and the SFIO were poor after the war, and
the two parties disagreed on many European issues. See Alfred Grosser'
s
essay "Germany and France: a Confrontation" in France Defeats EDC
,
eds.
Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1957)
p. 62.
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The European Army idea was defeated, and it marked the first
demonstration that Gaullists and Communists could join as objective
allies in certain political actions. This affinity becomes more
significant in the Fifth Republic.
The idea of "Europe", or a European Community, took root in
France as it became apparent that the nation's destiny no longer lay in
overseas Empire or a French Union. Many European-minded Socialists saw
EEC and economic integration as a prelude to political integrat ion-a
socialist nation of Europe. Gaullists scorned any such arrangement,
preferring a Europe of states, perhaps joined in confederation, but
retaining full national sovereignty.
Gaullism presented paradoxes to the Communists. At first the
PCF opposed the Fifth Republic vehemently, fearing both its constitu-
tional aspects as well as its threat of personalisme
. Yet Gaullists'
international perspectives oddly converged with many PCF policy posi-
tions, on such issues as decolonization, fear of a politically integrated
Europe, fear of US domination in foreign policy, and recognition of
China. Heightening the ambiguity, much of this was occurring in the mid-
sixties, a period when the PCF was starting to reach out to an electoral
alliance with the SFIO. This situation would require the PCF to defy for
the first time the immediate foreign policy desires of the USSR. These
are aspects to be examined further on.
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This chapte. has provided an overview of leftist perspectives
on Prance's international relations fro. aaur.3 to de Gaulle, leading
up to what will he the .ain focus of this dissertation: the years 1.68-
1975. These latter years cannot be understood fully apart fro. their
historical antecedents. Hence the foregoing was intended to provide
essential background. To grasp current PCF or Socialist conceptualizing
on Germany, defense, or relations with the USSR, one .ust understand
past struggles and convoluted events that are often still alive in the
consciousness of Frenchmen. From time-to-time it winLu ci I ll be necessary to
return to these earlier developments.
Discussion here has not dealt with PCF-CPSU relations (except
for the formative years around 1920). I have tried to show that the
USSR, following World War II, became obsessed with holding on to its
furthest European penetrations. Among other tasks, the PCF was assigned
that of not disturbing this new state of affairs. Hence French Commu-
nists had to defer their revolutionary class struggle, which, after all,
comprised so much of their raison d'etre.
I have tried to show that doctrinally, war and revolutionary
defeatism were the classical Leninist routes to revolution. But this
changed utterly with the advent of nuclear weapons in international
56_,
.
This will be discussed in the next chapter,
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relations: if war was now unthinkable, it could hardly provide the road
to revolutionary power.
I have not, however, had space in one introductory chapter to
deal with de-Stalinization, a process which since 1956 has loosened the
ties of European Communist Parties to the CPSU and the world movement,
freeing the PCF (and other parties) to launch new, independent initia-
tives. The implications will, of course, be examined in further
chapters
.
CHAPTER III
1968: THE DYNAMIC OF UNITY
France's post-war years required adjustments to wartime reoo-
very, disintegration of Empire, and acceptance of Germany's new role into
the Western Alliance. Gaullism accepted these realities. But by the
1960s it was seeking a new leadership and independence for France within
a Europe of nationstates-a Europe described as dominated by the super-
power blocs. This was the central historical setting as one approaches
the years examined here.
Favorable Perspectives for the Left
1968 marked the tenth year of the Fifth Republic, the Commu-
nists had been in opposition for 20 years; the Socialists for ten. The
PCF had maintained its post-war level of electoral strength, a little
more than a fifth of the French electorate.^ The Socialists had been
declining steadily since Liberation. Yet there was an aura of optimism
on the French left at the start of 1958: a moment of potential alignment.
For the first time, the Left saw a possibility of defeating a decade of
entrenched Gaullism. For several years, the Communists had learned to
accept the reality of the Fifth Republic and its constitutional arrange-
^Jean Poperen, L' Unite de la Gauche (Paris: Fayard, 1975), p. 61.
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»ents; they were no longer rejecting it as a bourgeois dictatorship.
^
Abroad, events appeared to be confirming certain conceptions generally
held by the left:
1) Strsin^^^^hejtest. The United States, chief representative
Of capitalist, was in a drift or decline, sy^olized by Lyndon Johnson's
decision not to run for the Presidency, balance of payments deficits,
and disorders at home. January, 1968 opened up with the Tet offensive
in Vietnam, auguring further setbacks.^
^' ^declining threat from the East. France under de Gaulle had
been able to establish reasonably good ties to the Soviet bloc. In
Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's new leadership generated much excitement on
the left. Frenchmen could increasingly view Communists more favorably
now as possible alliance partners, as reform after reform was announced
in Prague.
Ihe decline of_^ritain. Britain was reassessing its relation-
ship to Europe. Early in 1968 it had announced its withdrawal from East
of Suez, symbolizing a declining world role and a reaching out towards
Europe
.
'+) The world Communist movement
. A decade of de-stalinlzation
was encouraging autonomy of parties. At a meeting in Budapest early
that year, the Soviets agreed that no parties would be condemned or
2
See the discussion in Tiersky, pp. 230-232.
3
The general optimism of the period is reflected in Rochet's
speech at the World Conference of Communist Parties. L'Humanite, June
7, 1969, p. 3.
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expelled fro. the
_nt. There would be no action taken against the
Chinese
.
For the left in France, these developments (along with internal
factors) were encouraging the moinentum towards united action. By Feb-
ruary of that year, the Communists and the Federation of the Democratic
and Socialist Left (FGDS) were able to sign a Common Declaration.^
1958 was not the culmination of Left unity, nor was it the begin-
ning. As early as 1954, the PCF had been seeking some form of united
action or electoral alliance with the Socialists in order to break out
of its isolation.^ For several years it had articulated a doctrine of
peaceful transition to socialism, fully backed by the Soviet Communists
(CPSU). At its 17th Congress in 1964 the PCF declared that the parlia-
mentary road to power, only a remote possibility 50 years earlier, was
more likely than ever, because of the new correlation of world forces.
But such a development would require a long-range entente between the
PCF and the SFIO, which did, after all, share certain doctrinal objec-
tives and a common Marxist heritage.
To facilitate such an alliance, the Communists were prepared to
4
Le Monde
,
February 25, 1968, p. 7.
5
F^or a good discussion of the 1964 period see Frangois Fejto,
The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1957), pp. 150-170.
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reject the notion of a single party as a necessary condition for the
transition to socialise. This had been a false notion, based on the
limited experience of the Soviet Revolution, hardly applicable to France.
The PCF even invoked the experience in certain East-bloc countries
where there existed, at least nominally, other parties of the left.
Such a doctrinal concession was not always persuasive to the SFIO which
feared being absorbed like the Social Democrats of East Germany or
Prague. But the PCF hinted that such alliances might take on new and
original shapes, in order to dispel any such fears. The hope was that
the SFIO would at least respond.
Along with the PCF's desire for a new opening with the democratic
left, was a hope that the Socialists in France would soften their tradi-
tional Atlanticism and agree to a loosening of France's postwar ties to
NATO. Anything that encouraged the SFIO's perceptions of a peaceful
Soviet Union undid much of the rationale for NATO. Success here required
the PCF to emphasize the "peaceful road" and "peaceful coexistence" line,
that the Chinese Communists (CCP) rejected as a reformist betrayal.^
The rationale behind unity
. It is sometimes said that the Socialist-
Communist alliance originated in a banal necessity: each needed to
5
Throughout the 1960s, the PCF accepted the Soviet condemnation
of the CCP as splitters of the world movement, attempting to usurp the
primary role of the USSR in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The
Yugoslav and Italian Communists invoked polycentrism—and a desire to
restore unity. Hence they resisted attempts to expel the CCP, a view the
PCF would later adopt. Fetjo, pp. 185-192.
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gathe. on the
.un-off elections the other's fi.st
.ound votes in order
to protect its parliamentary strength. Practical necessity was concealed
behind an ideological fagade
.
More basically, there was a realization
that nothing could be done by the left in France without the Communists.
There could be no progress towards socialism without the participation
of the Communist Party. Neither Party could make transformations in
French life without the agreement of the other. Much of the momentum
towards unity of the left stemmed from the PCF. To demonstrate their
commitment to a parliamentary road, the Communists had backed the Social-
ist, Francois Mitterrand, in the September, 1965 presidential election,
a historic act of disobedience to the CPSU, since the Soviets had sig-
nalled their support for de Gaulle.^ This tension in PCF-CPSU relations,
regarding which candidate the Communists would support, would recur in
future years. However the deepening rapprochement between the Fifth
Republic and the USSR did not weaken the French Communists' resolve to
oppose the personal power represented by Gaullism.
It is the political ambiguity of this situation, compounded by
the recurring international differences between the two Parties, that must
be analyzed. Thus throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Socialists had con-
7^
Apparently the Soviets preferred their ties to the existing
Government of the right over the risks of a PCF-Mitterrand coalition
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sxstently supported the Atlantic relationship to which the Communists
were hostile.^ The Socialists had always inclined towards the construe
tion of Europe, viewing it as a Third Force between the two blocs.
The PCF always opposed it. Also to be resolved were questions of polic
towards the USSR, Czechoslovakia, defense and other areas of contention
These were major international obstacles as the two Parties of the Left
struggled towards their 1972 Common Program.^
Pre- 1968 Steps towards Unity
The dynamic of unity, as the French often term it, has had a
long genesis in post-war France, and 1958 marked an important step along
the road. But the concept itself was born well before 1968 and did not
reach fruition until the signing of the Common Program four years later.
A Gaullist, Roger Frey, has argued that the concept of a Common
Program was originally dreamed up by the Communists exclusively . ^°
Claude Estier, a National Secretary of the PS, denies this view. A
simple reading of the motion authorizing the program at the Congres d'
g
^ ..I^^'^''
^^""^^^ withdrew France from the military organization
of the Alliance m 1966, Mitterrand, then head of the FGDS, told the
Assemblee^nationale that the decision was harmful, detaching France with
out engaging her elsewhere. Le Monde
,
April 16, 1966.
9
.
This paper will not be concerned with domestic differences bet-
ween the two parties, on such issues as nationalizations, le gauchisme
proportional representation voting, a strong presidency versus the
'
legislature and other sources of disagreement.
-'-'^Le Monde
, March 1, 1973.
Epinay in 197X demonstrates the point. The purpose here is not to re-
solve a dispute Of paternity. It can be noted, however, that Maurice
Thorez first employed the term
..common program., as far back as October,
1958 in a speech before the Central Co™ittee." If the Socialists were
hardly responsive at this time, it was because they were still partici-
pating in the Gaullist Government. Even when the Socialists moved into
the opposition four months later, their critical view of cooperation
with the PCF remained. In fact, during the important referendum of Octo-
ber, 1962, where de Gaulle sought to legitimate direct elections for the
Presidency (a constitutional innovation considered as threatening by the
entire left) the SFIO remained hostile to Communist overtures. If the
Socialists were being wooed in the early 1960s, they would respond only
to arrangements that were purely electoral. There would be no ideologi-
cal rapprochement. As Guy Mollet, then Secretary General of the SFIO,
said;
There will be no unity of action and no Front Popu-laire as long as the PCF leaders subordinate the TKte-
rests of French workers to the foreign policy of the
Soviets.-'-^
This refrain would be repeated often. And Communist overtures
Branko Lazitch, L'Echec Permanent (Paris: Editions
' Roberts
Laffont, 1978), p. 72. '
'
Ibid.
,
p. 73.
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for Left unity were continually rejected because of the SFIO's histori-
cal memories, its basic suspicion of Communist ties to the Soviets, and
a conviction that the PCF aspired to operate as le parti unique. It
was probacy Mollet's falling out with the Ganll7^^^~Zr^^ately
made hii. receptive to PCF overtures. The Socialists were declining
seriously as a political force in the early 1950s. Gaston Defferre's
failure to direct the SFIO into a centrist alliance in 1965 also argued
for unity.
The momentum gathered force. By 1964 the term programme commun
was listed as a long-term goal of the PCF at its Seventeenth Congress.
Thorez died in July of that year, but his appointed successor, Waldeck
Rochet, continued the momentum. A year later, the PCF and SFIO were
able to agree on the single candidacy of Frangois Mitterrand to oppose
de Gaulle. The challenge was respectable, gaining 44 percent of the vote,
13^,
The polemics were strong in early 1968. Thus the SFIO's Claude
Fuzier (editor of Populaire) termed PCF loyalty to the USSR as that of
a "Fifth Column", Le Monde
,
January 6, 1958, p. 6.
Communist spokesman Rene Andrieu replied that the Socialist lead-
ers themselves had privileged ties to the United States, since they re-
peatedly followed the U.S. lead, as in expelling PCF ministers in 1947.
favoring France's entry into the Atlantic Alliance, and opposing her
withdrawal from NATO in 1966. Le Monde
,
January 9, 1968, p. 6.
These polemics are repetitive and boring, but they do demonstrate
that the two political formations perceived each other as residing in
opposite world camps. These polemics were proceeding during a period of
improved French-Soviet ties.
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Frustrated by Mollet and the SFIO leadership in going beyond
these electoral agreements, the Communists reached out to other forma-
tions of the democratic left. In 1966, first contacts were made between
Rochet and Mitterrand's Federation de la gauche democratique et social-
^^^^ (FGDS), a grouping of non-Communist leftist parties. In June,
1967, the two sides agreed to form a working group to formulate a Joint
Declaration. As Tiersky notes, the non-Communist left was now ready for
an alliance "at the top", rejecting Defferre's earliest strategy of
seeking to absorb the Com.munists . "^^
The Declaration Commune of February, 1958
With this declaration, the two sides devised a partial agreement
not a common program of government nor a joint legislative program.
Rather, both sides set forth their respective positions: agreements and
disagreements on foreign and domestic policy. The document, which op-
posed the personal power regime associated with de Gaulle, did not speak
IM-
FGDS was a leftist political formation of late 1965, created
after the defeat of Gaston Defferre's seeking of the Presidency. Its
general goal was to develop unity behind Mitterrand's Presidential cam-
paign in 1955. FGDS sought to link together the SFIO, the Radicals,
UDSR, CIR (Conventions des institutions republicaines ) and other dem.ocra
tic-left political clubs of the era. Its strategy revised earlier think
ing on the left. It followed the Mitterrand line of cooperation with
the Communists. The Federation begins its decline after the events of
May 1968, and Mitterrand resigned as president in November of that year.
15
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Tiersky, French Communism, chapter five.
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Of the transition to socialisn, although it did define a social progra™.
Its foreign policy aspects will now be considered; they are an early
articulation of different international conceptions held by the Co™-
nists and the non
-Communist left.
The document reflected inherently different conceptions of Euro-
pean unification and supranationality
. Thus the Federation supported a
general European framework, but opposed hostile, cold-war era military
blocs. A durable peace required that the blocs be replaced by what FGDS
described as a "European collective security" framework
.
The Democratic Left and European integration
. The FGDS was articulating
Mitterrand's position: France should be integrated into a political con-
struction of Europe—the only means of insuring genuine independence
from the two superpowers. Such an agreement might even lead to a lasting
rapprochement between East and West. But lacking such an arrangement,
France must not break unilaterally with the existing alliance—as the
Communists were urging in their demand that France withdraw from the
Atlantic Alliance, due for renewal in 1969. Not only should integration
16^ .
It IS never fully clear just how European leftists qualify
what they describe as collective security. One can assume they are not
suggesting the rigorous, automatic, world-encompassing system outlined
in the American school of international relations, as, for instance, in
Hans Morgenthau and Inis Claude. Communists, too, call for collective
security, but it is hard to see how it reconciles with their equally
vocal demands for national independence in foreign policy, since the
doctrine does require a large surrender of sovereignty.
17
Le Monde
,
February 25, 1968, p. 7.
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be accelerated, said the FGDS. but Europe should be enlarged to include
Britain as well as other European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.)
states. Furthermore, sectoral areas of EEC competence should be broad-
ened to include monetary policy, planning and even political competence
through a parliament elected by popular, universal suffrage. The FGDS
asserted:
From now on it seems quite possible to delegate alimited but real power, under democratic control
to the current institutions formed at the Treaty'
of Rome
.
The Communist view. The PCF demurred. It viewed national independence
as the essential of foreign policy. National security required that
France not be led into a war that was not in its own interest (that is
through an alliance dominated by the U.S., which was currently playing
a "world gendarme" role in Vietnam). While awaiting the simultaneous
dissolution of military blocs, France must stay outside the alliance and
seek collective security with all European states.
The Communists were in effect arguing that France should with-
draw from the frame^;orkof Western Europe. Instead of remaining bound
to a capitalist Petite Europe
,
she must develop economic ties to all of
Europe on the basis of mutual advantage.
At the same time, the PCF restated its long-standing hostility
Ibid.
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to the creation of any supra-national authority, particularly one domi-
nated by large business interests. The Federation had no such fears of
political union and envisioned a supranational political authority
composed of representatives from different states. Again, the PCF ob-
jected, such an entity would progressively be invested with all the
powers that today reside in national parliaments and governments
.
As they saw it, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutch and Luxembourgers
would be able to decide vital issues of French life and destiny, over-
ruling French representatives within the supranational organization.
There were two further aspects of the PCF argument:
1) Such a supranationalEuropean authority dominated by capitalist
interests would not in fact unify Europe, but would heighten its divi-
sion, since it would exclude the East-bloc states.
2) A Petite Europe would not be truly independent since it would
be compelled to submit to the hegemony of what in those days was de-
scribed as an "expansionist and revenge-seeking Germany", itself under
the tutelage of the Americans through links to the Atlantic Pact.
The Communists, in rejecting supranationalism, did not reject
EEC outright. Because they considered the Community to be dominated by
trusts and cartels, they (along with FGDS ) insisted that it be given a
"democratic content in its institutions" through vague references to
19
L'Humanite
,
February 26, 1968, p. 5,
ons
.
participation of „orker and facers organizati
In other aspects of foreign policy, the two signers of the
Declaration were able to reach agreement:
.
Defense
- Both sides renounced France's force rie
ii^oSf L^x^r Ldir"-° -^^-ar-
the nuclear no^lZifTrt.Tol l^T.^:
'"^^^^ °'
Si; ?h:^od:r-tiL°fSn^e'r:-^^^"."""^--
existence of two German staSs' andT ^ °'Federal Germany of its n^^n^^Lar s^at^^r^S^^^
• JiSi?™ - Both urged a halt to the bombings of 1968
Sa1::^w:s^?^^Ji::^?L"ihrr --"^.^^^ Sn::a"^eement.
nam (DRV,. The^^L
^fnT^ur^h^^r'lns"?-"'
unconditional fl q tth+k^ / "^ ^^^^^ insisting on
for the DCT and N^F tSfL"tt ="PP°"
representatives in Soutt WetnLf"IgDs''
°nly legitimate
NLF only one of the parties ^^^ th '
=°?s^dered the
.ue. .o. t.e ne.t.ai?S;-n oJ ^T^'^^.^ TsL,
' liilTl^.ht't'' arrangement based on
vl2ls of pSL? """""l' ^^^P^^^i-g the nationalright Palestinian Arabs and supporting the UNdecision against acquiring territory by force FGDS held
tiers as vital to any settlement. Here, the PCF disagreedcalling for an immediate, unconditional Israeli withdrawal.'
•
Rightwing^ dictatorships
- Both sides issued rhetorical
condemnations of the regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal.
•
Overseas Departments
- The PCF supported demands for
20.
At thn. ^^^^^Pf
^^^^s Germany will be treated fully in Chapter X
^Ln ; I -T '^"^ Communists rejected al! coope^a
ooHc?L "'""^""^ ^"^^1 1-ders accepted thesf
condJ "^P^^^^^ Ultimately fulHlled these
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complete independence of Martinique,
Guadeloupe and Guianna. FGDS urged'
free elections on that issue.
Clearly the outlook for joint action appeared promising in
early 1958. The Left was eager to achieve power. And the Communists'
doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism was being put to the test
in their new understandings with the non-Communist left. But the May-
June crisis intervened, undermining the entire edifice. Before the end
of the year, FGDS would disappear as a political force in France; Mit-
terrand would be in retirement.
The Events of May-June , 1968
While the upheavals in May-June in Paris will not be examined
in detail, their international relevance cannot be ignored.
To begin with, the student movement itself can be viewed as part
of a broader, international phenomenon; not in a formal but in a spi-
ritual sense. Similar disorders were, after all, igniting in Berlin,
Prague, New York, London, Madrid and Rome that year - as well as in
Paris. Marcel Niedergang even went so far as to speak of a "Youth
2
1
International", which invoked the same slogans, flags and symbols.
In fact, Daniel Cohn-Bendit ' s movement of March 22 was born on the eve
of a large demonstration against the war in Vietnam. Amid ^1
1
the
21
See his essay in Le Monde
,
May 23, 1958, pp. 1 and 10.
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shouting, it could be said that the students were articulating a funda-
mental awareness of the injustice of international relations. The anar-
chists were demanding an end to international frontiers. The very exist-
ence of Maoists implied some inspiration from abroad. In fact, much
of the PCF's hostility toward the Chinese Communists
-and its willingness
to accept the Soviet critique of Maoism-arose from the Party's fury at
domestic Maoist factions seeking to outflank them on the left.
These, then, were certain internationalist aspects of the May-
June events which help to frame a context and emphasize that the events
were not a purely domestic phenomenon. One might also note that many
Frenchmen saw an international aspect to the disorders. There were,
for instance, demagogic references to Cohn-Bendit 's Jewish origin.
Marchais would even refer to "that German".
A basic question is why the PCF failed to act and seize the re-
volutionary initiative in 1968. While there were, of course, domestic
reasons, one cannot ignore the international framework (or what the
Communists term the world balance of forces).
The question is a recurring one in Communist behavior,, going to
the issue of revolutionary pretensions in the Communist Party. Tiersky
terms it the dilemma of a revolutionary political formation operating
in a historical context that it considers non-revolutionary. The question
68
relates tc the very raison d'etre of the PC- P-r .
.
Five general explanations
can be given for the PCF's failure to act in 196a rum lybS. Three are domestic;
two are international. The mer.,-t- „j= u •in rit, of each will be considered.
1) iSCl^^i^JVan^iari^". (a domestic explanation): This
view concedes that the situation was indeed revolutionary, but since
the PCF was not in control of the spontaneous outbursts, it was reluc-
tant to join with political forces, the destiny of which it could not
control. Thus Co„u„sits will only seize the initiative in contexts
where they are playing what they insist is their vanguard role. This
explanation is weak. One would have to note that Co^unlsts (in other
contexts) have been able to coalesce with other insurrectionary forces
when deemed to their advantage. This occurred, for example, in the
Cuban Revolution.
^^-^^^S^L^LS^IS]:}^!^ The Communists, having grown
reformist, are no longer a political group that will make the promised
revolution, regardless of the circumstances. Somewhere, runs the argu-
ment, the PCF lost its historical elan. This view is often advanced
by the far left. Some maintain that the PCF abandoned its revolutionary
impulse at the time of the Popular Front, when it renounced its Leninist
origins in order to preserve the bourgeois Republic. Others date it at
the moment of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Some hold that the reformism of
the PCF first manifested itself in the 1944-45 Liberation era. Still
others date it at 1968 itself. My purpose now is not to accept or reject
this thesis argumentatively
.
It is an issue that will persist, and one
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that preoccupies much of the >,riti„gs of Tiersky and Kriegel respect-
ively. It Is a theme that will recur in this thesis. For the
.oment,
I shall accept Tiersky's formulation that the PCF has not lost its revo-
lutionary purpose and indeed ren^ins a significant force for political
transformation in France.
3) Lack_^^a_re^^lutW This interpretation is
on firmer ground. It is also one that is advanced by the Communists
themselves. The point here is not (as in explanation one) that the
Communists are incapable of making the revolution, or (as in two) that
they could not manipulate it. Rather, that they simply did not define
the May-June situation as revolutionary. The classical doctrine has
always held the working class decisive. Any group or class outside
the working class (and its vanguard) could not make the revolution.
Communist analysis of the class struggles in France saw in the spontan-
eous movement of 1968 no revolutionary situation. Admittedly, segments
of workers had linked up with the students, but not for genuinely revo-
lutionary purposes; only to improve their relative economic and social
situation within the Fifth Republic.
If the situation was not revolutionary, the PCF was not willing
to scuttle its domestic alliance strategy, so carefully nurtured since
the early 1960s. It concluded, probably correctly, that French workers
22^
.boviet perceptions, calling for broad class alliances, are
documented in Stiefbold, See pp. 3-5.
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wouxa not political o.
.evolutionary ai.s to thei. economic de^an.s
(even though so^e eight million were on strike at one point,. Further-
-re, French capitalist held preponderant power that could not be sha-
ken by spontaneous movements that lacked genuine vanguard support.
These views ste„ed fro. the very logic of the "peaceful transition-
doctrine. As Tiersky points out. the general strike and widespread dis-
orders were no longer "the key ™o.ent in strategy". The election was
significant. "By voting the left into power, the people launch a pro-
cess with a potentially revolutionary conclusion".^ At the same ti.e,
the Communists would do everything to convert the agitation into more
familiar channels of demand for higher wages and new social welfare
legislation
.
In seeking an alternative government program through a parlia-
mentary majority. Communists were reenacting aspects of the Popular
Front policy. Such a perspective required rejection of the May, 1968
disorders as adventurist risks that would cut them off from the non-
Communist masses, and assure them a loss of potential allies.
4) Loyalty to the USSR. (An international politics explanation).
The argument is that French Communists were pandering to Soviet foreign
policy interesta, supporting the USSR's satisfaction with the Qaullist
Tiersky, Journal of International Affairs
, p. 202.
2^+
.
This view IS summarized by Jean-Pierre Visier, an expelled
member of the Central Committee. See Le Monde
, June 7, 1969, p. 6.
The PCF line was roundly criticized from the far left as leading to
the party's social democratization.
Government. The force of the argument derives from the PCF's Stalinist
heritage: that it had often provided a knee-jerk response to Soviet
interests in the past. References have already been made to the Soviet
preference for continued Gaullist power over the uncertainties inherent
in a government of the non-Communist Left. Stiefbold shows that the
French Communists grasped fully the significance of the Soviet accommo-
dation with de Gaulle. 25 gut the PCF, through the voice of Rochet
himself, had stressed that there should be no illusions that the regime
far-sighted realism in foreign policy (friendship with the USSR) would
induce Communists to call off their domestic struggle against de Gaulle
2 6personalist power. At this point it seems best to reject the "Soviet
loyalty" explanation. There is no direct evidence to support it. This
does not mean that the question of whether or not the PCF is an appen-
dage of Soviet policy has been resolved. It will be discussed in fur-
ther chapters.
5) Unfavorable world balance of forces
. This attributes PCF
behavior in the Spring of 1968 to its assessment of the international
situation. Revolt would have been futile. An essay by Andre Fontaine
27provides the rationale. Even if by some miracle the May revolt had
25
See her discussion, pp. 12-13.
2 6
L' Human ite
,
December 11, 1957. Cited in Stiefbold, p. 12.
27
See Le Monde, June 24, 1969.
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triumphed ove. GauXU..,
.he Co^uni.ts „ere convinced that the a.^
perhaps with the ^iX s.,,..,
,he CIA and the Pentagon, „ouXd have
fo^ed in Paris a regi.e reminiscent of the Greek CoXoneXs. This «as
the nightmare. Such a scenario, said Fontaine, wouXd have presented
extre.e ris.s for the POP.
.ending a certain credihixit, to this theor,
was the fact that de GauXXe, ircnicaXly, and prohaLXy hypccriticaXXy,
attempted on Hay 24th to Xink the French Co»^ists with the disturb-
28
ances
.
reasons
;
To summarize, the PCF did not act in May, 1968 for three
.ajor
1) The situation was not perceived as revolutionary.
2) Their domestic alliance strategy based on a peacefultransition would have been undermined.
P^^=^^^^
28^
"ThrPcfL'^hif
f ''"""'^ '''^ ^^^^ Mitterrand said:ihe CF m t is_serious crisis' has not carried out any actsof an insurrectional nature, and it does not deserve Pompidou'
s
xnvectives which seek to portray it as a s^versi;e organlza-
Sv^.' "^^^^ ^^^^^d' ^he state wouldnave disappeared." Le Monde
, June 20, 1968.
•
Soviets, too, were highly critical of the Government's attemnt
attack on'dn:ul'i°"
Communists, although Pravda avoided any direcf'
tie tuiutl
personally. In inspiring attacks on the Communists,
^ol.-^^^^ f "'^f-''^ ""f ^"^"^P^i^g vain to isolate the PCF from other^p itical formations (probably a reference to the FGDS and the Molletsegment m the SFIO), Pravda did not suggest that the basically good
pltlT.
^^"^^^"^ and the USSR would be disturbed by these events.Pravd|, m an unsigned article of June 5, expressed the solidarity of the
?°T^ ! "^^^P "''-''^ ''^^ ''^^ h^^^ °f "the French working classes.LeMonde termed the Soviet critique "the first direct condemnation of theGaullist government's internal policy". (See Le Monde
, June 6, 1968, p.
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3) Even without the above two factors, the inter-natxonal environment precluded their acting!
It is item three above which must now be explored more fully.
This requires a brief digression to examine pre-1968 periods of possible
insurrection.
Revolution and the World Bal anrp of Forees
Earlier it was suggested that certain critics to the left of the
PCF date the reformist behavior of the Party to the 19.u-^5 era: specifi-
cally, that it refused to act on behalf of a revolutionary alternative
during Liberation. Thus PCF behavior in May-June, 1958 was only a con-
firmation of earlier practices.
Communist historians justify their behavior by their evaluations
of the revolutionary possibility as defined and limited by the interna-
tional framework imposed on Europe after the Second World War. Thus
their reticence to act during the Liberation period is explained by the
de facto spheres established at Yalta. (See the discussion in Chapter Two.)
And, of course, not everyone accepts the Communist assessment. Claudin
has argued that the Communist Parties of Italy and France should have
carried out their revolutions in the resistance years. The frustration
of this revolutionary possibility in 1945, he argues, was as historically
damaging as the betrayal and defeat of Lenin's hopes for revolutions in
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Germany and Austria-Hungary in iqift-iQiq k • . ,m 1918 1919 by social democracy. In other
words, the mass Communist Parties of Itaiv ;.r.H r^l t ly and France played essentially
the same role after World W^-n tt=oj-j^iw ar II as did the Social Democrats following
29
world War I. (And by implication, the PCF was confining that role
in 1968.)
In Claudin's analysis, the PCF erred in accepting a Gaullist
solution to the war and the Resistance. Even though the PCF dominated
the Resistance at the outset, it allowed de Gaulle to include other dis-
credited parties of the Third Republic in the CNR (National Council of
the Resistance), Furthermore, the PCF failed to transform the Resist-
ance into the Revolution. In other words, the Resistance should have
seized power, not the ersatz resistance of London and Algiers.
The Communists justify their behavior as a necessary action for
unity at the time. Furthermore, the steer presence of Anglo-U.S. troops
_
Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement; from Comintern toCominform, Pt. II (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 317 claudin
was on the Politburo of the Spanish Communist Party for 18 years.
_
The point IS made that the Liberation Committees and popular
militias formed everywhere after the Allied landings were centers of power
with mass support, formed by a PCF then playing a decisive role. AndreFontaine argues it was within power in parts of France. See his A His-tory of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean wiFlNew
York and London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968), p. 195. (Cited in Claudin,
p. 325.) Jacques Fauvet, now editor of Le Monde
, termed these organiza-
tions the most pervasive resistance force in France. See The History
of the Cold War
,
Vol II, p. 59.
75
negated any chance for an insurrectionary seizure of power.
Claudin further speculates that an insurrection would not have
led to a clash with the liberating Anglo-A.ericans
, but would have con-
fronted the Western Allies with a fai^acco.pli
, .uch as the Co..unist
forces had done in Yugoslavia. But, Thorez had no such intentions.
Returning to France from the USSR in November, 1944, he obeyed de
Gaulle's order to disband the militias. Thus the mass movement emer-
ging from the Liberation was strangled, and European Communism abdicated
at its greatest moment. Nuances of the debate cannot be explored here,
as they fall outside the time frame of this thesis. The essential
point is that French Communists, from Thorez onward, have justified non-
revolutionary action largely by the requirements of the international
situation
:
1) The wartime need to support the Grand Coalition.
2) The de facto spheres in Europe set forth at Yalta.
3) The presence of mass Allied armies in Western Europe.
And there is no reason to believe that on this score French
3
1
The dispute reopens inside the PCF in 1952, leading to the
removal of Andre Marty from the Party and Charles Tillon from
-the
leadership
.
32
Most sources on the subject dispute the Claudin view here.
Thus massed Allied armies in Europe were decisive according to Adam
^lam in The Rivals, America and Russia Since World War II (New York:
Penguin Books, 1971), p. 133. "
~
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Co^nist assessment varied significantly fro„ Soviet perceptions. In
fact, there is strong evidence that they were conforming to Soviet
wishes
.
It should be noted that the early post war years under Stalin
mrked a vital period of consolidation for the Soviet regime and world
Communism. As Marshall Shulman emphasizes, it was an era when the
Soviet Union was eager to secure its furtherst European penetrations,
despite perceptions of a hostile and superior United States with a
firm presence on the Continent
.
This required the Soviets to seek a period of peace-or peaceful
coexistence-,mtil there occurred a new stage or advance in the correla-
tion of forces favorable to them. This was the time of the peace
movement, a large-scale campaign embracing all groups and strata opposed
to war. By convincing a wide spectrum of Europeans, including Frenchmen,
of the Soviet Union's peaceful aims, they hoped to undermine Europe's
33
In fact all sources agree that the Ivestern Communists were
aligned fully with Soviet requirements. Ironically, when the Grand
Coalition of World War II collapsed in 1947, the Cominform severely re-
primanded the PCF and PCI for yielding to legalism and parliamentarism
during this period. See Claudin, Part II, pp. 384-386.
34
Marshall Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New
York: Atheneum, 1959). Tiersky also confirms that the PCF acted to
ferego the revolution in order to further the more certain gains of the
socialist takeovers by the Red Army in the East. Thus foreign policy
was aligned with their new government role. See French Communism, pp.
121-122.
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ties to the Atlantic Alliance and the United State, and preclude the
possibility of an armed Germany.
Any attempt by Western European Communists to achieve power
would have to await some change in what Communists term the "correlatio
of forces". Hence the post-war era became a period of stabilization
for European Communists, a holding action. Their Cominform-assigned
role was to weaken the Western bloc to the extent possible, but to
reject class struggle and revolutionary politics, since there was a
judgment that there was little prospect for revolutionary action by the
Western European proletariat after the War. As Shulman notes, instead
of revolutionary politics, there would now be power-bloc politices.
Communists abroad were enjoined to take a broad national line and seek
mass support. This was legitimated by Stalin's thesis that Communist
Parties uphold bourgeois democratic freedoms, national independence and
sovereignty, "if you wish to be the patriots of your country. "^^
This Soviet exhortation confirmed the PCF's own experience. (It
had, after all, been most isolated in 19^+9 when Thorez declared support
for the Red Army in the event of an East-West war J Now Western Commu-
nists could exploit nationalism, peace sentiments and anti-imperialism
to strengthen the Soviet bloc, instead of advancing the social revolu-
tion. Claudin and others term this revisionism. For Shulman, it
35
Shulman, pp. 253 and 247-248.
7!
ernbodied the movement's adaptation to the great transformation in world
politics since the end of World War II. The old classical theory, and
hope, that the working classes of industrial countries would be the
vehicle of revolution had been repeately frustrated by events, as
these classes began to enjoy the fruits of bourgeois life.
It can be concluded that Communist behavior in May, 1968, was
consistent with their entire post-war strategy, deriving from their own
(and the movement's) assessment of the revolutionary possibility in
Western Europe, given the world balance during these decades. France
remained firmly anchored to the Western sphere in 1968, as it had been
a quarter-of-a-century earlier.
The June Presidential Elections of 1968
Having analyzed some of the revolutionary possibilities in
France, we can now return to the unity problem.
The "dynamic towards unity", which originally appeared so hope-
ful in early 1968, continued to move toward a crisis that Spring. The
Communists had hoped to regain lost ground in the June 23 legislative
elections called by de Gaulle, Perhaps their responsible behavior
during the crisis would legitimate them in the eyes of the voters.
Even the Soviets made no overt judgements on the elections, but private-
ly, they were now describing de Gaulle as a man of the past, who
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lacked any grasp of working class problei^s.^^ The June elections,
however, were a decisive defeat for the entire left, and especially the
Communists, who despite their good behavior, remained identified with
the outbreaks of that Spring. But the shocks of that year had only
begun. For as Kriegel notes, what was memorable about 1968 to the
PCF "was not so much May in Paris, but August in Prague".
3 S
Lejonde, June 11, 196 8, p. 2. Chinese commentary attackedboth the Soviet Union and the PCF for "extinguishing the flames of
revolution and for urging revisionist electoral solutions that would
only lead to a disguised scheme for Rochet to collaborate with thebourgeoisie. Le Monde
,
July 7-8, 1968, p. 5.
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The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and
France
, p. 40.^ ' ' ' ' —
CHAPTER IV
THE CZECH CRISIS AND THE FRENCH LEFT
General Perspectives
Most observers correctly attribute special significance to the
PCF's response to events in Czechoslovakia, terming it the first asser-
tion of French Communist independence from the CPSU. And indeed the
Stalinist heritage of the PCF had burdened it deservedly with a reputa-
tion for unswerving loyalty to the Soviets.^ Given this reputation,
some observers exaggerate all signs of PCF-Soviet differences as evi-
dence of a rupture in relations. But judgments must be made carefully.
A careful historian might note that disapproval of the 1968 invasion was
not the PCF's first disagreement with Soviet foreign policy. One could
cite others:
.
The PCF now claims it conceived of the Popular
Front idea in 1934, despite opposition from the
Communist International.
^
The French Party lacked the initiative of other Parties, which
were less ouvriste
,
or perhaps had undergone longer years of illegality,
such as the more innovative Spanish, Italian and Yugoslav Parties. See'
Donald L.M. Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Commu -
nism", in Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Communism in Italy and France
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
This is reported by Jean Kanapa, who headed the Foreign Affairs
section of the PCF's Political Bureau. See his essay, "A 'New Policy'
of the French Communists", Foreign Affairs
,
January, 1977, vol. 55, no.
2, p. 283.
'
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Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Communistdeputies voted unanimously for defense credits
when France went to war against Germany.
3
Thorez in 1946 opposed Stalin's view that theRuhr be placed under inter-Allied control He
also wanted the Saar placed under French con-
trol, a policy the Soviets did not support.
It is arguable how significant these differences were; none of
them persisted very long.^
T^e 1968 challenge to Soviet actions, however, was of histori-
cally different significance: it was a strongly articulated objection,
which, although modified, has essentially been sustained over the years.
The actions of the left during this crisis are at a crucial intersection
of international behavior and domestic alliance strategy. They will
now be considered.
Responses Prior to the Invasion
Throughout the Spring of 1958, the PCF, in the pages of the
Party press and in the deliberations of its leadership, dealt closely
3
Fernando Claudin, pp. 317-318.
I have found no confirmation for Kanapa's version of the Popu-
lar Front's paternity. Regarding the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the PCF promptly
acted to realign policies with Moscow. Disagreements over postwar
German policy were trivial in the sense they involved the same goal:
preventing German resurgence.
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with events unfolding in Prague. Rochet, speaking to the Central Com-
mittee on April 18, observed an important democratization of life in
Eastern Europe.^ While changes in process and corrections of past
errors were entirely the affair of the Czech Party, international soli-
darity did justify his touching on certain common problems. For the
public record. Rochet stressed that new dramatic practices in no way
endangered the socialist basis of Czech society. (We will see shortly
that he did have doubts on this subject.) He went on to note that
Czech foreign policy remained firmly linked to the Soviet Union. Des-
pite some transformations, the nation remained in the Socialist Camp.^
The Socialists, too, were noting events approvingly. After all,
developments in Prague did have symbolic importance, and the Czechs
were even suggesting that their practices could apply in other states
with democratic traditions. Thus Socialist deputy Claude Estier (a
member of the secretariat national ) , wrote in the Mitterrand-edited
Combat Republicain that "the winds blowing from Prague must serve to
further cooperation with the Communists". The meaning was clear: the
French Communists stood to gain dramatically from the positive image of
5
.
L ' Human ite
,
April 20, 1958, p. 5 and May 9, 1958, p. 2.
6
Rochet distinguished the situation from Poland, where there
was a threat to the socialist order and the alliance with the Soviets.
7
Le Monde
,
April 12, 1958, p. 2.
g
Reported in Le Monde
,
April 28, 1968, p. 5.
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the Prague Spring.
But it was the Soviets who grew increasingly alarn^.ed about
"winds from Prague". And the French Communists, in turn, were growing
alarmed at possible Soviet reactions. In mid-July the five East-bloc
Communist Parties had notified the Czech Central Committee that while
they would not intervene in Czech affairs, they would not "accept Czech-
oslovakia being led away from the path of socialism". This would be
a threat to the entire bloc:
Our parties are not solely responsible before their
own working classes, but before the international
working classes for their actions.
9
This was a cliche of old-style internationalism, but it hinted
at the Brezhnev Doctrine to follow.
Rochet's view of internationalism held that each Party had to
determine its own policies, a principle well-established at earlier
international conferences. But a "particular Party could express its
own views on this or that aspect of the behavior of another party, par-
ticularly if it was a question concerning the common objectives of all
parties—that is the international Communist movement",''"'^
Fearing the worst--a Czech-Soviet confrontation—the PCF took
^
Le Monde
,
July 18, 1958, p. 3.
"^^L ' Human it e, August 7, 1968, p. 1.
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certain initiatives internationally. On July 15 Rochet journeyed to
Moscow with Luigi Longo, then Secretary of the PCI. Apparently both
sought to discourage the Soviet leaders from using force against Czecho-
slovakia, which would have violated agreed upon norms of non-interfer-
Two days later, the PCF launched another initiative and pro-
posed a meeting of all European Communist Parties to discuss events in
Czechoslovakia. ^2 j^^^
^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
^
It is clear that the PCF, which had always had solid ties to the Czech
Party, was attempting to serve as an intermediary in the dispute. On
the one hand, the leadership wanted to caution the Soviets against
seeking a military solution (on a domestic level this threatened to
destroy the developing ties with the democratic left in France), on the
other, they wanted to warn the Dubcek leadership against letting the
situation get out of control, as that would provoke Soviet intervention,
A week after urging a meeting of European Communists, the PCF
withdrew its proposal and accepted the Soviets' preference for talks at
11
In talks such as these with Soviet leaders the prestige of
Western Parties is high, particularly the PCI, which had just scored
some electoral successes. The PCF's credit was high, too, despite the
electoral setbacks in June. See Le Monde
,
July 18, 1968, p. 3. It is
interesting to note that Rochet's trip to Moscow was not without pre-
cedent. According to Rochet himself, he journeyed there in October,
1964 to protest the manner in which Khrushchev had been removed. See
Andre Lauren's essay in Le Monde
,
July 28-29, 1958, p. 1.
12
The Italian, Swiss, Belgian and Austrian Parties agreed to
come, L'Humanite
,
July 18, 1968, p, 1.
Bratislava between the Czechs and other East-bloc Parties only. (The
Soviets were apparently more comfortable in dealing with ruling parties
than non-ruling ones, as they had more control over the former.) The
immediate crisis appeared defused for the moment, and the PCF re-
gistered its approval of the results of this conference.
Much of what is now known about the celebrated Duhcek-Rochet
meeting of July 19th emerged a year-and-a-half after the event^^ ^i^h
disclosures embarrassing to the PCF. The meeting reveals much about the
nature of the game the PCF was attempting to play in those confused days
On a deeper level it is also an interesting glimpse into French Commu-
nist operations at the international dimension. Before examining the
meeting, a few observations can be made.
To understand the role of the French Communists in these maneu-
verings, one must grasp Kriegel's notion that the PCF functions as a non
state controlled entity inside the world Communist system. It also func
tions "as a potentially or 'proto'
-state element within the world
^
Kanapa apparently took notes for the PCF side. L'Humanite
editor Etienne Fajon sent copies of the minutes back to the Czech author
ities in November, 1959. It was charged later by Roger Garaudy that the
Kanapa notes might have been used to implicate Dubcek at a trial. See
LeJIonde, May 13, 1970, p. 9, May 20, 1970, p. 7 and L'Humanite, May 18,
1970, pp. 1, 5 and 6. '
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interstate syste.". Thi. world syste. is not ™erel, a territorial en-
tity. "but a
.ulti-di.ensio„al concept e^racing at the sa^e ti.e a
aSlaiL^fjS^^tie., both ruling and non-ruling, as well as a broad
system of alliances that reach nut-r o t into the national movements in the
Third world." It is
.e^ership in this system that enfranchises the
PCF (and other parties in the system) to participate at an almost
government-li,e level at these international forums. Conventional inter-
national law notions of non-interference in the internal affairs of stat
seem to dissolve in these new relationships. «e have seen that from its
very birth, French Communism has mainrained its links to the world move-
ment, yet refining a part of the domestic French political system. It
is this duality which leads Kriegel and others to describe the PCF as
a hybrid of pre- 19W French socialism and Leninism. Out of this ambi-
valence grew the need for an organization that could walk this political
tightrope.
... to maintain its double identity, the Frenchparty has had to construct an ideological and organ-izational apparatus designed to compensate for ^ts
close relationship to the French political system.
This unique structure has been successful in pre-
venting the party's "Frenchness" from submerging
Its internationalism.
c. membership in the international Communist
movement is the historical and logical basis for the
existence of any Communist party. It constitutes a
practical corollary to Communism' s ideological
es
Blackmer and Kriegel, pp. 37, 39 and 54.
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goal—worldwide proletarian revolution.
The above should be helpful in understanding the nature of the
dialogue that occurs in international discussions among Communist Party
leaders. To return to the July 19th meeting:
Rochet began by noting that a serious situation had arisen of
concern to all parties. And while the PCF had never interfered in the
internal affairs of the Czech Party, a solution had to be found. "Such
is the spirit in which I came to Moscow earlier this week and come here
today". He went on to note that forces existed inside Czechoslovakia
which could exploit a situation for goals hostile to socialism. Then
echoing the Soviet assessment, he urged constant vigilance; the leading
role of the Party was being challenged:
The non-Communist press had the right to advance
its own erroneous ideas, but it was the role of
the Party press, the unions and the state radio-
TV to respond vigorously, so that false ideas
could be refuted and could not influence the
masses
.
Rochet was conveying the Soviet point of view, as explained to
him earlier that week: the Czechs were not responding adequately to a
long-term threat to socialism.
Turning to Czech foreign policy. Rochet emphasized that a
"^^Ibid.
,
p. 37
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deterioration in ties between the Czechs and Soviets was disturbing to
French Co^nists. He conceded that while the Czech party had pledged
its loyalty to the Soviets, certain intellectuals had issued declara-
tions casting doubt on the decisive significance of these ties. This
did concern the PCF, since it related to peace and security. "Neither
of us can forget Munich". He explained that a break with the USSR
could expose Czechoslovakia to "all sorts of maneuvers fro. West Gernnny
and the United States. T^e relation of forces would be changed, and
the security of Europe threatened
„ The Soviet Union and the Socialist
states could not allow such a situation to develop". PCF leaders
clearly knew the Soviets were prepared to act.
After painting this gloomy scenario. Rochet urged:
.
The search for a "terrain of entente"between
Czechs and Soviets.
• Tighter Party control over the press.
IS
This is the oh/erse of what was suggested earlier. French
Communists determine the limits of policy by their assessment of a re-
lationship which they term the international balance of forces. They
are precluded from certain actions in France because of their geograph-
ical sphere as defined by Yalta. Similarly, they view the Czech pre-
dicament through the same lense: the bloc will impose its own norms,
limiting the transformations under the Prague Spring. For an interes-
ting discussion on this theme see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband,
World Politics: Verbal Strategy among the Super Powers (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1971). They argue that U.S. behavior in its
own sphere provides precedents and justifications for Soviet behavior
under the Brezhnev Doctrine. Often the "crises are as symmetrical as
a classical ballet ... an extraordinary reversal of roles". Smaller
states within a bloc cannot escape the jurisdiction of that bloc; force
will insure this jurisdiction.
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D.bcek thanked Rochet graciously for hi. remarks and indicated
his understanding that Rochet was transmitting the views of the Soviets,
Rochet denied this:
Soviet '.m/'"
""^^ ''^^"'Sed with translating
ence x
' T"' independ-
sTtuat.-n
^'"^^^^^ heard, and concluded thei uation was serious.
Dubcek then said that PCF fears of a break with the CPSU were
unfounded, since the Czechs had given no pretext or provocation for
such a rupture. He did not think Rochet's proposal for a Euro-wide
Communist conference devoted strictly to Czech affairs was useful just
then, perhaps later.
The French Communists Respond to the War...w P.n^j^^^^^^
The invasion itself, following so closely after the turbulent
events of the Spring, placed the French Communists in still another
crisis. The Party responded immediately.
The Political Bureau expressed its "shock and disapproval" on
the morning of August 21st, noting that problems between parties must
be resolved by "fraternal discussions and bilateral and multilateral
meetings". There must be respect for the independence of each' state
and party within a framework of proletarian internationalism.
17
L'Humanite
,
August 21, 1968, p. 1. The Confederation Gene-
rale du Travail (CGT) also condemned the invasion ^FThat Hay.
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The Central Committee issued its oun statement the following
day, repeating many of the same points, yet different in tone This
led many to call it a retreat from the original condemnation. The ori-
ginal wording was modified to an expression of "regret and disagreement
V
But it did approve the Political Bureau's statement of the prior day,
opposing all interference in the affairs of a fraternal party, a posi-
tion well-defined by the Declaration of 81 parties issued in 1960.
Despite the condemnation, the statement indicated that French Communists
would in no way relax efforts to promote unity in the movement. They
would continue to work with all parties, particularly the CPSU and
"would struggle against all anti-Soviet provocations".
The PCF saw no inconsistency in its two statements
. Both
condemned the invasion. In fact, the latter statement of the Central
Committee went further, indicating the Party's basic international
1
8
L ' Human ite
,
August 23, 1958, p. 1.
19G^eorges Marchais also denied any difference between the Poli-
tical Bureau statement, "sa surprise et sa reprobation", and the later
Central Committee text, noting "desapprobat ion " "there is absolu-
tely no difference. The second statement clearly indicated disapproval"
Marchais argued it was perfectly normal for a Central Committee resolu-
tion to expand its analysis.
The PCI had issued an even stronger statement, urging the re-
moval of Soviet troops. Marchais, however, ruled out any common action
between the two European Parties. But the two parties continued to
keep close contacts, as evidenced by the earlier Longo-Rochet meetings.
See L' Humanite
,
August 24, 1958, p. 2.
position: namely that it would strengthen ties with all parties. It
was this renewed stress upon closer ties to the Soviets that enemies of
the PCF were seizing upon, said Etienne Fajon, editor of L_'Humanite.
Were the Party to "sink into anti-Sovietism, the rallying point of all
regressive forces for half-a-century
, it would cease to be Communist".
By late August, it was clear that the force of the PCF's
initial objection had subtly been softened. The Communists continued
to reject the specific Soviet action, but would not loosen their funda-
mental alliance with the world movement. They were now putting their
faith in the "normalization" process so touted at the end of August.
_Reactions from the non-Communist left
. There was a general scorn for
the "normalization" by the democratic left groups. It was considered
a Soviet diktat to Prague. The invasion had now become a domestic poli-
tical problem within the French left. After the invasion, Alain Savary
of FGDS went further, terming the events a moment of truth for Western
Communists. "Only an immediate and unequivocal condemnation can save
their (that is the PCF's) relations with the democratic left".^° The
Socialist International, to which the SFIO was linked, issued its own
denunciation, terming it an act of imperialism recalling Hitler's in-
vasions. Condemnations came in from Pietro Nenni and Golda Meir, as
the world socialist body urged an emergency session of the UK Security
20
Le Monde-, August 22, 1958, p. 5
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Council
.
Guy Mollet took a more conciliatory line.^l ^^Ue denounc- -
ing the invasion, he did see major historic significance to the French
Communists' condemnation. Unlike many of his colleagues, he saw no
significant difference between the two statements cited earlier issuing
from the PCF's Political Bureau and Central Committee. He saw no need
to interrupt the unity discussions between his party and the Communists.
In fact, he welcomed a recent trend among French and Italian Communists.
Mitterrand, however, did not embrace the PCF initiative. The
invasion stemmed from Yalta, the classic whipping boy of the Gaullists.
It demonstrated that the Russians were still tied to the special
privileges of an out-of-date Yalta Agreement which had divided Europe.
The logic of this analysis led him to conclude that France had to
"hasten the arrival of an independent Europe".
One could go on citing the various reactions from all quarters:
Thus the Youth Contingent of the SFIO termed the PCF attitude
21
See Le Monde
,
August 2^+, 1968, p. 7. Also see L'Humanite
of the same date, p. 3. Contrast this with Mollet' s statements in
the early 1950s, cited in the previous chapter.
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•Wageous.. and a step that could strengthen the process of unity... ^2
^-^^^=^^^^-^^^^1^^
signaled its support
and satisfaction to the PCF leadership.
As the weeks wore on, one could discern
.ore critical attitudes
in the ranks of the non-Co..unist left, especially as the Co^nists
appeared to retreat fro. the original force of their condemnation.
The PCF was only temporizing. Evidence for this was the fact that the
Communists were repudiating the Garaudy line, which had welcomed the
pre-invasion innovations in Pra^e
. Furthermore, the PCF was accepting
uncritically the post-invasion accords between Dubcek and the USSR,
which were viewed as little more than diktats by the democratic left.
On September 3, the Political Bureau of the PCF issued a new
statement, which was somewhat different from its earlier statements.
1) It expressed a strong desire to see the new Moscow-Prague
agreement of August 27th carried out satisfactorily, putting the origi-
nal Bratislava principles into effect: namely that Czechoslovakia
22
If many Socialists were responding favorably to the PCF con-demnation, the Radicals were more aloof. Maurice Faure and Felix
Gaillard saw no reason to embrace the historic action of the PCF. Thuthe Radicals were far more sceptical about the possibility of left
unity than the SFIO and FGDS, See Le Monde
,
August 29, 1968, p. 7.
23
See the SFIO's resolution of September 5th. While welcoming
certain actions of the PCF, the "retreat" endangered any hope for true
unity. See L' h'umanite
,
September 6, 1968, p. 3.
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would uphold socialise and renain loyal to the Warsaw Alliance, and at
the same time pledging a withdrawal of Soviet troops.
2) It did not conceal a basic PCF sympathy for the continued
development of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia, as originally
envisaged by Dubcek in January of that year. (At this point it had
not been revealed that Rochet had been critical of certain lapses in
Czech vigilance in his celebrated meeting with Dubcek on July 19th.)
3) It reaffirmed the initial response of disapproval with the
Soviet invasion.
It is not my purpose here to analyze Soviet behavior in any
depth. Nevertheless, one can state that the Soviets made a trade-off
regarding Western European Communists. To gain stability and orthodoxy
among East European Communists (who were ruling parties), they would
sacrifice the prestige of Western parties (non-ruling),. In other words,
it was preferable to preserve ruling parties, and take certain risks
among those parties without actual power: a sheer calculation of advan-
tage. The Soviets probably sensed that the invasion would be condemned
by Western Parties. They had, a.fter all, been warned. One can assume
that from the Longo-Rochet meetings in Moscow the prior month.
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Earlier, Marshall Shul.an was cited to the effect that in the
1950S the USSR shifted f.o. insurrectional, politics to power hloc pol-
itics
-
and imposed this nor. on all Western Parties. The PCF, we saw
acquiesced in this policy, leading it to formulate the doctrine of peace-
ful transition. In Czechoslovakia, the Soviets were once again engaged
in power-.loc politics. This ti.e, however, they were not endangering
the insurrectionary goals of the Western Co„nists. But they were en-
dangering the very objectives of peaceful^rans^ In asking that the
Western Parties approve of its power-bloc
.oves in Europe, the USSR was
in effect condemning the parliamentary strategies and alliance policies
of the mass Communist Parties of Western Europe to defeat. If the
Western Parties were prepared to make this sacrifice after the war and
in the early days of Cominform, they were no longer prepared to do it
in 1968. This appears to be a fair reading of the fact that virtually
all Western Parties condemned the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.
Why did the Western Communists sacrifice their purposes to Soviet
power-bloc goals 20 years earlier and not in 1968? Probably because
they themselves could see the futility of insurrectionary politics in
the 1940s. The Soviet argument made reasonable sense. In 1968 the
Soviet argument made no sense, because the Western Parties saw alterna-
tive and potentially achievable roads to power, which would have been
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closed had they identified with Soviet po„e.-bloc methods in Europe.
Having rejected the insurrectionary road, the Western Parties could
not reject the parliamentary road as well. This would have left the.
with no strategy at all.
If the above reasoning is correct, it still leaves unanswered
the question as to why the Western Parties did not break totally with
the Soviet Union. This is, of course, a basic question of the PCF's
international relationship, and an attempt to answer it will be «de
further on.
At this point, some limited conclusions can be drawn about the
effect of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia on the world movement.
The phenomenon of Eurocommunism will be discussed later. And
it is not being suggested that the Czech invasion gave birth to its rise
(although its contribution will have to be considered). At this point
it seems reasonable to say that the crisis in Czechoslovakia opened up
a new, third pole in the world movement. (The split with China demon-
strated a second variety of socialism that spoke to the less developed
states, which could assume certain risks that an established power like
the USSR regarded as imprudent.)
The invasion of Czechoslovakia revealed a wide gap be twee
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the developed Western capitalist states and the USSR. One thing it made
clear was that the USSR could no longer embody the future for the
most modern, industrial states. This seemed to be a major lesson of
Prague. It served as a moment of truth for the Western Parties: the
Soviet Union was no longer a model. By the 1960s, the progress of the
mass parties of the West was being retarded by aspects of Soviet
reality.
Maurice Duverger argues that the Czechoslovak event had a
24
special meaning. It showed that the Soviets were determined to crush
any manifestations of genuine liberty, placing the Communists of the
West in a new situation. It was no longer unthinkable that Communists
could begin to share power (as, say, in Finland). As social democracy
grew more gestionnaire
,
it became more open to a liberal communism in
the advanced countries. Given this situation, the USSR's international
position was difficult. On the one hand, as a growing great power, it
required a rapprochement with the U.S. to further its own economic
development. Hence it had to separate itself from the more revolu-
tionary posturing of the Chinese. But since it refused any genuine lib-
eralization, it justified the birth of a new form of communism in the
West. Duverger conceded a certain weight to the basic importance of
the USSR since 1917 in furthering a general advance of world socialism.
Without Soviet power confronting the United States, capitalism, as
24
See his article m Le Monde
,
September 5, 1958, p. 4.
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e
own
e^odied in the U.S., would be able to expand increasingly. The Western
CoTOists understood, hence they refused to break with Moscow. In
this sense, he argues, they were realistic. Duverger goes on to point
out that Stalin transformed the Soviet Union from a revolutionary
exporter of ideas into a citadel, concerned chiefly with safety and
security. And perhaps it had some further lessons to teach the Chines
and the underdeveloped states. But it no longer had anything to teach
the Communists of the developed Western states. They were on their
This stems from the fact that the Soviets refused any liberalization:
Communists of the West were only allowed to develop to a level that
corresponded with the level of development in the East, which, he holds
was untenable in the long run. In saying "no" to the USSR on the Czech
invasion, the Western Communists opened the road to a new development.
Post-Invasion Fallout
After the dust had settled, the August international crisis
threatened Communist assumptions and purposes in four areas, 1) -Foreign
policy, 2) Party unity, 3) domestic alliance strategy, and 4) doctrine.
Foreign policy objectives endangered
. The PCF was now anticipating
these setbacks in Europe:
. Hostile forces would intensify the cold war and
blame the Communists.
.
The Center and Democratic Left in France would
expoit the crisis and urge closer links to the
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Atlantic Alliance.
.
Germany would now reject the Nuclear non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Indeed, there was evidence to justify these fears. The NATO
Council of Ministers had gone on record against further Soviet actions
in Eastern Europe. The U.S. had issued strong warnings against
possible moves in Austria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Michel Debre, in
the afterrrath of the invasion, had told the UN that a "fatal shadow-
had been cast over detente.^G
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^
idency augured a return to cold-war tactics.
But Communist fears of a renewed cold war proved unwarranted.
Within a few months, Debre would note that Soviet intervention within
its bloc was not a new phenomenon, hardly requiring a renunciation of
detente
.
In fact, the invasion only temporarily interrupted the Franco-
2 7Soviet relationship.
25
At the Council meeting Willy Brandt and Joseph Luns were espe-
cially concerned that Western Europe not relax its vigilance to a Soviet
threat. See Le Monde
,
November 18, 1968, pp. 1 and 4.
25
Le Monde, January 4, 1959, p. 1.
27
Shortly after the Prague invasion, Franco-Soviet cooperation
continued its advance, proceeding from the basis of de Gaulle's visit to
Moscow in June, 1955. By January, 1959, a joint Grande Commission was
established between the two states to deal with economic, technical and
other aspects of cooperation. By early 1959, France ranked as the lar-
gest Western supplier of goods to the USSR. Le Monde, January 5-5,
1969, p. 5.
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PCF fears concerning Ge™an behavior „ere
.ore valid. There
was a stronger basis for fearing that Bonn „ouid no longer sign the
non-proliferation Treaty. Bonn's adherence had been a long-ter™ goal
Of the rrench Co^unists. The invasion, and the subsequent proclamation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, heightened fears in r^^ ,iiLen a t Germany (particularly In
the CDU) of a Soviet action beyond the bloo.^^
ii£S£22^I£L-itOlES^ The international crisis opened a rift
within the Party. Roger Garaudy, a member of the Political Bureau
(P.B.) and director of the CeHr^jLlt^^d^^^^j^^;^^
(CEKM), attacked the Soviet action because it seriously ignored the world
movement. 23 At the other extreme, a te^W^reWu^on^ around
Jeanette Vermeersch-Thorez accepted the Soviet rationale for the inva-
sion. Soon afterward, Vermeersch-Thorez resigned from the leadership;
Garaudy was expelled in 1970.
,f .
^^^^^ello^ Kurt Kiesmger worried about the USSR's assertion
an
Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter authoriz'nTaction agaxnst a former enemy state. He further argued th^^
non-proliferation Treaty had already been violated by SfsovLts rthexr xnyasxon of Czechoslovakia, since the nuclear powers hid Sven a
SemoTr^K? " ''^'^ '°
non-nuclear powers. These guarantees were'
aJLd ?hat ^hf^ r The Social Democrats in Germany
?hfMM . ^oj^ets could never intervene in Germany under cover of
d\\\arVri:"i9L";^ ^--^ --^
^^Le Monde, August 28, 1968, p. 2. The logic of his position
would have ultimately led to a break with the Soviets.
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^ii^^^H^-^teg^J;,^,^
^^^^^^^^^^
generally had „eX.o„ed the original
.Veprohation". (.he first signs of
appreciable change by the French Co^unists towards Moscow since 1920)3
But the PCP.S approval of the later
..pseudo-agreement"
„as viewed as a
retreat. In ef-Fpri- -t-h.^ c • -, •fect, the Socialists were compelling the PCF to choose
either unity of the left or obedience in principle to the USSR: break
strongly and publicly with the USSR or return to the ghetto. Later,
it will be shown that the
.arch toward unity recuperated fro. the
temporary traumas of 1968-69, as long-term factors reasserted them-
selves
.
jjoctrinal questions. Amid the turmoil of those months, it is hard to
isolate any dramatic doctrinal innovations emerging from the Czech
"anifest.de Champi^nv, the Central Committee. s articula-
tion of pemocratie avancee
, followed the Czech invasion by four months,
but it owes its origins more to the Hay-June events than to the August
31invasion.
But there were stirrings. For example, an essay in Nouvelle
Critique, a journal for Party intellectuals, conceded that the entry
of Soviet troops into Prague had cast do.^t on the ability of Socialism
30,
,Le Monde
,
September 7, 1968, p. 1.
31
The iManifesto has more domestic political significance thaninternational. It will be examined further in the nex? chapter.
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to assure Lasic rights to its citizens:^^ a valid polUical insight,
but hardly novel to those familiar with Soviet repression. The
article suggested a crisis in world socialism and spoke of a need to
adapt to a new epoch. New democratic forms were arising which called
for revised theoretical analyses. No conclusions were reached, but
the essay called for further reflection.
More significant than any form.al doctrinal rethinking was a
gradual restructuring of the Communists' self
-identity
, a nationalizing
of the Party's purpose and scope. Surely there was no break with the
USSR. The French Communists continued to accept the decisive role and
historical validity of the Soviet Party in the world movement. But
the infallibility of Soviet authority had disappeared. The CPSU was
only the first among many.
The trauma wrought by Czechoslovakia can perhaps be understood
if one grasps the nature and role of tho Soviet patrie in the eyes of
French Communists. George Lichtheim suggests that historically Commu-
nists fell heir to a revolutionary movement in a non-revolutionary
33
situation. Since there could be no genuine proletarian revolution
in France, this hope was transferred to the USSR as the "fatherland of
32„
A summary of the essay appears in Le Monde, October 4, 1958,
p. 2.
33
George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York:
Columbia Univeristy Press, 1965), pp. 70-71.
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the workers". The SnviV-h rir^-r^r.o iet Union appeared as the embodiment of a revo-
lution which France had missed nrh^„ kHQ , other observers term this "the mis-
placed identity of the PCF" or "the adoption of a myth not its o™".
The point is that events in Pra^e undermined this relationship.^^
The Communists have not resolved the nature of their national
identity. The Party is capable of fully meshing with a national iden-
tity of France, and then reversing. Even after the Czech invasion,
Rene Andrieu could say:
(The PCF) is not a national party. Our doctrineholds that the workers of the entire world are in
solidarity. Even if a nation is a historical
reality, it is for us this powerful solidarity of
all
_ workers in the world, and this solidarity pri-mrily manifests itself in regard to the USSR, theiirst socialist state.
Finally, it must be emphasized, French Communists (like all
other Communists except the Chinese) had traditionally denied an aggres-
sive, war-like intent to Soviet policies. This, a.fter all, stemmed
from the USSR's inherent identity with-and membership in-the so-
called "camp of peace". In fact, much of the PCF's defense doctrine
Jean Daniel, editor of the independent left Le Nouvel Obser-
vateur, holds that the lower ranks of the PCF are far ^e Stalinist '
than the leadership. Whenever the party makes large shifts, certain
cells and federations will resist, and the Soviet myth remains quite
alive. Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage a I'interieur du Parti
communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974), p .'''i2M~.
Ibid.
, p. 44.
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was predicted on a peaceful Soviet Union, a nation which surely posed
no threat to the peace of Europe. This assumption, too, was to be
undermined by the demonstration of raw force in CechoslovaKia. (The
implications of this will be discussed in the chapter on defense
policy , )
CHAPTER V
THE POST-DE GAULLE PERIOD
MgjLlerspectlves and P^_^ nr^r^uj^^^^^^
In the year following Prague, the parties of the Left inevit-
ably grew preoccupied with new circumstances: the reconstitution of the
socialist Party, the PCF's ManiSsted^O^aai^ 3,,^,^^ ^
world Conference of Co^unist Parties in aune
, 1969. By the spring of
that year, the Russians themselves were preoccupied with conflict on
the Sino-Soviet border, an event which heightened the urgency of their
su..ons for a Conference on Security in Europe. Divisions in the French
left over Czechoslovakia receded in significance,^ as far stronger for-
ces were pushing for united action. On April 29th, de Gaulle withdrew
from French political life after 11 years?
Pompidou vi^ ctorlous. The June election of Pompidou was hardly a victory
for the Left. The newly reconstituted Socialist Party, replacing the
replaced 'Subcek™%L^s''^ f ^" 'P"'^' ''''' ^ustav Husak
bu? thfprr J
Socialists urged the Communists to speak outt e PCF refused, arguing that Socialists were only usiL the c^».hissue as a pretext to dismiss the PCF as a poliUcafpartne? Lifjto^dx' April 21, 1969, p. 21 and April 2^, 1969, p 11
2
.
A majority of Frenchmen had voted "non" on de Gaulle'sreferendum for reform. He then renounced hii^andate.
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old SFIO, did poorly. But the Per hCF demonstrated its resurgence fror
the chaotic days of 1968 by gathering 21
candidate, Duclos.^
percent of the vote for its
It will be useful to examine the 1969 ei..^-lection and Pompidou 's
-cto.,
.o aete^i^e t.eir e«e«s on PCP
.e.av.or
developments within the Socialist Party itself „nH. I undergoing a metamor-
phosis in the wake of Defferre's rlef„=t j ^ ,r s defea , and follow the transitions
that led to the Unity Congress of Epinay in June, 1971.
The Soviets themselves, speaking through Pravda, viewed the
^"-leetion^ 3s a defeat for Atlanticist strategy.^ Yet
Socialist''otdL'a?:rL^Son°Lffgi^^iM^ - rejected. The
::c?alS:e^" ?he=L1t^ '^^M^H^^^
.
/. iii ijerx vote was so splmter^ed t-ha-t- -m^^ ~~:disaster. The PCF viewed Defferre's candid^P^
campaign was a
Third Force notions of the Das^ ^hJ f^^^^^^^^ ^ "^^^e to revive old
hands of the Gaullis^s Thl T I ""^^ ""^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ce into the
success but dirrenLr^omLe ?rde r"fl''-"'' "^^^^^"^ °^ ^^1-'icy. He was after
de Gaulle m the realm of foreign pol-
ge^ian War and opened new
"'^^^ liquidated thfaI
May 2, 1969 n ^ ^^.""^
alternatives to Atlanticism. See Le Monde
FrLc^s indep;nd;nt fo'rei" "v"''
'''' '^^'^'^ ^^^^ thiT-^'
new Governmenrhfd I sH^hf f^^^' Pompidou's
Foreign Minister w?th Dfh^- "°-''\'°r' '^^^"^^^^ was named
named'prime Minister ?he PCF^t'oo
^haban-Delmas' being
role in the ForeJ^MinLtrf To"herhe'"''''^"' f Schumann's new'
Force tendencies S tJe M R ^ L 1 ^^P^^^^^^^d the old Third
United St=.t-.. !L ^ earlier era: submission to the
1959! p 7'
rearmament of Germany. See L'Humanite
, June 2.,
4
_
Thus the Europeanist Pohrer (candidate of the Center) was nn.hi.to reinsert France into its old NATO role. See Le Monde June
"
^969
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it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviets had si.ply ordered the
PCF to abstain in the Po.pidou-Pohrer run-off of mid-June, a strategy
which helped assure a Gaullist victory. It has been argued here that
the French Communists, since their origins in the era of Lenin, have
learned (perhaps intuitively, and without Soviet prodding) to conform
their behavior to a worldwide conception of strategy. The leadership
of the French Party, given its hostility to all "Third Force" tendencies,
did not require instructions to see that the immediate danger was that
France might fall back into its Atlantic orbit, undoing much of the
Gaullist legacy. This perception, and the behavior flowing from it,
demonstrate a genuine and objective affinity between the Soviet and
French Communist visions of the international environment
. And the PCF's
abstention did go a long way towards assuring Pompidou 's victory. In
this sense, it was e strong rejection of Atlanticism and a European
orientation for France.
However, there was a fear that the new Pompidou regime would
move in a European direction that would be more receptive to an enlarge-
,ment of EEC or the entry of Britain.^ But these fears were offset
by the fact that the Pompidou Government essentially retained its
5
Communists also feared a rapprochement between Petite Europe
and the U.S. stemming from the new post-de Gaulle leadership. See
Le Monde
,
July 25, 1969, p. 11.
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Gaullist stance vis-a-vis the Soviets Bv thP iQin. ^±«Lb. y e 1970s, one could say
that the USSR and France supported:
.
Similar positions on Indo-China.
.
A European Conference on Security in Europe.
.
Israeli withdrawal from territory acquired
after 1967. x a
.
The new and historic Soviet-West German
relationship of August, 1970.
.
An end to blocs in Europe,
Social_jemocracy prevails_mj3errT^ If the Communists welcomed the
departure of de Gaulle from the Fifth Republic (viewing it as a further
reason for a renewed unity dialogue with the Socialists), they had
almost as much reason to applaud events in Germany. In October, 1969,
four months after Pompidou' s election, Willy Brandt came to power.
This marked the first SPD Government since establishment of the Bonn
Republic. The policies of the CDU had led nowhere, in their analyses,
except to militarization of the regime. Perhaps there would be a
Tournant a Bonn
.
5tIn mid-October, 1970 Pompidou concluded further ties in Moscow
with the USSR.
7
.
This was the Treaty of Cooperation, where the ERG recognized
the World War Il-imposed frontiers of the Oder-Neisse line and 'those be-
tween the two Germanys, and affirmed its renunciation of nuclear weapons.
These, we have seen, were long-term foreign policy outcomes sought by
the French Communists. Of course the PCF wanted Pompidou to go further,
namely to recognize the GDR and to take positive steps to organize a Euro-
pean Security Conference.
L'Humanite
, October 4, 1959, pp., 1 and 3.
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It was hoped that the new Government would quickly sign the
non-Proliferation Treaty, and renounce the "Hallsteln Doctrine-.^
Ten days after Brandt was elected Chancellor (he had just indicated a
readiness to negotiate with the GDR), the PCF issued a joint declara-
tion with the DKP (German Co^unist Party) setting forth co^on views
10on these topics. For the French Communists, the significant step
was the 1969 settlement between the two German states. This was basic
to European security. The Political Bureau (B.P.) welcomed the event -
coming 25 years after the end of the Second World War - which offered
a hope for a new beginning in Europe. It was now logical for France
to display a similar realism and recognize the GDR„ One would also
note that this rapprochement between Willy Brandt and Willy Stoph in
Erfurt had a symbolic significance in that Social Democrats were talking
to Communists, which, after all, is precisely what the PCF was proposing
inside France.
The discussion thus far has described French Communist reaction
to the more significant international events of the 1968 to 1970 period.
Where possible, this behavior has been related to the PCF's links to
9
The Doctrine required the Federal Republic to sever ties withthose states recognizing the GDR (except for the USSR). For the PCF
It was a further manifestation of Bonn ' s fretens ion to represent allGermany.
10G^erman Communists were a mere shell of the pre-war KPD. It
was shown earlier that PCF international policies had supported and co-
operated with Communists in Germany as far back as the years following
World War I. ^ b
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the Soviet Communists and to its dialogue with the Socialists. It
Should now he clear that as an opposition Party, the PCF had very defi-
nite international policy objecxives. Despite their opposition status,
the French Communists were capable of behaving as a formidable politi-
cal actor, invoking leverage where they could.
Next I will examine some newly articulated Communist strategies
for achieving power during this period. While the question may appear
domestic in scope, it has international dimensions:
1) The very advent of Communists to power inside
a ^ Western European state would have interna-
tional siginificance.il
2) Useful comparisons can be made between French
Communist conceptions and those emerging in
other key West European Parties.
Lejfanifeste de Champ_igny. This document of the Central Committee was
issued December 5-6, 1968, a mere four months after Prague and six months
following the May
-June events. Here, the Communists set forth their
program for an "Advanced Democracy", calling for a unity of the left:
an announcement of the Party's readiness to work with all working class
and democratic forces.
11™ •
This was discussed m the sections on the Liberation and on
May, 1968, where it was shown that insurrectionary strategy was rejec-
ted. Later, the international significance of events in Portugal and
Chile will be discussed, in that they affected thinking on the left re-
garding peaceful strategies for achieving and sustaining power.
Ill
telMcee «as not a Mueprint
.or socialise. » „3s
transitional in nature, setting forth an intermediate stage. It did
"Ot i.pl, an end to capitalist o^ership nor to control of the state
by the wording cXass. Kather, it „as designed to change the relation
Of forces between classes and prepare the w.v ^ 12x n ay towards socialism.
In its specific proposals, the manifesto offered little that
was ne. in foreign policy or domestic social programs. That had all
been set forth in the February 2., 19S8, Declat2ticn__
„ith the
FGDS ten months earlier." Apparently May, 1968 had confirmed to the
Co^unists that the class struggle had not been attenuated in advanced
capitalist society. What was lacRing then, and needed now, was a new
and deeper alliance of all forces. The class struggle would follow a
peaceful road. This was only a reaffirmation of the thesis emerging
from the World Conference of 81 Parties in 1960. But the peaceful road
was not just the parliamentary road: it was the class struggle in all
for^short of civil war. Iftiie the Communists ^ged cooperation with
Ji, Februa'ry'vf196"! p!'"'' '° ''""^"^ Committee, L-Humani -
all parti!s'or?h^
reaffirmation of the parliamentary road, embracing
reinec^ f ' "''Santzatlons and trade unions. It pledged
that of the SFIO, which had earlier confirmed its support for a trans-formation to a see ety with a socialist character. In Tiersky's ^dsthe PCF was expanding the base of those it sought to be the tribune of'See his essay "French Communism in 1976", Problems of Communism Tan"-
'
ary-February, 1976, vol. XXV, pp. 38-t5.
~
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all elemencs, they continued to ^"n^is^ nr. •nc. t on their own decisive role a
reaff^tio. of thei. van^a.a position.- rur.^er i.,Uc..ioJof
the new Cha^pigny strategies and the suspicions they generated on the
Democratic Left will be discussed lat.:er
.
If the new program had little to offer in terms of new interna-
tional policy, in what sense did it have international significance?
The important point is that the PCF's embracing of Democrati™cee
was reflected interntionally in the sense that it wI^^^^Z^^T^,,
thinking of other West European Communist Parties, such as the Spanish
CP and the PCI, the latter of which would go on to formulate its Histo-
ric Compromise. Essentially, the new program was a step deriving from
the new logic of the global system and from some reassessment of the
role of the working class and its allies as driving forces in achieving
ime
15
power.
The 1969 World Conference
If there was a new logic to the world global system at the t
of Champigny, one would expect to see it manifested at the World
14
L Humanite
, December 7, 1968, pp , 5 and 6.
15
.
^^^2 ^2 not to suggest a concerted effort in social policy,ihe PCF and PCE, for instance, declared their aim to extend the social-izing of ma]or enterprises. But the PCI's Historic Compromise had no
sucn plans to extend the public sector in Italy. Jean-Pierre Chev§ne-
"lent, Les Socialistes, les Communistes et le s autres (Paris: Aubier
Montaigne, 1977), p. 200. ~
~
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conference of 65 Co^nist Parties held June 6, in Moscow. Unity
did not emerge at this Conference. Nevertheless, the European Co«-
ntst., despite other differences which will be discussed below, did
agree that the era was one in which capitalise
.ight be isolated if
they could somehow extend their own forces to the right and integrate
their parties into the nationalist reality of capitalist. In France,
as we have seen, this would require efforts to open up a democratic
perspective and an alternative government program, hoping to gain power
with a parliamentary majority - including social democrats.
The Soviet Communists were not entirely persuaded by this the-
sis. At the Conference, Brezhnev's speech scored social democracy's
role, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, where it had mort-
gaged itself to anti-communism and Atlanticism. The Soviet leader did
concede, however, that Western Communists should be prepared to lead a
joint struggle with other forces willing to struggle against imperialism.
Another issue at the conference concerned the nature of the
World Movement. The Italians prevailed in that the Conference conceded
that there was indeed no center to the World Movement. The old-style
model of democratic centralism, which once operated globally, no longer
applied to the International relations of parties. Questions of prin-
ciple would not be resolved by votes among various national Communist
Parties. One might say that Communist Parties, in asserting their own
sovereignty, were behaving ™uch in the nature of nation states at any
world foru.. I„ a sense, the „B9 Conference was not enunciating a new
doctrine, rather, it was confirming the new reality of relations then
existing between Communist Parties at the dawn of the 1970s. The fact
that the PCI refused to sign the ^jor document of the Conference, fur-
ther confirmed that the World Movement would, in effect, allow an'inter-
nal opposition. This was the notorious factionalism decried by Lenin.
The PCI reused to submit to the democratic-centralist discipline of
an international body, under the argument that such an international
body no longer existed.
^SJIllJiff^E^nce^^
assessing the relations
of Western European Communist Parties to the Soviets and to interna-
tional questions, one must note certain perceptual and policy differen-
ces between the Western Parties themselves. Here, we are concerned
particularly with the 1959-1970 period.
Although, both the PCF and PCI agreed on a general need for
unity of action, at least where it was possible, the Italian Communists
went on to stress certain persistent differences within what they
term "the international workers movement",. Speaking broadly, it could
be said that in 1969 the PCI manifested a deeper distrust of Soviet
policies and behavior than did the PCF.
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1) ?SSS^I,^^21^iste^. The Italian Co™«„ists did not chal-
lenge this basic Co^unist perspective. I„ fact, thei. lon,-te™ suc-
cess depended on a normalisation of relations between the two blocs
Kather, the PCI feared bipolarity - or the logic of a bipolar concept
Of the world. But there was a fear that a U.S.-Soviet dialogue ™ight
lead to an ultimate bipolarity, which would paralyze the autonomy of
other states (and, by implication, political parties)"
2) l2ter;PH3yjle,latlo^ The PCI in arguing for far greater
autonomy and independence at the World Conference, went so far as to
approve certain of the bold initiatives taken by Czech Communists. In
its view, developments in Czechoslovakia concerned not just that coun-
try, but posed problems of principle to the entire movement. This view
was not openly shared by the PCF.''"'^
3) China. The Sino-Soviet dispute was perceived differently by
Secret.r.. .^^^^Pf^^P^^T^^^ .
°n bipolarity was spelled out by PCI Generalretary Luigi Longo m his speech on the eve of the Moscow ConferenceSee Le^Monde May 29, 1959, p. i. m the 1969-1970 period, the FrenchCommunists did not especially perceive this danger in Peaceful Coexistence.
_i^ater we will see they became quite emphatic that detent^ in noway implied a freezing of the status quo in Europe.
17
M "^I^^.^^^^^h
did not raise the Czech issue at the Moscow meetingGeorge Marchais, now Acting Secretary General (during the illness ofRochet), explained this by noting that 1) the Czechs asked that it not
ot ppi^^"^' ^.
^^^^^ ^°''^d interference in Czech affairs and
<i} PCF participation would emphasize common interests with other parties
not differences. ' '
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the two mass Communist Parties of Europe. The PCF at this stage was
prepared to go along with the Soviet drive to expel China from the
world movement. In fact, French Communists had consistently supported
the Soviet side in the dispute with China. The point is that the PCF
firmly rejected "anti-Sovietism" (although paradoxically, retaining
its own right to criticize aspects of Soviet reality).
The PCI of course rejected the idea that Mao was a new Lenin
and opposed Chinese efforts to split parties of other nations. But it
would not support the expulsion of China from the movement. Rather, it
saw a need to seek out and learn the objective causes of the Chinese
development. Any effort to remove China would only be an excuse for
the Soviets to reinstate the norms and hegemony of the past in inter-
party relations.
Europe. The world conference highlighted certain key concep-
tual differences between the PCF and the Soviets on the one hand, and
the Italian Communists on the other regarding Europe, The Italian
18
Some hold that this support arose from their own irritation
with domestic Maoists operating to their left in the 1960s. But the
argument is not entirely persuasive. The PCI also had a Maoist movement
to contend with, yet it was far more tolerant of Chinese behavior,
Tiersky argiies that the PCF is a beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute,
since it gains international bargaining leverage with the Soviets by
supporting their side. Some argue that the PCF would continue to oppose
the Chinese line even if the Soviets reached a truce. The point is
made by Francois Fejto, who attributes it to a private source (and it
is of course ^highly speculative). See his The French Communist Party
and the Crisis of International Communism, p, 192.
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Co^unists saw
..siealXy progressive aspects to European integration
although they refined critical of EEC domination by capitalist forces
in fact,
.y 1..3, the PCI was now participating in Co^nity decision-
making. The PCI even saw the Co«n Market as a potentially disrup-.
tlve force in weakening the U.S. domination of the Continent?" The
French Co-unists, on the other hand, viewed EEC as a cover for American
interests and cold-war strategy.
Conmm ist-S Relations in
the Post-de Gaulle Period
Having reviewed international essentials of the period following
the departure of de Gaulle, it is now appropriate to return to the dyna-
mic of unity between the two leftist parties in France. Chapter VI will
discuss, the unified Socialist Party, born at the Epinay-sur-Seine Con-
gress in 1971, and explore the Prograrrune^^ which emerges one year
later. Intricacies of the PCF/PS dialogue will be examined only to the
extent that they shed light on shifting international perspectives.
^^^-^^^1^^1^11.1^^^^ Paralleling their unity dialogue
with the Communists, the Socialists were also striving to restructure
19
See Blackmer in Blackmer and Kriegel, pp. .19-21, which has agood discussion of Italian Communist attitudes towards the European
Community.
2 0
.
This latter perception, we will see, places the PCI view of
Europe somewhat closer to French Socialist thinking. The SFIO had gener-
ally viewed an integrated Europe as an important "third force" between
the two superpowers.
118
their own party, gathering together the various federations and clubs
that comprised the democratic left. And the need was compelling indeed,
considering that in the Presidential elections of 1969 they could
muster a mere five percent of the vote. Ultimate Pq .n,uxL r fb emergence as the
major electoral force in France by the mid-1970- win Ky Lilt: 11IJ.U ij/uo W ll be an important
sub-theme, explaining much of the reciprocal behavior of the PCF in
the ensuing years.
In Chapter II it was shown that the PS was the heir of a cer-
tain historical tradition. But not all segments of the Party necessar-
ily agreed on the nature of this legacy. Hence, one must always bear
in mind the heterogeneous currents that flow within the Party (even
after the unity forged at Epinay). It will be helpful to identify
briefly some of the groupings, since they will be referred to in f,a-
ture discussions.
Thierry Pfister suggests three distinct currents that were ulti-
mately grafted on to the old SFIO of Pierre Mauroy and Gaston Defferre?^
The Mitterrand current
. This group combines a radical and
Republican tradition embodied in the clubs of the Convent ion des insti-
tutions republicaines (CIR). It developed largely as a response to
'^"'
"Les Socialistes (Paris: Albin Michel, 1967), pp. 17-20.
Pfister is a journalist with Le Monde and has written widely on the
French Left.
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Gaullism, or what used to be te^ed the GauUist coup d'etat of 1958
and the personalist regime that followed?^
2) TheJ^ERES.a™t. Rallying around Jean-Pierre Chevenement,
Didier Motchane and Alain Go.ez« CERES was once described as a "party'
within a party"?^ In a sense this is apt. in that it defines its o™
doctrines, stages its own meetings, edits its own publications and in
effect operates as a monolithic, lively and dynamic bloc within the PS.
CERES began as a study group of intellectuals during 1966 in the 14th
Arrondissement of Paris. Its influence grew significantly, and it played
pivotal role at the historic Epinay Congress by throwing its support
to Mitterrand?^
CERES remains essentially a Paris-located force, lacking any
real base outside the City, but is is a force to be reckoned with. Its
22
ma:or goal was to establish new institutions with a
'^j;?;5,':°^°^^^^°" °^ justice, but not necessarily to break withcapxtalxsm. Mitterrand's political insight was to conceive a new emer-gmg majority encompassing the entire Left.
23.
All of whom are graduates of ENA.
.
Maurice Duverger, Lettre ouverte aux socialistes (Paris-Editions Alb in Michel, 1975), p. 103.
~
25^
Guy Mollet and Alain Savary had 46 percent of the votes-
Mitterrand and Gaston Defferre had 45 percent. CERES, with 8.5 per-
cent, was thus the balance of power. Thanks to it, Mitterrand ber^ame
.irct Secretary in 1971. Chevenement was placed in chargp of the
Party Program. By the Grenoble Congress of June, 1973, CERES comprised
one-quarter of the P.S. Executive Bureau.
12 0
internatioiial perspective.
„ill be discussed further on. As Pfister
notes, it adheres to a Marxist ideology which often approaches sec-
tarianisn,. Or as Buver.er puts it. "it see.s to reconcile a .auchist^
temperament with a Communist discipline".
Ideologically and strategically, CERES seeks to transcend a
.ere electoral alliance with the Communists. Rather, its basic calling
is to heal the historic rift of Tours: to reunite the working class
movement of France.
3) Current autogestionaire
.
This derives from the tradition of
Proudhon, seeking a decentralized society of worker management, both
in the state and the industrial enterprises. Its roots are in the old
PSU, and today it unites around Michel Rocard and the CFDT labor syndi-
cate
.
The Congress of Issy-les Moulineaux in July, 1969 marked a first
stage in the gradual rebuilding of the Socialist left, even though Mit-
terrand's forces and the other currents described above had not yet
been brought into the Party. Alain Savary was named First Secretary
of the new PS, replacing Mollet's rule of 23 years. Much of the debate
at the time concerned the wisdom of negotiating a unity agreement with
Duverger, Lettre ouverte
, p. 103.
27
„
^^^s is often termed "unity at the base, rather than unity attne top
.
Socialism is impossible in France without this unity thev
maintain. ^
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the Communists.^^
Given these various currents in the French Left, „e can now
return to the Son' ai i c~-t-c- » ^- iLu csociai s s dialogue with thp Ppp =.r,^5 c xLii Lne rLJ: and examine points at
issue between the two parties.
Many of the obstacles to unity during this period arose fro.
domestic politics disagreements. For example, with their Manifeste de
Ch£IBpignZ the Communists had shifted slightly from their earlier elec-
toral and parliamentary strategy, arousing the suspicions of the demo-
cratic left. The Manifeste invoked a new, and sometimes ominous rhe-
toric concerning the struggle of the popular masses, suggesting pos-
sible confrontations against the power of the monopolies. This led
many Socialists to ask if the PCF wanted power inside a genuine coali-
tion, or if it was merely seeking a new relation of forces in its favor
power with others, or power within the Left? And if the latter, power
for what purposes? And there were other ambiguities in the Manifeste.
It stated that subversion and violence by "forces hostile to socialism"
would legitimate forceful countermeasures by the new regime. Unexpres-
sed was any definition of the true rights of a minority under the fu-
ture regime. And what possibilities did such a minority have for re-
28^.
Pierre Mauroy argued it was risky to negotiate with the PCFfrom weakness, when the democratic left was dispersed, especially with
Mitterrand's forces outside the fold. Otheis favored immediate unity
discussions.
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.=ta.Ushi„, UseXf someday as a
.a.o.ity, what activities «ul.
constitute the
-suhversion re.er.ed to. These „ere reaXX, th» oM
questions that always seeded to arise when the "roie^ri^..
invoked, a doctrine the Communists, even todav have, o y, never renounced.
The Socialists, in elaborating their own theory of unity -
Claimed to seek only an alliance of e,uals.« But later, when the
communists hegan to note steady Socialist successes, they would accuse
the PS of seeking hegemony within the alliance.
•«H2SS-!£_^". in October, 1971, the Communists, now under the lea-
dership Of Marchais, issued their J^osamme-l^jouve^^
2i^:H2i£2_P2PUlaire. entitled "C^^ Unlike the Hanifeste,
it offered more possibilities for a dialogue with the PS.
Its foreign policy positions were not a major break with per-
spectives set forth in the 1968 Common Declaration.^" Nevertheless,
1975) B''^9rTh,?T"' iCi*iiijiLi2.^aucAe (Paris: Artheme Favard,
role But dM^h "^"""""^ ^lH^nce strategy was to obtain a' leading
tha?'-;t
"^^'^'^ P^-^t^ss behave any differently? Lazitch argues
Since ?
^^"^ hegemony, but their methods of seeing itLentn considered all alliances temporary. Communists would us!their own methods to weaken their partners : placing their own people inthe camp of their partners (and future enemies) such as Otto GroUe^h"in Germany or Fierlinger in Czechoslovakia. See Branko Lazitch
Mg^-gf:"l9.,Sf^:— .'^"^^''"'"^"^^ ^ <P,ris: Editions
See Chapter III.
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tne.e was e change of e.pKasis. a
.operation i„ certain approaches
Por example, ISes OecXaration caUed
.or an i„edla.e withdrawal
by France from the AtlantnV Par-t i.n,.ct.
'Changerjlej^"
„as softer in tone
It oniy called upon Prance to take steps to disengage from the Pact
One can debate the true significance of a modification such as this.
But in analyzing Co«nist pronouncements, one must attribute some
Significance to even subtle changes in emphasis. The policy remained
the same, but its mode of exDression ^r^. .r.^^p was softened. Other foreign
policy positions, while essentially unchanged, were expressed in a
.ore reasonable manner: France should not break unilaterally with the
common Market, but should strive to revise the Rome Treaty. Regarding
the Middle East, it confirmed Israel's right to exist and recognized
the national rights of all peoples in the region. These were all
positions which at least allowed room for negotiation with the PS,
which was itself undergoing a major transformation in the latter part
of 1971.
Th^ongress of Unity at Epinayj_Jun^2iZl. fpinay marked a major
turning point for the Democratic Left. Here, Mitterrand emerged as
leader of the new PS, combining the forces of the CIR, CERES and other
left currents, and narrowly overcoming the old Mollet-Savary majority.
Equally important, the Congress called for a Program of Government
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with the PCF, a basic goal of Mitterrand sinee 1965.^1
Eplnay was not a forum for enunciating new foreign policy
initiatives, nevertheless, various perspectives did e.erge.^^ Contention
arose over the Atlantic Alliance: whether Prance should stay in it
withdraw unilaterally, or work for the simultaneous dissolution of
both blocs.
Mitterrand supported a mainstream position (along with the
Savary leadership and Guy Mollet as well as Mauroy and Defferre),
urging the simultaneous dissolution of the two military blocs in Europe
To withdraw alone implied neutralism, which was unthinkable, since it
would leave France without any defense policy at all. CERES, and a
strong current within CIR, urged a unilateral withdrawal, assuming a
breakdown of future European security talks. (This was also the
31-
to Q •
P^''!^ oriented the Party strongly to the left: committing
Ms infusion ^ '"f ' ""'^'"^ ^y"^-- Mitterrand ani
^ed ^h. f ""1 °f ^""^y' "^"y °f ^hom were radical-by t e upheavals of May, 1958. Frank Wilson argues that on someissues It r^oved even further to the left than the p!f: autoges^ionunionization of the military and a renewed anticlericalii^^^'in-
soc^TT ^ resolution was narrowly defeated condemningocial democracy and calling on the PS to withdraw from the Socialist
K^"
'
"The French Left u_nder the Fifth Republic"3 ! P^P^: ^^""^^^ ^ the "Two Decades— Gaullism" Co-^^n'e,SUNY Brockport, N.Y., June 9-11, 1978, p. 24
„
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Thus certain ritualistic postions of the left were voicedFirst Secretary Savary scored French foreign policy, citing the "con-
cealed war in Chad" as well as Government tolerance towards FrancoSpam, Portugal, South Africa and the Greek Colonels. See Le Monde
June 13-14, p. 6. '
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position the Communists). But the pfrfq« CERES proposal was defeated- a
prior collective security agreement in Europe was a h-.-r^uro condition precedent
to any withdrawal from the Alliance CERFS m^- . .d . LL E ultimately abandoned its
unilateral position.
Regarding Europe, there was no consensus, but all factions
agreed that certain guarantees were needed if the powers of the
Community were to be broadened.
As a result of Epinay, the path was now clear for a progra^atic
confrontation with the PCF. Nevertheless, Mitterrand chose th
sion to define the limits to the field of negotiations, stating "
ne changerons pas de camp "
.
The 1969 Referendum on Europe
Between Epinay and the signing of the Programme commun a year
later, there arose an important test of PCF-PS ability to work together
toward common purposes in foreign policy, despite allegiances to rival
33
J"^
'^^ging a rejection of blocs and alliances, the PS was nowin a position where it had to conceive a new defense policy for Franceand resolve the issue of nuclear weapons. At this stage the new Par^vhad not yet begun to consider such issues.
^""^^P?^^^' P- 379. This was the dilemma regarding any recon-ciliation of international positions by the two parties: Lirultimate identifications with the different camps of East and West.
IS occa-
g "Nous
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ca.ps. The test ca.e fro™ Pompidou. The Gove^ent had. of course
not overlooked these debates on the left regarding Europe and dlf-
'
ferences with the Co-unlsts. Thus Po.pldou was able to place the t«o
parties in contention by announcing a Referendim nn r^ ^ r u o Europe m March of
1972
Both leftist parties opposed the Referendum since it amounted
to a vote-of-confidence for the regime. Yet the PS leadership essen-
tially supported EEC and could not vote 'W'. Hence they called for
ahstention.3^ After all, EEC had been formed years ago; why vote on
it now? The Communists on the other hand, decided on a "Non"-vote.
Abstention was hardly a rebuff to the Pompidou Government. It was
insufficient because it indicated indifference to the masses of people
on what, really was a plebiscite. How could the masses be neutral on
what they were struggling against?^^ Thus .the Referendum became not only
35
thpr. I
."^ "^""^^ expansion of EEC, British membership, and fur-
mLe ^h^H ^?^^^d^^i"t-g^^tion. Many viewed it as a device to under-ine t e delicate PCF-PS negotiations then underway: a domestic poS-
InTtilt™ "'^'"^ ^^'^^^ ^ S--- f--^ policy
35_
.
Socialist Party of this period had almost a generation
fJP
thinking over the issue of Europe. The old veterans of theSFIO from the days of Mollet considered the Treaty of Rome as one of
llrl""/IrT^l^ ^""^^^^^ achievements. The new generation sus-pected EEC of giving free-play to the penetration of Europe by American
corporations. For them, any action on Europe had to be linked to thecontent of the undertaking. They would not yield their options merelyto build Europe. ^
p. 7.
37„
J: or a summary of these views, see Le Monde
,
March 29, 1972,
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a stu^Iin, between the two parties in their ais=u..io„s towards
a Co_on Program, but it beca.e a sy^olic test of strength as well.^S
A full discussion of Co.unist and Socialist attitudes towards
Europe will appear in Chapter VIII. nevertheless, these debates durin,
the post-Epinay period are instructive. They highlight the very dif-
ferent perspectives through which the two parties arrived at political
decisions. And to .any, these debates raised the question: could the
two parties ever hope to govern jointly. There were two separate, but
related, issues raised by the Referendum:
.
Entry of Britain to EEC.
.
Expansion of EEC powers (the issues of French
sovereignty)
.
The Communists advanced four objections to Britain's entry:
Sj^cions of the reformist Lahonr P..^. The PCF was naturally
sceptical regarding arguments that the Left would be strengthened some-
how if
-the power of the Party of Harold Wilson" joined EEC. Marchais
3 8
^
P°f"^ is that both parties feared any attempt by theother to monopolize the terrain on the Left. Thus Mitterrand had fromtxme-to-time said openly that he sought a new equilibrium on the Leftto demonstrate that Socialists could reconquer a large share of theaudience in France. And the Communists would soon begin posing' thesame question: were their potential alliance partners seeking to gainpower jointly, or were they seeking to demonstrate their own dominancein an intra-left rivalry? Some of these issues are addressed by the
socialist Claude Estier. See Le Monde
,
April 1, 1972, p. 5.
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insisted tnat entrv o-F •
35
^ reinforce the Atlantic
MXiance. The POP „as p.ep„ea to cooperate „ith Socialists in Prance
(Who ha. heen essentially ra.icali.ea in recent
.ears,. Bnt t^::;:::.
-t social democracy e^odied in the Labour Party „as another matter;
It remained deeply suspect.
2' Britain_a^^^^con^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
certain non-.onopoly sectors of Trench industry to disappear, creating
une.ploy.ent and dislocations in Prance. P.rther„re. Britai„.s pres-
ence would Place demands on European agricultural producers to lower
their prices. This would harm French farmers.
3' IhS.^P2£S£^L^OHE2PS»i5^ Entry Of Britain into EEC was a
prelude to an integrated defense system, integrated nuclear weapons and
possibly even a sharing of weapons with the FRG. In Communist eyes it
was not far-fetched to think that closer economic and political ties by
Britalr^ to the Continent would ultimately draw that nation closer to
i?y the si-caned ' '
''"^ distrusted the Anglo-Saxon a.ffin-r n o call "special relationship" with the [J S
Tp^rtiaT^r^r^ '^^'^^'^ acc^pt^^StSh e;t;y n' ILTsTTs
mil i '° P°^^^ °^ Germany. See Roy Macridis
'.^^^^^.^^^.^ (Englewood Clik, N.. . /p.enSce^^n
,
Onlv theT^Rpf^
unrealistic to expect the PS to share this hostility.y e CE ES faction was hostile to British reformism.
L' Human ite
, April 4, 1972, p. 5.
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Europe in rhe realm of defense.
^^^^^^^^£j:^^^g^i^g£^^ernocracV . The dP n n— y- I e Gaulle Constitution restric-
ted the prerogatives of parliament and periodical i .ciiiu lly made direct, plebis
citary appeals to the public Pn^ +. But to the Communists, these were pseudo
appeals to the general winll. The communists, claiming a more Jacobin
inheritance, saw themselves as defender^^ of th. r k. •renaero e Republican representa-
awa.
..o.
.a3o. decisions o. state.
.Ve..e.„«
.
Of re,Ut.a«o... Since t.e regime a.so
.ept
.ts citizens aioo. ^o™
the state, xt „as a caricature of democracy to offer the™ a periodic
-ght to re.pond on national policy questions, such as entry of Britain
"here they lacked any
.cans to be genuinely informed. ^'^
Despite their abstention on the Referendum, the Socialists did
42
cited a Br
See L'Human ite, April 19 1979 n q ,u
itislTGBlJiF^^nt Lite PanPr,,; • '
^""^
tion. In Germany, Fr.nz-Soseph Str^nl f
'"'^ '^^"^
^°°P^^^-
of nuclear effort by Britain and u^''° ^^^^^ ^ P°°li^g
the Bundeswehr with nuclear we.non''* ^ave provided
that-ThTp^Idou Lveriment was cov't? ^'^"^ "^^^ f^-^
^iLH]£!!£2ite, April
_
ver ly promoting a new EDC. See
31, 1972''p!'2'"
'''''' '° '^"'"^^ Committee, in I^Humanite
, March
PoliticsrFl'ncelL's"o1°\?t^le'r' ''~y^ "-^Y Ehrmann,_jnce ^Bo ton. Little Brown and Co., 1968), pp. g-.u and
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not share these perspectives Ac,P x . s early as 1968 they had observed
Britain's retrenchment, its revised world role .nHia , a d even a loosening of
the historieauy
.lose ties to the U.S.: a shiftin, towards Europe
Th.s. in fact, had led the democratic left in Prance to oppose de
Gaulle's earlier rejections of Britain. Socialist opinion in Prance
.hcreasingly felt that the old London-Washington Axis, based on a
Shared political outloo.. military policy and financial viewpoint, „as
weakening. Perhaps the U.S. had at one time granted Britain a certain
privileged position in exchange for its political support, as well as
its bases and protection throughout the Co-onwealth. But a shrinking
Empire and a weakening of the Pound had undermined Britain's value to
the U.S.'^^
^^^^-i^^^i2I^^l^£^^ The Referendum to broaden EEC was being
proposed by a Gaullist Government. But as Debre reminded everyone,
Gaullists had always been true to French sovereignty, opposing delega-
tions of authority belonging to national governments.^^ They had always
insisted on the strict operation of the unanimity principle in suprana-
tional institutions. Europe would continue to be based on governmental
45
pp. 1 and 2!^
^^"^ Dabernat's essay in Le Monde, January 14-15, 1958,
45
suDranat.•n^.^''^'
^^"^^'^ P^^^S^^ ^^^^ of itsp anational essence, compelling his allies to renounce the rule ofm^ority voting in the Council of Ministers. See Le Monde, April 14
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agreement wherever vital questions were at issue. Thus the Po.pidou
leadership hardly needed lessons in Gaullism fro. the Communists.
But these Gaullist arguments were not sufficiently reassuring
to the Communists for two reasons:
1) National independence had always been a rallying cry of the
Communists in the post-war years. Reading ?CF rhetoric on the topic,
it often seemed exaggerated and demagogic. As an opposition Party,
they are not the policy-makers of France (and they are a Party whose
own independence had often been questioned in the past).^^ But in
1972 they had a genuine stake in the question. Now they saw a possible
deliverance
.from their traditional opposition status, a chance to be
projected into a Governmental role. As potential policymakers, they
would have to champion national independence. An isolated leftist
Government, operating in a supranational' European regional body, would
require full sovereignty to enact the transformations the Left had in
M-8
mind for France. Thus a broadened EEC posed a potential threat to
47
Of course they were often the derivative beneficiaries of
(^ullist assertions of national independence, as in the withdrawal from
NATO in 1955.
48
The 14-member Commission in Brussels operates with suprana-
tional powers, representing the Community interest and animating the
integration process. Far more powerful is the Council of Ministers,
where unanimity is still the rule. Its ultimate approval is required
in decision making. But the Commission retains a policy-initiating
role and strong inputs in implementation. See Leon N. Lindberg and
Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in
the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prent ice -Hall
,
1970),
pp. 82-98.
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their social program for France. ^9
2) By 1972, the PCF was beginning to feel, pe.hep. with a touch
Of paranoia, that a strong Europe (and an enlarged EEC, was a device or
a political maneuver to weaken the large Co^unist Parties of Europe. =°
By 1972, socialists, too, were manifesting disench.ant^ent regard-
mg EEC. A maiorltv felt tha+- -i-k^ nJ i y r that the Common Market was unfulfilled. It
had not served as a counterweight to the domination of U.S. capitalism
Which many had hoped for. Merely to enlarge it into a vast
.one of free
exchange would serve little purpose: A majority agreed with the PCF
on one point: any future Government of the Left would have to retain
49
the effectJ':f'siptL?L"Siror^;m::?rso!:t""^" '-^^^ investigated
^renceJ4:\^:L"rd°-p-:dLla^hI; Z-
s :jf^i:-r -^-^^^^
in Moderr?api?StL Thfr^ -"'T"^'' policy..." See his discussion
f--fTT I M
Changing Balance of Public .nH Pr^...... p^^er(Oxford. Oxford University P^^iiirTOTsTTyar ticularly op. 133-134.
.
. ,
spokesman Roland Leroy spelled out the argument ina special essay for Le Monde : that the designs of the Cen^rSs (suc^as Jean Lecanuet and Duhamel) as well as the U.D.R. were to seek asupranational Europe in the hope of "reducing the innuence or^helarge^Communist Parties". See that newspaper, Aprl 2" 1972 p 8Tnis IS not the conventional objection to EEC.' Usually 'co«is;s ;ttackxt on economic grounds: as threatening Europe and its workinrclass or
:^J™ur\r;ro1uc^ ^--^^^— -Lp
in Ee Monir!agr;l2;1f^^"^°^^^:/g ^ '^'^
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freedom of maneuver in rRr^r^.r^r. ^carrying out xts social planning and national-
-tions „i.M„ a H.opean eo«nit.. P.r.aps certain pc„e..
.ig,,
delegate, to a Kuropea„-„ide political autnorit.. To. example tHe
European Parlia„,ent might be broadened with perhans , • ,
'
P =^nap > legislative powers
to control the Community budget Bni- = r *y D a . ut any Left Government would be
foolish to denv it^^if +k .y sel the possibility of extending the pubULie sector,
s were
I^^-^Wt::-^. Shortly before the Referendum, the Communist
able to bolster their campaign for a
-no" vote by adroitly revealin
(and distorting) the "Hansholt letter-, an internal EEC document sug-
gesting that future policies! of th= rcies the Community would have to envision
reduced consumption levels in Europe." As Marchais described it. this
was tangible evidence that EEC would lead to an international order
"here the consumption levels and the well-being of people would be
lowered, a "Europe of misery and regressive economic development", as
well as lowered population levels. This was the Malthuslan solution
implied by Pompidou-s £etit^Jur2,e_de^ts^
^^^^^^^
"as to rally as much discontent as possible around a "no" vote. After
all. there were important negotiations coming up with the Socialists
inj few weeks on the Programme commun, and the Communists wanted to
policies would hat to ' ' ',n' ="88^=*'='' ^^at future Commissionui ave incorporate "limits to growth" solutions thai-had recently been popularized by the MIT-Club S Rome study ?hL wasbefore the energy crisis of 197H, but it did call for a reduced oonsump-
"
9 pp "^randT"'' °° ' -^1- ' P" " .
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de^cstrate as much electoral force as possible In fact th •f j-uA.^. i r , eir exploi-
tation of the memo was patently tar^nV-,! . a ^P . ctical and demagogic, and one could
hardly consider it a sincere reflection of their international policy
-garding energy and consumption policies. Communist Parties in oppos-
ition will normally reject austerity programs. Once in power, they
will, of course, restrict consumption to serve any purpose they have in
n.ind, as has so often happened in the East Bloc countries.
Results of the Referendum were an^iguous, allowing all sides to
claim victory. The government could point to a "Oui" vote of 68 percent
Representing 38 percent of the eligible voters). On the other hand, the
number of abstentions and blanks were the highest ever recorded in a
French election, prompting Duverger to term it a victory for the
Socialists. ^3 Communists described it as a defeat for Pompidou's
Europe, since only 38 percent of the French electorate were authorizing
an enlarged Common Market, which was less- than Pompidou's mandate in the
Presidential elections. The "Non" vote was 32 percent (17 percent of
the eligibles). On the other hand, one could not term all of the "Non-
votes as votes for the PCF.^^
With the bickering over and the Referendum behind them, the PCF
53,
Le Monde
,
April 27, 1972, p. 1.
54
See Alain Duhamel's analysis in Le Monde
,
April 25, 1972, p. 9,
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and PS were now free to renew th^i^ ^ • ,exr dxalogue on the historic progr«
SSjmxm. Perhaps the lesson was that thp r. •e regime could be opposed succe
fully, but only if there was unity of action.
CHAPTER VI
LE PROGRAMME COMMUN
It has
.een sal.
.Hat the Co.™o„ Pro^ra. proM.e. American ah.n-
dance, Scandinavian esalitari ^nn crn, c •cgdix Laria ism, Soviet pni i ^^^-h-t •
, collectivism and Rousseauian
-^ocrae,.
.33p.te the
.roaa appea. to a.X
.en, ,t „„t a...es.
two
.nternationa. reaUt.es that „o..a he „eh concern to
.overn.nt.
m the 1970s: the world energy crisis and th.gy e recession/inflation syn-
drome of the industrial Westo
Nevertheless, it was a Key document. 1„ Co™unlst eyes, the
strategy of the Co„on Progra™ was the logical corollary of the "peace-
ful coexistence- doctrine. Under the conditions of that era, the work-
ing Classes could now achieve potential majorities in parliament, trans-
form the state from a tool serving the class interests of the hourgeoisle
.nto an instrument serving the wording people.^ Many non-Communists had
had doubts about the genuineness of the PCF's commitment to such a
doctrine: Could such a historically authoritarian and revolutionary
movement pursue a democratic road to power? The far Left had doubts as
well: the very act o f seeking power in the bourgeois state confirmed
Fayolle.'iglalT""'' ^ """"^
2
Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 274-275
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that the PCF was opting for reformism over revolution - much as the
SFIO had done in 1905.
I2£li£3^alliar^ The Common Program was hardly the first historical
attempt by Communists and Socialists to form an alliance directed at
governing. 3 One may reasonably assume that the Frw^^opulalre and
Liberation would continue to haunt the negotiators of 1972. There was,
after all, a deep hostility between the two parties. In the view of
the Comn^unists: social democracy, wherever in power, was incapable of
genuine systemic changes. The social democracies of Austria, Sweden
or Harold Wilson's Britain were hopelessly reformist. While there
were improved aspects of national life, the villain, monopoly capital-
ism, remained untouched.
Furthermore, European social democracies were anti-Communist,
and had, since the end of World War II, essentially siobordinated their
policies to the U.S. In fact, before and after the war, social democ-
ratic international policies were at odds with the Communist line.
.
The non-interventionist SFIO refused aid to
Spanish Republicans.
.
The SFIO supported Munich. The PCF backed
the Hitler-Stalin Pact„
3
For the first time since Tours the two parties recognized a
reciprocal existence. Earlier pacts sought to unite the two into an
organic unity. See Bournazel, p. 82. CERES, incidentally, never
accepted the finality of the split at Toxros. The left must surmount
its differences if it is to ever incarnate the national will.
Chevenement, p. 19.
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rne PCF at the start of World War II.
.
A
_ Socialist Prime Minister expelled PCF
ministers from the Government in 1947.
.
French Socialists joined with the BritishConservatives and Israelis in the war againstEgypt m 1955.
as Gaulle's new Government in 1959.
More currently, the Socialist International was perceived as a
MensheviK axis of Bruno KreisRy, Olof Pal„e and Golda Meir, all domina-
ted by the SPD in Bonn. These Social Democrats were designing a supra-
national Europe: a device to defeat the ^ss Communist Parties of the
Continent. They would work to block any alliance of Social Democrats
and Communists, whether in France, or later in Spain and Portugal.
Socialist suspicions. The Socialists cited an equally long
catalogue of Communist misdeeds and crimes, dating back to Tours and the
period reviewed in Chapter 1. Within more recent memory, there had been
the destruction by Stalin of Socialist Parties in Eastern Europe.
Fueling the hostility was the Communist's "vanguard" argument: the per-
sistent pretense of serving as the ultimate interpreter and guiding
force of France's destiny. The undemocratic implications of such a doc-
trine were clear. Might they not someday pose a threat to the PS in
France?
13 9
The Programme co,un was not designed to resolve these historic
incompatibilities, but to transoend suspicions stewing fro™ the™. As
Pierre Hassner noted, the left could reach power in a Sociallst-Co.^u-
nist alliance "only to the extent that the former would go beyond social
democracy and the latter beyond Stalinism".^ I„ elaborating the Pro-
ran,, both parties had to transcend their extremes. Once signed, the
agreement continued to define the left's position until the breakdo»>
Of talks to update it in Septeinber, 1977.
The document nowhere speaks of socialism, although the PS termed
the 1972 Programme commun as the beginning of socialism (a view rejected
by the PCF). Thus the two parties at the outset had a key interpretive
difference.
In spite of these differences, the Program did anticipate a
Government by the left. It invoked the device of a legislative con-
tract: if it won, the Government was pledged to carry out the program.
_\e Monde, August 17-18, 1975, p. 5. A similar point was madeby Maurice Duverger. The alliance permitted the Communists to re-
strain the Socialists from becoming managers of a less harsh capitalism
while the "Socialists restrained the Communists from sliding into a
class dictatorship (such as that of their Soviet friends)". Lettre
ouverte aux socialistes, p. 12. *
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Virtually axl left
.o™,i„„3 (e.cept PSU and the fa. left) aahe.ed.=
During the 1972 discussions, the PS was the „eaKer negotiator
Having Just elected new leadership, it „as husy carrying out the reno-
vations Of Epinay. CERES was prodding the Party closer to PCF posi-
tions, ^us the Socialists probably ^de the ™a:or concessions/ But
by 197.. the Socialists emerged as the strongest party on the left.
«ith demonstrable electoral strength, they now challenged the post-war
PCF dominance of the left.' CERES would soon be edged to the sidelines,
and the PS could now resist concessions it .ight have negotiated earlier'
reflects'j':e5:c;io;if"t^re"°\^'' '^""^'^ "^^^^ =^^-"1^
=^ ^iP^^P^^-^sJ^^'^r:'^^^ it
-ti jn, ^^p^^:ir=^,
Western ITiLIZ T/^""
language that would keep France out of the
tZ fZ "^l^^'l'"^ ^""^ ^ statement to the effect that France would reiect
slstlgron ? ''P' -
sot neither. In fact, the PS prevailed, in"
its arfenal in'^^f'c '"T' ^1"—xLt> d s i m its urrent state.
7
p ,
Program result reversed the electoral pattern
.1t:e:n'S32\^nd"l93". " '"^'^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
_
^Marchais confirms this point. By the mid-1970s, thp PCF wascomplaining that Socialist strategy was to strengthen it^ position atCommunist expense. Having done this, they "then took their distance
fvTh 99 rr^"
See George Marcha is , "Forward to the Lines set
1978 5
^"'"^''^^
' ^^P°^^ ^he Central Committee, April 26-28
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In a broader context the^uiiLe x, Common Program
diaxo^e
.ejected a new n,oo. i„ Europe, a tha„i„, of positions inter-
national!,. It i. interesting to note t.at t.e tai.s
.et„een SoeiaXists
a.d Co„unists in Prance were occurring at the very sa.e ti^e that the
Socxal Democrats of West Ce»any were tailing to the Co^nists of the
GDR. People sensed a .ove^ent in positions that had been glacially
frozen for twenty-five years. Discussions towards the ,oint orogra. in
France began in Decoder, 1970. But differences persisted on inter-
national issues such as French sovereignty and national independence,
echoing earlier disagreements of the 1968 period.
Socialists afflrn,ed a commitment to national independence, but
also favored participation in a European Community. Independence was
compatible with partial surrenders of sovereignty (if freely agreed to
by a majority). The current generation of Socialists had lived through
a nationalism that had torn Europe apart during the Century. A new
Europe could bury that nationalism. And. a united European economy
might better resist foreign penetrations on the Continent.'
The PCF, too, affirmed loyalty to internationalism, but the
proletarian variety. Their priority was national independence. EEC
was a monopolist enterprise; it would create regional dislocations
within France; it was an economic weapon against the Socialist bloc.
9
For a summary of Socialist views before the signing seeLe Monde
, December 2H
,
1970, p. 10
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nation of large business interests.
Both parties favored the simultaneous dissolution of hlocs in
-rope an. a European Security Conference. Xhe POP „ent even further
and tried to hoi. out for outright withdrawal fro. the
.lUanoe
.
mainstream of the Socialist Part., hr.
10
^
however, rejected such a unilateral
step.
The document that emerged from the negotiations in the Spring,
1972, was inevitably a compromise, with some differences resolved
others unresolved. Common Program lan^age masked ^ny real foreign
policy differences between the Parties, with both sides retreating from
long-held positions. For instance, the Program softened the basic ^in-
stream Socialist commitment to the Alliance, Europe and a pro-Israeli
posture. At the same time, it glossed over the essential anti-Ameri-
canism of the Communists.
14-3
EEC. This was a sensitive issue. The PCF always saw it as a class
alliance (and one endangering French independence). The Cc.on Progra.
ccMtted hoth parties to a policy of participation in the Co^nity
yet preserving their freedo. of action to carry out programs they dee.ed
valid. France under a Left Government would help build EEC, yet work
to free it fro. capitalist interests by democratizing its institutions.
Thus a France inside the EEC would retain its freedom of action to
realize its radical, political, economic and social program. Such a
Left Government would invoke all of the safeguards provided by the
Treaty of Rome. It would be free to define and extend the public sec-
tor in France, apply its own credit policies and institute its own
system of planning. The French Government would continue to be respon-
sible to its own National Assembly.
Despite the language of the text, each Party retained its own
interpretations. Mitterrand, for exam.ple, went further in his elabora-
tion of the Socialist Party Program, stressing that the European choice
of the PS was primordial: that there was an intimate link between the
European Construction and the advent of socialism in France. The Commu-
^^^^'^ Programme pour un gouvernement democratique d' union populaire
did not go that far. While it recognized some changed international
realities, and conceeded that modern economies require cooperation at
the level of production, such a closed economic bloc as EEC distorted
Programme commun
,
Flarrarrion, p. 115.
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th.s
.e,ui.e.e„t and Blocked genuine Internationa, cooperation. The
PCP invoke, its rhetorio o. national independence and soverei^ty: iar.
scale capitalist should not expand on the prerogatives of the Trench
^
nat.on. This sort of ian^age is ,uite at odds with the PS view that
socialist cannot be hased on an outdated nationalise. Co™,.ists would
not support a ..Europe" designed to extricate capitalist frot its crisis
Supranationality by nature deprives a government of freedot of action
to effect its program.
The Program states that a Government of the Left will be re-
sponsible for its European actions before the French National Assembly.
Both parties agreed (and the Program stated) that changes would be pro-
posed in the Treaty of Rome to democratize the economic and social
bodies. This called for a more equitable representation of trade union
representatives on the EEC body.^^
It called for general, complete, controlled disarmament.
But the wording was general, without violating basic principles of either
Party. As a distant objective, nuclear weapons would be renounced by
France. France would immediately halt building new weapons and stop
nuclear tests. While awaiting a world agreement on nuclear weapons,
France's force de frappe would not be destroyed, but maintained in its
12^, .
Ibid.
, P. 116.
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current state (maintem^^i^^
The nuclear weapons clause marked a PPF n^r.iiidij^ea tL concession. At this
point, (1972), Communists had been callina f^ g for a unilateral renuncia-
tion u„«x othe. nations
.oine. In. m .His sense, tHe socieXist view
the Communists reversed: in true fenn-;.^ 4rm Gaullist fashion, they would hold that
such weapons were the essence of national independence.
This would be stricly national. Tactical nuclear
weapons would remain on French territory. Their use would be a national
(and Presidential) decision. The tous_a^ strategy would be main-
tained, with France defending against all aggressors. The Gaullist
policy of non-integration into NATO would continue.
liH£^P££2_^^£]Elty
.
Although Communists
.identify with the world forces
of socialism, they do view France as outside the two cam.ps. The PS has
never made that leap. They still see France as fundamentally within
the Western camp. The Communists failed to negotiate a clause calling
^.
"^ainstream Socialists and left Radicals would not favor des-truction of nuclear weapons. As opposition party people, they mLh^
B^t L'n ''rf • "'"^"^ pledged unilate;al disarmamentu he never acted on the pledge. ^uieuL.
14
, ^
The PCF urged that the entire mission of the army be limitedto territorial defense. Mitterrand rejected this
146
for outright withdrawal, ^^The ioinr3 x t Program did call for the simulta-
neous dissolution o. the Warsaw and Atlantic Mii^nees. i.
.3.ed .or
a European Security Conference, proposing that the U.S. and Canada
join m as two Atlantic powers.
The Left Program was also calling for a na.r.'.iu r p rtial disengagement
in Europe, particularly central Europe, as well as the d • •f , ::, designation of
nuclear-free zones of Europe.
in other
„or.d,s France would practice an independent policy out-
side Of all
.ilitany Mocs. Neither of the t«o European alliances
oould serve as pretexts for intervention hy any state in the internal
affairs of another (a reference to Soviet action in Czechoslovakia)
for a U.S. withdrawal fro™ Vietnam, and a peaceful settlement of that
were set forth. Support was given to the QN decision of Nove*er 22,
1967. on Israeli withdrawal." Regarding other questions, it urged that
both German states enter the UN T-h r^=,n^^ui uiN. it called upon France to establish
non-aggre"l\^:rl?i:s\\rid"tL=\::d~ "^^^^^^ ^'^'^^
that thp ptr.''^
compromise phraseology that led many to arguee Programme commun was vague and ultimately unworkable Mi^Lr-rand sympathized with the Israelis, the PCF with the Arabs
147
ties with the GDR and to recognize North Vietna. c.„hvx r m, Cambodia and North
Korea. Nothing was said about China.
Failure of the Common o^ram
Thierr, Poster holds that the hrea.do™ in the Program five
years iater had iittXe to do „ith disputes over 30ciai poHoy or the
extent of nationalizations Rathor, i,. her, he argues, the PCF abandoned the
negotiations because it did not obtain fro™ its coalition partners the
positions Of power and the institutional „tees it was claiming in
various ministries.''"'^
Most important of all, were Communist fears of a new equili-
brium on the left. During the original 1972 negotiations, the P.S.,
having just elected new leadership, was weak relative to the PCF.
'
CERES was pushing the PS towards many PCF positions. Hence, it was the
PS Which made the Key concessions in the document. But five years later,
at the breakdown, the situation had reversed. The PS wa. now demon-
strating voting strength, CERES had been edged to the sidelines. The
PS could now resist concessions.^^
This conforms to the PCF vi^w that the purpose of the PS in
17^
Le Monde
,
December 23, 1977, p. lo.
18.
82 r.-.^-./r r
^"^,^^^61, Les Communistes (Paris: Seuil, 1968), pp. 81-82. CD Led by Frank Wilson, The French Left Under the Fifth Republicissued at the SUNY Brockport~onference
. 5^^7-39 ,
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signing the Common Program in the fir.=t „ig s place was to strengthen its
foroe to the detriment of the Communists. Each
.ide in the negotia-
tions had suspected the other of hegemonism. As far hacK as the PS
congress of Unity at Epinay in 1971 Mitterrand had remarked that the
socialist had to he the most representative Party of the Left, that
they had to regain terrain lost to the PCF and other parties. This
kind of language confirmed PCF suspicions that the PS had signed the
agreement to seek gains at Communist expense, to challenge the Commu-
nist's vanguard role.
In entering into the Comn^on Program, the PS had to justify its
behavior on an international lev.l. it too was a .ember of a world
movement: it had friends and allies in the Socialist International.
For example, Mitterrand told the Twelfth Congress of the Socialist
International immediately after he signed the Common Program:
Our fundamental goal is to rebuild a huge
Socialist Party on the terrain occupied by thePCF
... that IS the reason for the agreement.!^
This is a most significant remark, uttered in Vienna before the
Socialist International, at a gathering where were assembled Harold
Wilson, Pietro Nenni and others. Mitterrand noted that for three
decades
.Socialists had appeared less powerful than the Communists. Now
it was vital for the Socialists to rediscover their authenticity be.tore
19
Le Monde
,
June 30, 1972, p. 5,
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the people and build a great Party in France, "Of the five
.iuion
can vote Socialist", he added.'
Communist voters, three million c;„„,„,._ 20
Not only did the Pirst Secretary
.eveal his domestic strategy
but he told the delegates (and enraged the PCF) that a Government of
Left unity would see. to strengthen the Common Market and would remain
a faithful ally of the United States.
Nevertheless, l.S. Conference delegates were still sceptical of
the Mitterrand strategy. An Austrian Socialist expressed fear of PCF
domination of the alliance. A German representative noted that such
an alliance would never be possible in his country. =1 The following day,
the PCF registered its "astonishment" that Mitterrand could make such
'
remarks the day after putting his signature to the Common Program.
«
The elections of October, 1974 produced large gains for the
Socialists and setbacks for -tho vrr tv,,- ^- , .LUdCK r the PCF. This confirmed Mitterrand's ploy
bater, at an l.S. meeting in Elsinor in 1975, Mitterrandconfided to Helmut Schmidt, "We do not say our union i a ha^y onewe say it is the only means of reducing the Communist Party ?o'a
'
marginal role". Bournazel, p. 83. ^y
l
^he Monde, June 30, 1972, p. 5. This was of course prudentUnder Lenin's dicta. Communists consider all alliances temporary,
socialists
_ were always wary of Communist actions against SocialDemocrats m Eastern Europe.
Le Monde
,
July 1, 1972, p. 9.
150
and unleashed a nine-.onth controversy between the two.^^
.gain the
PS was Charged with seeding a re-e,uilihniu. on the Left. By aalary
1975 CERES had been removed fron, the Secretariat by Mitterrand. Each
Party was now challenging the international links of the other. Thus
the PS was tied to Brandt, Kreisky and Pal^e; the PCF tied to Moscow,
being out of step with the more Euro-Co«nist PCI and PCE.^"*
^^^Sl-tiSnal^ollcy^nd^^ Prank Wilson suggests that past
alliances between the democratic left and the PCF always disintegrated
over international disagreements.^^ Five years after the signing, it
was clear that there were important differences cf an international
nature between the two parties. As Marchais expressed it:^^
23
.ea-d
; Tpz ^.^t^^:z^^ - h"It would be a threat to detente). By the October elections tte reP
anr^taliaT?'' ''r" '^"'^^ "^"^ EuropeaS P:i cy of French
to m"
C^-'-lsts", International Affairs Vol. 53, No. 3, pp.\o5
24„.
section,
,""!^™<1 <:laims that when he negotiated the Common Programs dealing with international questions "Communists interrupSdth mselves every half hour to telephone MoscoW. la^taaa, Februarys,
25
i-h.^ ^ K
policy towards Spain was completely at odds withthat of both the PCF and the USSR. See Franx L. Wilson, The FrenchDemocratxc^Left 1963-1969 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Pres s,
Marchais made these charges in a report to the Central Com-
mittee justifying the September, 1977 break. See Forward on the Lines
_Set Out by the XXIInd Congress
, issued by the Secretariat of the Commu-
nist Group, European Parliament, p. 13.
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been abandoned. u^ope naa
T.TIpT ^ ^^^^^g^hening of ties between the PSand SPD, as well as the adoption of a joint plat-
parties Democratic'
3) French Socialists had veered to the right and
IttT.t''^' ^-^-^ by "alngo her hings, growing more favorable to Euro-pean military integration.
4) When the PCF finally reversed itself on theissue of retaining the nuclear strike force
It sharply opposed Mitterrand's proposal for
a referendum on that issue.
Many of these issues will be more f.Hly discussed in later sec-
tions relating to defense and European social democracy. The point
here is not to identify all possible reasons for a break in the Union
of the Left, but merely to isolate those of international significance.
There is one current of thought that has not yet been examined. It
holds that the Communists broke off the Program discussion in September,
1977 on instructions from the USSR.^"^
The Soviet Union and the Union of the Left
The Soviets saw a heightening of class struggles in Europe
,
27
.
Lionel Jospin, a PS foreign policy expert, esooused' this viewm a series of articles in Le Monde : The Soviets, fearing a Left vic-
tory, instructed the PCF to break off the alliance. With the evidence
at hand, the theory remains unproveable„ See that journal during the
week following September 23rd.
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which called for unity of actior.- ^ .y xon. trade unions, co«nists and socialistshould all work together.
s
An interesting,
authoritative discussion •
^ . oo
IS given by the Soviethistorian I M v-n^rr^ 28 -^'-'vier
• He makes the distinction that u v
. ^
-Lii^Lio working withsocial democratic parties is not the same a. • • •i-ut; s loinma in -t-K^-:
-J ^"^"g m their government.Lenin gave the idea legitimcv in 1 q9 1 v,
the KPO o«erea no.
""^"^ """^^
t onxy support,
..t offered to enter, under oert.in
terms, a new government headed by the SPD A= . .y cn bF . s the Comintern's uth Con-
gress noted: these were not t„,,i- ruly workers governments, but they too
'were capable of objectively accelerating the process of d^ ecay of bour-
geois authority" • •,-t
.
He reminds that the PCF never did join the Popular
Front (although it offered to in 1937 k ^- u •, m /, by which time the SFIO and Rad-
icals
, rejected the offer).
The Soviet position seems to be that Communists can enter "pro-
gressive" non-^nni
^
_^_^^^°™al.st governments if, and only if, they retain their
28
Participatx:: b;^:o™n'i:ts1n°1hfGo^'^^^^-^^ ™^ '™ ^-Wems ofPSoblem/o^Hi^ lls %T T'T non-Socialist Count-th-t Ma?^l;^rEHi5lF^;d working Class parties'''ments, if it impaired their revol,,M P in bourgeois govern-
not arise in the 18H8 revoL?lons burd •d'"'''''i"==
'
Generally, it was leoitTJ^rTlT^ ' ''"'^"S the Commune,
just any bourgeois Jover^ent '^™i""°n^''y government, but not
condemned Hillerrand tte w , • ^ °^ ""^ strongly
of General GalSet had^K'""" ''''' ^"^"'^'^ ^^e Governmentaiiire , who been the executioner of the Commune.
29,, .
Ibid.
, p. 12.
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pushed aside or beclouded by the ioint
ment" L V
' ™" °^ the coalition govern-
.
iack^ng these conditions, they should go into the o •^ -Lzixo n pposition
as in 1947, '
The Soviets, as should be clear hu r.by now, regarded the possibility
Of a Left Government in France ambiguouslv T>. • .i^iguou y. This stemmed from both doc-t-nal and foreign policy reasons. Certaiuly the Soviets continue to
-Id their o»
.Ode o. achieving po„er as valid. On the other hand.
they do endorse the "np3r«-F,n -.- • .Ln peaceful transition" doctrine i-h^^ « ^ .uu i that emerged with de-
Stalinization.
•
The Soviets legitimated a parliamentary road to power, l^e pro-
blem „as that so.e of the Western parties e^cpanded on the dictu™ and
evolved notions of pluralism in the :9S0s that went
.ar beyond anything
the Soviets were suggesting. To su.^ri.e it in a phrase: European
Communism created a foreign policy dilemma for the USSR:
IV'^'^-
^'''^ ""^^ reformist ideas emer-ging tn the^ Western Parties could not be tole-
E^t bloc?35"^^«^°°
^hat could spread to the
^.::L^L^^aSnt:opV"^" %Sng!-r:iS:
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On the other hsnH -i-v, -,
tolerated in the West ?t , f
West and underpin" ; fo"eI° ooK™"'of detente. r r ign policy goals
Hence the Soviets u.,ed a middle road: Western Co^nnists shoulddevelop^hroad alliance strategies, hnt ne.er renounce their leading
-es. But ho„ does one
.ulld an alliance strategy and stUl retain
a leading role?
Joint Co^unlst-Socialist action was required in Prance, said
leading Soviet leaders Mi.hail Suslov and Boris Pono.are. to Mitterrand
.n tal.s during the latter.s visit to Moscow.^^ But there was a caveat
a few months later: such political alliances should not "dilute the
Co^ist Party into an amorphous organization
... there should 5e no
•unity at any price' slogan", said Konstaintin Zarodov."
^2^^i21^2££iSLiolioy^^
^^.^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
-™«™«, the Soviets (in their relation to Western Parties)
31^
As Brezhnev said four vears l^t^-n n u--, ...broad democratic trends ^nrUu^^l ^ ""^^^^ Doming with
.He Co„ni3ts .e^^-.::!^-^-^ - --ians^..
^
'^Newjorkj^ May 5, 1975. See Chapter IX herein.
.evolutirTllne^^dldL^^^^the^^SlI^ ^ ^
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repeatedly placed their foreign nolp xcy requxrements ahead of the needs
of particular European class struggles And H •ig . during the 1970s, Soviet
dipXo.acy p..3ue.
..e ,oaX o. ac,.,r.„,
,ec.„o.o^ West
This ar,.e.
...
. p.„3perous,
„on-.os.Ue eapUaUs™, a Hu.ope in
crisis that could jeopardize everything A rian. .j/Lu ii . gl ce at some of the
evidence reveals the following:
•
During the Presidential election of 19V. the Russians put
the independent Saullist policies towards the U.S. and Germany.
•
The Soviets irritated the PCF by displaying special ties to
Clscard d.Estaing that same year. When Soviet A*assador Tchervonen.o
Visited Giscard between rounds in the May, 137. election, the E.hassy
denied the visit had any link to the French elections- it „a,--L i^Lions. I w s merely an
e>=ploration of economic questions.. But it evoked memories of the cele
brated incident of December, 1965 when the Soviet press indicated its
support for de Gaulle during a campaign where Mitterrand was running
with PCF support.
The Soviets were growing skeptical about the Alliance of the
certain socia"isfst1?es""f
-iT".""""" '""^^ ^l^^" ^^ose with
Le Monde. Sclober ^25 [sTl 'T rl°" °' ' '°
and lndo-c\-:a"-
^-.o-re^ta-i-h-g tSlo^ K^t ^Jl^^^
35,
Le Monde
, May 10, 1974, p. 3,
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the
Left in France. Soviet spokesinen had hinted that wh • ii ±nzea ile parties of
Left might win an election, they would not be able to^^^^ ^° govern together
for a long time. ^
•
There were signs the Russians understood that Prance held
too oentraX a strategic position for the U.S. to abandon it to
.oroes
of the Left. There would be so.e
.ove to frustrate it as th
^„
^•^L^dL I , ere was
later in Chile.
.
Could Mitterrand, as an heir of Noske and R.m.H- uiNosK a adier, be trusted.
His true loyalty was to the bourgeoisie and th. a •^ uxb e Americans. He was
only making use of the Communists to r^nn h- -^apull his own party into power.
.
one could cite further evidence, as the 1970s progressed, the
increasing distance between the PCF and the CPSU; the declining fre-
quency of Brezhnev-Marchais meetings- Mar^rh..-.. vuie Ling , rc ais' absence from the CPSU
25th conference early in 1976; the PCF's growing outspokenness in chal-
lenging Soviet hunnn rights violation, and the critiques of Soviet
reality being voiced fro™ within the Party, as fro. Jean Ellenstein.
36
pp. 1 and 9!^ Thllov'Sfn:;:d^th:^ tt^&f^- ''"''^'^^^ 1"''
well require austerity
.easuJes couple iy\\"v™L\°c"r;ith1'" "'f
'
gram proposals. These nuirk nnr^^r^,n
arian e with Common Pro-
spurring'an offensive fro^lhe righ'^ ""^'^^'^^ ^"PF-t,
ro„taine""?hLXd'to"d ^e^l^^^^^"S:^^- '\f^^never allow Portugal to fall to the othjr sWe.
38
Iv nr.. ^^l
Soviets were too discreet to utter these suspicions onen-
ev.-d.n ""T ""^"^^ °^ journalistic accounts and accept or reject theide ce. An undisclosed East European diplomat reportedly ^oJd^£j^on^ that
.'Marchais has finally grasped that Mi?ter;a?d w'a^n'ted touse him as a stepping stone..." September 25-26, 1977, p. 9.
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.
in fact, the Soviets seeded „.e comfortable with the Italian
Co^nists. Berlin^er.s Historic Compromise, a policy of
unxon. progressively managed to install Communists into the hourgeois
state Without yielding the leading role to the Socialists, furthermore.
the PCI was less provocative to the U.S.^^
Some of the above is .ore :ournalistic speculation than hard
evidence of Soviet feeling toward the domestic alliance in Prance. Por
see it is perhaps decisive and cumulative evidence of Soviet opposition
to the strategy of the left union. One current even goes so far as to
hold that the Russians, in their displeasure, instructed the PCF to
break off the Co..on Progra. discussions Others
.ight say that the
Soviets hardly need to issue instructions. After all, the PCP and CPSU
" bas^interpretation. The USSR remains, to French Communists,
39
7,
""^^ charitable to the PCF's strategv Union Hpij^auche was not an agreement of Republican defense, as In'iglT^merely an electoral accord, "but a step towards unit; in the poKt^calstruggle for Europe", said Georgio Amendola. In urging a Lmociatiz'd
Itiia. P ^he views of the PCl' Sealian arty official noted. Le Monde, July 18, 1972.
He arSdlt\ZtT^ ^^gg^^^ting "la main de MoscouV
tie Te tall. -^^ ^ ^ PCF to scut-i ^^ ; ,J^\^h^°^y IS susceptible to proof either way, butIt should probably be assigned minimum validity. Even if the Soviets
^n^trict tVrt °^h''' ^^^f^"^^' ^^e days were long past when they couldi s u he Frenc communists to sacrifice in furtherance of -Sovietraison d etat
.
Annie Kriegel attributes PCF stubborness in 1974 to itsacceptance of a new international strategy drafted in Moscow. See herUne Nouvelle strategie communiste?" Contrepoint
, No. 17, November, 1975.
pp. 47-67. " '
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"la^atrie du socialisms" th^ 4=^ii^
,
the fortress confronting the enemv P . •Ipftir+^n-
L lie y. Earlier
^„ ^^^^
^^^^^
^^^^
IS'^y unity was no longer compatible with Soviet n,b purposes. During theperiod of the Common Program challenge to Gaullism ^ .
, ^
^ul ism, trench Communists
had to live with the fact that the Soviets essent.'.nx ^ ially approved the
never publicly voiced the fear that th. u .r e West would move forcefully to
challenge a Government of the Left in France.
^^^^^J^^El.^I^^_theLeftist Aliiance
we have yet to determine whether international realities would
have allowed a leftist government to continue. Would the West have tole-
rated such a government, or would it have m.ved to de-stabilize it.
Such a question (or speculation) cannot be examined fully here, but
later events in Chile and Portugal did place the possibility of de-sta-
bilization on the agenda. Some tentative speculations are possible.
Ralph Milliband suggested two broad possibilities.^^
.
The new Government would enact minor reformsbut no genuine transformations to socialism.'Ultimately, the reformist movement would be
rejected: the old order returns.
Marxism and Politic^ fOvFor.ri- nr.-p^^^ n •
1977), pp.
—
83-186.
^Uxford. Oxford University Press,
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arousP tho ^- nature. This would
fS?:::^/ Lf---:,!-ity fro. conservative
under the letter pos.iMUty, international oapltalist interests
would move to de-stahi i i +-k ,
.
i i ze the offending government a^^e, s^ i . And, argues Milli-
band, it would be the Social Democrats ofiJemocra other countries that would be
the leading conservative forces. Not
.erely the U.S., hut the
..Social
Be.ocrats of Oer„.ny and Britain would try to hring the offending govern-
ment to heel".
The task here is not to speculate over hypothetical outcomes
only to note that all sides had to consider the possibilities. In these
pages. „e have referred to (and generally accepted) the
.-Yalta.' thesis:
that neither bloc would allow any portion to be abandoned. If a
leftist France threatened the entire edifice since World War II, the
west could react. Given this possibility, it raised vital questions of
national independence and defense policy.
CHAPTER VII
DEFENSE POLICY
The issue of national defense in World War 1 generated the his-
-ie split in t.e Preno. „or.i„, olas3
.ove.ent. Co.unists, eo.oin,
^enin, rejected the SPIO-s defense of the hour.eois Rep.hlie, as „as
in Chapter II. Onl, in the 1.30s did the POP for„late an.
defense policy, adoptine the nna^,- t= kP g quasi-Jacobm patriotism of the Popular
Front, ultimately expressed in the Resistance.
^
Communists claim that their defense policies derive from class
relations, thus they confer legitimacy on certain struggles,
„hile op-
posing others. Class loyalty required a defense of the USSR (or the
And, during the early decades of BolsheviK rule the
doctrine perhaps had some validity, because non-ruling parties felt that
their existence was often linked to the survival of the vulnerable
^-i^t^tate^^w^ the USSR, they risked destruction as a political
nationall^^nL^'^n'Ig^tlrCha'rl"
^'T' ^^""^ -
Francois BiUoux was Minister of National n"f"'Liberation Cabinet Jean kj^anl f Defense m Ramadier's post-
Defense national! • :- '^"^P^> ''sport to the Central Committee-| | g_ e. indepe
_ndance^j>aj^et de'sarmement
. Paris, 11 May,
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movement:
struggle against impeSu'sr 7f
and peace, for democracy social,' T"'""-^"These fraternal ties ™Ite us1 ^s^ TATrTT'Communist Parties. 3 -^-L^iT ot all to the
TO move
.eyond the jargon, then, P.ench Communists held a dual
membership both within the French DolitnV.ip ical system and within the world
movement. As Annie Kriegel points out,
.o;;mr^^^^^^
const ?u?:'''^"^'
°' Party!
ideoloiica! ' Pr^'''"' ^°-°ll-y to Communism's
iuSon ?i ?w ~ ^^^I'i-id- proletarian revo-
2l^T: ^".^^^t sense, the movement ennovs anabsolute T>ri n-n-i -t^r • • ^ijjuyb
centrar.nH P^^^rxty which, given the
in^the^decis.on-™aking processes of Se'prench
union, we'^LtldefiSyluhlt'L^rl™ '° ^^^^^^ ^^e Soviet
The People's Front in Frl r« ^^'T' defense". Marcel Cachin19357-£j-^^Ii22J^^^ (New York: Workers Library Publishers, '
POP ^.n/SnXsrs^u^;-
'2:\Tr\i: ^iLTrsTc'^-'^--ry-March, 1975, pp. 54-65 lers du Communisme. Februa-
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The
.Trench Section of the Co^nist International"
„y have
appeared as an appendage of Soviet dipio^cy in the earlier years.
Today, the organisational framework is better described as the
..Social,
ist Camp", according to Kriegel.
....not simply a territorial, but a multi-dxmensxonal concept embracing at the same time
L ^'lT.f - the Soviet Union, Chi-na and the popular democracies; Communist and
Lstl'v a'r
"'^''^^
- andlastly, dual system of alliances labelled
and ioT'"^'^^^'^" ~ alliance of CommunistW rkers parties with nationalist movementsin colonial countries as well as an alliance
ror peace.
^
Earlier, we discussed the limits imposed on the Communists by
the de_^ Yalta sphere, which Stalin and Thorez well understood.
Thus the PCF supressed its revolutionary impulse, while the USSR con-
solidated the tangible gains of the Red Army in Europe. It was a geo-
political dilemma for the PCF. The most it could do was work to dimi-
nish U.S. influence on the Continent. This, then, is a key thesis
advanced here: European Communists, frustrated in revolution, viewed
success in the class struggle as hinging on the reversal of the
5
This is the theory. But thp Fr.3+-
uegenerated "into a battlLround nT ^'^^^''^"al socialist community
racial interests
• .
.
. ?L L^sfca^h"^ economic, geographical and
schism, diplomatic, and e^en armed con^iie'r': ''rv^^^^
'^'^'^^
aspects Of capitalist international™ o;;3r^1,\^,"^ f^3^^--
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relation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union.
In establishing
priorities of defense, it see.s neasonahle to suggest tha. political
parties, in or out of government, first define an outside peril - and
then frame policies. But „hat if each party in a coalition identifies
a different perils This type of situation occurred in the post-„ar
years between the PCF and the SFIO: each perceived and defined a dif-
ferent potential enemy of France.' And this created inevitable diver-
gencies on defense. For Socialists, the Red Army was the threat, while
the PCF viewed the Bundeswehr or the Americans as the enemy. Given
these disagreements, it was difficult for them to frame a joint defense
policy
.
on. K
Italian Communists differ. Socialism will not advance in Eui^-
the part of 'the^U^.r'^'H"'"''^
'"^ possibility of aggressive intent on
PnLrfp r : ^""^^ ^ genuine shock when Soviet troopsentered Prague. It destroyed a key pillar of PCF defense policy ^hemyth of an essentially peaceful USSR. See Chapter IV.
g
Thorez once said that if the Red Army had to pursue an aggres-sor onto French soil, French Communists would not resist. L'HumaniteFebruary 23, 1949. But during talks to update the Common Program, M^r-
PP?""^ ?i K
Chevenement that if the Soviets attacked France, thePCF would be m the front ranks defending the nation. Le Monde, Sep-tember 25-25, 1977, p. 5. ^
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Before the war a si.iXar confusion arose a„o„, the parties of
the left, socia. Be^oorats. for exa^pie, assessed the international
perii ,uite differenti, fro„ the Co^nists. To the SPIO Ha.is™ „as
not an i^ternatio^X danger in the early
.ears. The Co^unists, how-
ever, did view the Nazis as a genuine international danger bv 193.,
but only after the Soviet £atrie was endangered.
^
To help sort out the divergenoie<! anH „„ i • •eigencies d complexities of defense
policies on the ^ef-^ tl t, I will employ the foregoing as an organizing prin-
ciple.
1 will explain PS-PCF differences by their identities with the
two different post-war blocs. Such a framework should help to demon-
strate varying attitudes on the left toward such issues as alliance
policy, nuclear weapons, targeting, flexible response, tactical nuclear
weapons, development of a Navy, forward defense, and a professional
army.
An overview of defen se requireinents. France is sometimes described as
The British Labour Partv likp the Qrm • u. j
armament policies against the Ge'J^an'^L'a
.''LthJ^^l lerSs^rfin'^-
= f : . °PP°se an international danger. A good diseus-
is L Adotf?/°':k'"= °° ^^'^''^^ the inter°°ar years
service. CommunLts sipo^ed^irin t^te' re^W ^ TellT lt"s"Ster-esting to note a historic role reversal: today, the Communists of Sat-
in the ig^Os'"'^:^
neutralist-pacifist movements that have sproSed
ihe SPD and f ^^f^'T'" ^oeialist Parties favor stronger defenses.T the British Labour Party are seriously split on this question.
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.
nauonax Hexe.on,
.
.avin,
.,..e ™ari«™e
...es. Canned,
.Ua.tie an.
Mediterranean, an. three continental si.es, Pyrenees, «p3 and KMne-
land. Defense traditionally focused on a powerful Germany, a danger
usually „et through the erection of a European alliance structure."
Following world War II, the goals and strategies closely resem-
bled the Classic outlook of 1919: defense policies were those of preserv-
ing territorial satisfaction in Europe, retaining the French Union,
maintaining a weak, dis.e*ered Germany, and continuing the traditional
alliance with the Russians. Cle.enceau would have approved. But it
was no longer 1919, and post-war Governments began to question the tra-
ditional alliance with the Russians. We have seen how France reversed
itself, joining Germany against the new power of Russian imperialism.
Se--it5-«^^^ by the American presence." But if the Atlantic
1815. GovernL'nrh^rrLe'r"""^ "^^^ ^''^^ hexagon of
See Jean-Bap?SrDuioLur
"?h,'n"^
'•^^""'^ frontiers,
in m Search o? France Stanlev HT' " ^"^f PoU-^y since 19^5"
bookrx963), pp.^"-3
-37 and ' "^^^^
kins Pressf;962)"°pp^l53gS-r'^',r' (Baltimore: John Hop-
trad^ko-al^^L^fif Z^Z^^ b^^tLin^lt^:™
back France' ™^ thrRu"h" ^ue^Itlfn" ^
^"^^""^^^^^
o..... ^ T.
^""^^^S" Minister Georges Bidault actually feared a Soviet take-ver of Western Europe in 1948. See U.S. Ambassador Jefferson McCaffe^v'scable
_
to George Marshall, March 1948, in Department of S ater^ore ™Relations of the U.S. 1948
. Vol. Ill, p. 629
__dj^ _^jor ign
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rorces. Communists, of conT^c,^
aoinde H
initiative, towardsn independent defense, nevertheless
.
"heles , xt was the Socialists they were
-u«.„g as a domestic ally, not the Gaulllsts.
^^^^-^^^^^iutlon^o^S^^
.
"
- "^th
.epuhlic lao.ed any dy-n™^c defense concepts, particularly when contrasted with the .ore in-
novative Caullists or the «re dramatic ideas of the PCP. Ihere was
vague discussion nf oc-h^ki • u •establishing an independence from the U.S., p,^3uing
a European framework, dismantling the force de f.o a r _^^_ rappe and dissolving
all the Mocs in Enrope. Much of this was the wisht.1 thinkin, of a
party in opposition, rather than reali.ahle policy. - But OauXlist poli-
ces were also vulnerable: The attempted An^lo-Prench-U.S. triu.virate
over MTO had collapsed, the Paris-Bonn A.is appeared dead. Prench in-
fluence in the Third World was frustrated A GauUn'^t fo u. fl t llis France seemed
only capable of reiectinn^- n^r, ^-
_^
^ *° ="Pranatlonality, non to Britain, non
of defensl'poii:"
^Andlhe'S's'^freo"';, '"^^ -P—
Thus Marines were landed in L^b^non .HtK !
""P""" "^'^^ subordinations.
French. De Gaulle's
''^'^^ wi hout any consultation with the
Western Alliance :as turned ToZ S ^J"P-""e directory of tLr down. ee Le_Monde, March 1, 1969, p. 2.
rejected
"iTLrba^slclf a^forc^de^^r^^t"^: °" ™ty issuel. It
0I n^^io::.""--"^ «as^~l^'.: -trr:iVbTa i^.
to NATO.
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Charles Hernn ^ q^^a t •
'''' ™ -"^-y matters, attri-buted the failures in G.„ui3t defense policy to a Wd
P ,
wide gap between
France s pretenses as a world power and the actual no
,
16 p wer at her dispo-
-X. Her™ atte.pted to
.roaden the le.el of de.ate to . .ore
...r.-
Z " - — ^ore i„
— conceptions of the
.r.^-s role in the nation, all
--tes surronndin, weapons systems, hardware and scenarios
„ere secon-
" "
-
-e tradition of
.a.r.s, „ere
Hardly pacifists, hut the ar.y had to he tranfor.d into an emanation
=-e the "ghetto"
.alaise af-flictmg the forces.
in Noven^er, 1973, one
.onth hefore the Socialists Convention
B^^i2iHle at Bagnolet, Charles' Hernu's studv • • •n s y commission issued its pro-
posal: Prance could not continue to reject the Atlantic fra.e„orK for-
ever. Nor could it accept the other extre.es of neutralization or uni-
versal disarmament.^^ A Soriainc^c list Government could only reach its objec-
72-76. S2ldat:Cito^ (Pa.is: Flammarion, 1975), pp.
17
rand's Cabinit! 'was 'probaWv the™' f° " "^"i^^^" - ""ter-
questions with n the'ps andU """"^^^^^ spokesman on defense
great weight with Mrtte^rand ?oi'?h°" ii»Mili£££teur who carried
ficant.
iitt r . F r t ese reai^ns his vielJTTre signi-
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::::r
^° ^ ---^^^^^ p--a......
the Atlantic Alliance cr the Wester^n f
" ""i™-
''"her, he refinedIt With some general referenroo +^ rc.s to Europe-wxde collective security de-
nuclearized zones and partial disarmament E.h • .. c oing the Common Program
--'^ =-tion ot a citi^ens ar., or.ani.e. around territorial
course, to preserve the nation.s security durin, the envisaged
transition to socialise. follo„in, the formation ot a Covern.ent under
the Common Program.
_Wuclear Weapons and National Defen^
PVanoe "went nuclear" in the sixties when it judged the two
superpowers to he mutual!, in^lneraUe tro. attack, or unlikely to
attack one another. However, critics on lett and right soon challenged
the wisdo. and efficacy of such a deterrent in the hands of a middle-
range power." But ™uch of the debates over weapons and deterrence
hissed an essential Gaullist political point: a forc^^^frappe was
Vital to advance diplo^tic goals. Defensive, «aginot-line conceptions
;-^^^™tf»aMlity Of earlier Governments to pursue foreign policy
18
to deter a's^vie'^'attack^'This'"'"""' ^^^^^"^ -""ty
Plutons. see A^on^s ? e c-a D^'St^" Z °l ^'^'^^(Garden city, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co SlFy-^^-'^HSlS^^.St^^
p. 82.
ui ud a ., 1965, Trans. Ernest Pawell),
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before the war." True, the ho^ couXa not provide security fro™ a
Kussian attac. hut it could secure inaepe.aeuce fro. the United StateFurthermore, sa.d so.e Cauiiists, it couid serve as an effective trig-
gering device to compel the engagement of U.S. forces, shifting the
locus of war-making decision from Washington to Paris."
^i^S-^^SHlMS^n^^^lear^^ Throughout the sixties and seven-
ties strong anti-nuclear currents existed in the non-Communist left.
The arguments advanced were often moral in tone. But there were prag-
matic ones as well. Thus the force de frapue seemed impotent next to
that of the superpowers. A few Mirage TVs could never penetrate an
enemy's defenses. Furthermore, France was highly vulnerable itself.
Twenty-five nuclear-tipped missiles could destroy everything within th.
hexagon, civil defense was non-existent.^^
19
attack us"^^''RnJ^i^'^'"''.f ^'^^ "^"^"^ "^^ ^ill defend if you
In other words the British gained no diplomatic advantages Som tL
^attison), p. loo. ' ^^^^ Ames
21
Bv the 1970s ^r- "^^f^^^g
war-making initiative, see Grosser, p. 103y , Giscard was calling on France to rank as the third-stro-^est nuclear power in the world. Le Monde
. June 4, 1976, pp iti5
"'^
One it la^k!r^
Beregovoy of the SFIO held the weapon to be useless., I cked any second-strike capability. Two, it was blind sinceunlxnked to any radar and tele-communication syst;m (these being opera-ted by the U.S. and NATO). He urged that it be renounced. "'"^
^^"^^
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Graduau,, however, between 13S8 and ™a„, on t.e non-
Communist left and within the Pq h=S began to reappraise earlier frozen no-
Sltions. Some of the flss,,-^ =c assic arguments against the foree de frappe
were growing outmoded, as new weapons emerged, such TZZZ^^.r.,.
bomhers, nuclear suhmarines.
.Ibion missiles and the Pluton. Purther-
more, de Gaulle's election victories iqr. . .om 1965 and 1969 could reasonably
be viewed as mandates for th^. t.,,^te nuclear program, unquestionably a popular
one with Frenchmen. On December 18-19 1971
. n.,iy/ , a ew proposal was sub-
mitted to the Comite_dlrecteur of the P S wh • h •^ rn t^.b. ic said in effect:
•
Nuclear weapons, a reality for lo years ir. P..could only be renounced i^ the ^aJ;::o:,^:f'L^J^^I
we': nec'ssTr^' -i^-^-^^ly. Such weapons
France! ^ ^ middle-rank power such as
'
iTcllllTr'r'
°f
--clear weapons by a
Lsef constitute a decisiveass t from a diplomatic negotiation point of view?^
In other words, a Government of the Left would formulate its o.^
defense policies. As Hernu and Jacques Huntzinger were saying in the
early 1970s, a Socialist France would require protection against the
direct or indirect manoeuvers from hostile blocs. One might pay lip
service to a disarmed world, but in the short run, France under a So-
cialist regime would have to retain the existing arsenal built up
23
the origina!^"ul!ist"decSi:„"t:
"gfnu^tar^^^^L^aVpo^r^L^^l is It"'was mtlttary. See Stanley Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal r'en'h foreLPolicy since the 1930. (New York: ViklHTKess, p. 298.
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cu.re„.s o. „eut.aXi..
..at had e.iste. oX. SHO an. the PS
Which usually urged unilateral di sarmament.
in early 1072, Jean-Pierre Chevene.ent joined the debate- to
renounce the ho* was de^.ogie and Irresponsihle
. He advanced a classic
powers, comparisons were
.trictly speculative, since strategic purposes
were different. Prance need only confront a future aggressor with an
.ntolerable risK. (The PCP argued that such a strategy might invite a
preventative assault.
)
One could say that de Gaulle's great nuclear legacy was now
under less threat by policymakers of the Left. Hernu and his team of
experts were quite influential with Mitterrand, and ultimately would
prevail upon the PS to accept the force de franpe
. And the Co.unists,
too, we will see, later reversed their long-standing opposition.
Mitterrand's thinking on nuclear issues over the years indicates
that he too was capable of reappraisal. Like many observers in France,
2^
,, !
P"'"''^ conference. Hay W, 197U, he remarked that philo-sophically and morally he opposed nuclear weapons for France "But vouare asking me the question in 197., and I am a politicaUy r^alistl"^man
.
•' Hernu, p. 2W. Michel Debre" reminds us that Mitterrand wis aminister m the Mendes-France Government that launched a felSbiStystudy on nuclear weapons in 1954. Le Monde
,
January 13, 1973, p. 9.
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he holds that the superpowers have sanctuari.ed themselves
.
^ n successfully.
But, xn any war, Europe, and surely France woulH ky r e , d be ravaged. The
oT;:;;:V^"^^
— the dete.e„ee value
^ ^
- «^^Pon.v in the arsenal o.the superpowers. His point is that Pv,France could not inflict sufficient
^a^ge on a possible aggressor to prevent an attaC. Respite these
cogent ar^.ents, Mitterrand nevertheless committed the PS in
-PPO- f^^.^S
^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
considerable tas., since reintegration hac. into NATO was out of the'
question.
in assessing his nuclear views, one should also note his evalua-
tion of the disarmament issue. It was de Gaulle who led France away
fro. a policy Of disarmament in 1962. Disarmament would have confirmed
the U.S.-Soviet condominium and perpetuated the division sanctioned at
Valta. Thus, says Mitterrand, de Gaulle ij^ored disarmament conferences
for much the reason he withdrew from NATO: he dreamed of an independent,
self-sufficient France, always retaining basic links to the Alliance
(and always clinging to General AiUerefs stra«sie_tou^^^imu^
^1^^^;;^;^^^^^^;;^
ever mterfereT^ the essence of ttis
tion, but'noi'd::SoTe™ftLr:toc°r" Z'?'" rr/° i;^" p^^^'-^-question unre-^nlv^H . ^'^'-["S sto ks. The formula left the basic
I compromiL™^;„-:,^\:-„:,-t=^L"1e%^^^^
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Gaullist
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^
autonomous role of France in i-h^ itthe allxance gave her a special position
r7
"^"^
^ - ^~r s„perpo„e.
.isoa., tl
-
initiatives in
.isa^a^ent, voicing oni,
.topian
'
Slogans of general and complete disar^^nt, but i.norin.
.27 »
JJ^L Ig g more practical
steps
.
se in
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1^^ Co»nist3 in rranoe, li.e the..
...
^he soviet union, considered that the advent of .ass destruction weapons
had wrought so^e basic changes in doctrine and had tunda.entall, altered
international nolitiV^ c^kp .es. such weapons effectively barred the possibility
Of war as a prelude to world revolotion. P.^ther.ore. they removed the
likelihood that capitalist states would war a.ong themselves, as happened
^;^^^^^_-^W^These weapons logically required a policy of co-
26
.
Mitterrand's views are spt -Fo-n-hh •
December 14, 1977 nn i JIa m ^^^^ article in Le Monde,
Of disarmament ne^oS^tions'su"; afsLrr^vLlLflL'^^"among superpowers. Hernu, for example br^nLd SAfr ? conspiracysuperpowers to desimate their rec^n^^^ ande LT I an attempt by the
tuaries, fixing Europe as the site^of f territories as sanc-
it should be noted Select ^hirl. communists,
among superpowers. ' ' '
interpretation of arms limitation talks
A.Mtious"^SL\:i:~ Mitterrand,
impossible, he holds.
r'ender all genuine agreement
28
Leninist no^^L^ns'o^'^hTa.^UhTilf t^^'
^^""^ ^
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existence. Given the reality of a hostile capitalist Moe, it was fully
acceptable for the Soviet Union to possess nuclear weapons.
However, it was not acceptable for France to possess nuclear
weapons, said the PCF. Such at least was the policy until the updating
Of the Prograin^e commun in the Spring of 1977, when the Central Co.ittee
reversed this long-stanaing doctrine. But throughout
.ost of the years
of the Fifth Republic, communists opposed a key tenet of Gaullist nation-
al independence and defense policy. This stand aligned the™ with some
of the more pacifist segments inside the PS who, we have seen, always
opposed the bomb on principle. Communists, however, did not base their
opposition to the weapon as pacifism. They variously employed these
arguments
:
1) The bomb would not act to deter an aggressor. Such thinkinaxgnored the true (or possible) manner in which wa'^s unfolded! ^h^s
'
France could well be led into war against its will. 29
a n.t.•nn^^
integration of Trance into petite Europe might transforma io al force de frappe into a European^^^^^
^,
.
Nuclear weapons could not be used against non-nuclear states.This would outrage world opinion. Nor could they be employed if Frenchsoil was invaded: the French population would be destroyed.
4) Nuclear weapons were not more econom.ical than conventionalin war, ground troops still had to occupy enemy terrain.
29
Thus war might have followed from the Cuba missile crisis
particularly when de Gaulle cabled Kennedy full support. Or,' war wis
possible m Central Europe. France could easily be drawn in because
she had troops in the FRG. Mere possession of the bomb would not pro-
tect her from being drawn in. These various reasons are discussed in
Pierre Villon, "Reflections on Gaullist Military Policy", Cahiers du
Communis me
.
No. 3, March, 1959, pp. 24-32.
"~
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cation. VsZlT^sZiXtlTTr^ZlTf ^ ^ P-™-into a nuclear war. 30 transforming any conventional attack
6) France's possession n-F u ^
refusal to sign the Ln-ProSJerat^on tIT.I Government'sdeveloping its own bomb.
^^^^"^^^^^^
^^^^^Y' would drive the FRG into
The PC F and a nuclear C.e.-rm^r..r item six ahov. •_ xLttiu b D e requires a closer
examination. One might think that thp PPP'. k6 xiii^ ma e CF s obsession with the FRG
would lead it to the Gaullist view: that the bo* was necessary in solv-
ing the "German problem" (na.ely by giving France superiority)
. But
the PCF rejected this perspective. Rather, Communists emphasized the
danger of nuclear proliferation, m 1968 they were strongly critical of
de Gaulle's boycott of the Geneva Conference on non-proliferation.
The particular, and often explicit fear, was Germany: by not signing NPT,
France would Induce Germany to develop such weapons."
30
17 1975 r%n^™S^'? T""" '° Committee, Le Monde, April
tadi! tey'9, ?975" p 7!'
" "non-firstuse pledge bFTi^e".^ ^
31
13. The if:; c\"^;ir; iTZT^iiiir,,^'^
'iVsVAii: 'i- ' r
h7co--i!:SitLs"™^-' - c-eir?hrs:ttic^-ne:r-
32
.
contention of Generals Baufre and Gallois that the spreadof such weapons would have a stabilizing influence was "out of touchwith reality", L'Humanite
, November 14, 1975, p. 8.
33,
Rnn^
Respite the FRG's renunciation of nuclear weapons, ther- was a
^H£desv^ memo of I960 urging development of such weapons. L'HumaniJeurged a modifying clause in the NPT: that nuclear powers not employ or^threaten their atomic weapons against states on whose territory there
non'
"° namely those states which did not want such wea-
^ uu !
Soviets could not promise to spare the FRGwhich had some 6,000 American nuclear weapons on its territory. L'Huma-
nite, November 14, 1975, p. 8.
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in 1S58 the Co.^ists were asking „hy de GauUe refused to
-Sn the
„3s ™.erst.„,.Me. sai.
..es
.orea., the.
not si,„ the Moscow Treat, ha„„i„, a.ove-^ou„. tests (this „oui.
have bioe.ea Prance's own aeveiop.ent of the forc^^^^,.
™otives in issa were „ore complex. Ce GauUe wante. to retain his
optron Of supplying nuclear weapons to West Germany. There was, after
an. a Bonn-Paris axis: the for^^ejrappe represented one of the
"ele.ents of Prance's dowry- that Prance was offering in this nerriage?'
In the late 1960s, it see^s, the Co„unists were wary of a
German plan, articulated by Defense Minister Pranz-.oseph Strauss, to
establish a European nuclear deterrent force within the framework of
"the Six".
Ih^JSIS^e frappe le.iti^t_ed. Despite the arguments cited,
Co^unists, as often in the past, reversed themselves on a national de-
fense issue. After a .ajor review of defense problems, the PCP in May,
^--"cally^^ gears on its long-standing policy of opposition
'
College teLurf'an Z proposed to the German War
i-h= B i
"^"^"I'g. organic cooperation between the French Armv andthe Bundeswehr. supgestinir scienti-fiV =„w » k ,
"ei'on n y
.an ; ^5i: SL^"pS~^^
tion of nuclear weapons through the MLF proposal.
acquisi
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to nuclear weapons in FranoA nce. Unquestionably, the bomb was today in
France a reality, and did constitute the onlv H .tur n y deterrent for the nation
even if today it was in the hands of the class e.Pr rn nemy - and pointed only
at socialist nations. The PCP, of course, „o,ad give these weapons a
"new waning... retaining the. exolusivel, on Prenoh territory, pointed
^'^ ^-^-^ possible agcrreqcin-PQ -, ^ .
—
g ssors. One could cxte several immediate reasons
for the reversal:
Military. To assure the ar.y that the sophisticated bases of
had'L'd
di-antled.' The nuclear bu ldup
France *°,f
'^""'^ ^^^lect of conventional forces^oould not be left defenseless, as MarcSiJ'
Electoral. It « I, , ,oliU..,,y popular step in the up-coming 1978 legislative elections. Independentdefense was now a value internalized and'mandaLby almost all Frenchmen. manaated
Diplomatic. Nuclear weapons could be used to diplomatic advan-
^unSt'ar'gSr?!' °' —
Germany. There was no longer the earlier fear that Frenchpossession of the bomb would induce the FRG to
seek Its own.
poiiScs with°tr"''A":^''" ^"^"^ PS to breaknti . heir Atlantic orientation, preferred targeting
- policies^ etc. s^-^^^fe
n,.-T-^ .
^^""^P^ Report, op^ cit. The reversal shocked manv
vision Th
about—e-CiT^tral Committee vote on tele-
PC^r^ass baL ?h''r'n'
was done without any consultation with th
2lJ ^ ^^^^^ded its volte face in that it consi-dered the issue a year-and-a-half
. FriHce Nouvelle
, June 6, 1^77.
3 6
Le Monde, September 25-25, 1977, p. 6.
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Were the Co«unists really reversing themselves on nuclear „ea-
i.sues as weapons abstractly, but within a political context. Perhaps
it nede sense to oppose these weapons under a right-wing government.
But why oppose the. if the left achieved power, Why yield a valuable
asset when you were about to assume power. Most of all, the Communists,
like many on the non-Communist left, had a premonition that a Govern-
ment Of the heft, committed to deep social transformations - and stand-
ing isolated in Western Europe - was inherently prone to de-stabili-
zation from abroad. "Socialism in one ccmtry", to use Duverger's
phrase, would require a potent national defense."
The Communists attempted to attach certain conditions to their
acceptance of nuclear weapons in any future, hypothetical Government of
the Left, that:
a) French forces remain i-ndependent
, unlinked to NATO
and its warning systems. 3°
b) There be a doctrine of strict deterrence. Dissuasion
37
The left's analysis of events in Portugal and Chile height-
ened fears of outside interference with a Government of the Left.
3 8
. ^
French deterrent must not rely on the NADGE air defense
and detection data supplied by NATO and the U.S. The nation must deve-lop Its own observation satellites, radar svstem, and surveillance
aircraft, plus a capability of orbitting observation and communication
satellites.
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had to replace the ^trategi^de_^^
c) Weapons be kept in their current state-ones were not to be perfected '
^"'^
^han'an'''"? °^ "button", rathertn exclusively PresidPTi+-n=,i a .'/^^^^^
de Gaulle had it)/ Ha^cha ^ ^'op ^^It^a f
?L Chi fT'^'^" "^^^^ included .ft
ti%^\L of 2T\'"^"' -presentaJi^ea
IhrSd'h" """^ Disarmament Talks (whichshe had been absent fr-om for years) and asso-ciate herself „,th the SALT negotiations. tl
USSR?"*''
°' """-"SS'^-^^'ion be signed with the
the phrase'deSn^f?o'us':.i::r" Huf™' h^'S'"^ ^""^''^ ^° -^1"''-point
..i?iiiii-^rSi?^;s.. L rd °° "--iallies
.
e Monde
, August 9, 1977 n 1
40 > ^.
This was consistent with th^ vor -Tr^-t- ^- ^
parliamentary and cabinet role ifFif^h RenuhK h ^ "^'^^^Mitterrand rejected this too rn?/ f ^P^blic decisionmaking. But
weapon of any'deterrent vSu; in ' "
^^^^^^^ deprived the
collegiality, he was p^eoared to
""^'^"^ '^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
the President and"L^Sme Minlste"'' Le'T'f consultation byMarch 13, 1978. ^mister. e Monde , August 19, 1977 and
41
Some Socialists were warv of ^att ^^-o^-:^
of the superpowers to desicm^t. • '
considering it an effort
:LT"afd^i-/^"-"="-"-^Clonal, and on European territory. ^unven
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Tactical Nuclear Weapon.^-
Forward Defense or^ ^_^r^r^^^^^j^
Nuclear weapons, once accepted^^ opened up a ^rther array of
questions for the defense analysts on the left: tactical weapons,
placement of
.issiles in Germany, targeting and levels of response.
Classical Gaullist thinking articulated by General Ailleret em-
situations did not require a .assive response.^^ They called for tac-
tical weapons at the division level. As General Fourquet, successor to
Ailleret expresses it, there was a need to demonstrate resistance with-
out invoking a "jeu de 1' escalade ".^"^
And once one deployed tactical nuclear weapons, it raised the
further issue of forward links to the allies and NATO. Giscard had
42
R
^^^^^ ^'^^ turn-around. Socialistsand Radicals proposed a referendum on the force de frappe questionThe proposal was withdrawn but revived at the celebrated Mitterran^-Marchaxs summxt of September 22, where discussions on the Programme com-mun ultimately collapsed. Duverger called it illegal, noting^hat the
appSe'a Jo"l T^'"'-^
'""^ since 're ferendumfonJylie t laws dealing with government organization or ratification ofcertain treaties. Le Monde
,
August 2, 1977.
r r r
Communists, for example, rejected an anti-cities doctrine- itwould convert
_ urban populations into hostages. The Kanapa Report p21. Louis Baillot, director of the Party's Commission on National De-tense, proposed a policy of targeting on an enemy's scientific and in-dustrial centers. How one did this without also striking cities was
not clear. See Le Monde
, March 8, 1978, p. 9.
44
Le Monde
,
April 30, 1969, p. 11.
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innovated with a forward battle ^one nr.xn Germany, a significant reversal of
Polxcy, as some on the left claimed.
Ill£Jll£yiGallois dispute Tt w^. p-P . I as Pxerre Gallois who popularized
"abso-
lute sanctuarization": the idea th^^ rx at France was untouchable, unconcerned
with neigboring states. Under snrh . ^ tu a uc a policy, the nation would:
*
IZW'"'"''^^^'' submarines, silosand bombers. -^-L-Li^i,
.
Dismantle almost all other forces.
.
Keep perhaps a few thousand troops to&Jard nuclear arsenals.
^
The problem „as, this absolute sanctuarization doctrine ignored
all limited war scenarios, those calling for a response below the nuc-
lear threshhold. Under th^^ r-^n^-;^ ^ ^ •u e Gallois doctrine, France might- indeed emerg
intact, but under Soviet sway or alone in a "Finlandized" Europe.
Speaking for the Giscard regime, Guy Mery challenged the "abso
lute" doctrine as "neutralism". Even "if all Europe collapsed around
us, we could, never resist the demands on us", said the Chief of Staff
tical stake ""^l
unthinkable, justified by no poll-r i . Hence French forces of the future would be a small armvof technicians, outside the usual military mould, hardly the so^t abLto launch a Bonapartist coup d'etat
, let alone storm the Elyse'e See
May Isf19 5,'pp. !39^^^ Gall^ Paris Mat^h ,
e
under Giscard.
Instead. Mery proposed an "enlarged sanctuary" or forward bat-
tle doctrine: rather than sanctuarize within the hexagon if attacked
France should deploy conventionally, or even nuclearly on the soil of
allies (meaning the FRG). While there would be no such forward posi-
tions in peacetime, in actual co^at, French troops would defend not
only northern and eastern frontiers, but fight alongside NATO forces,
defending the front line eastern borders of West Germany, if needed/
Thus French troops deployed along the Rhine in the 1970s would have
shifted eastwards towards the Weser and Elbe."'
The Left and tactical nuclear weanon.
. How did the Left respond to
these new doctrines? As a rule, their spokes„,en feared any possible
entry by French forces into broad conventional tactical nuclear war-
fare in Europe. This was surely possible if Giscard attempted to
reconcile NATO's flexible -ppc^nnnQo t>.^,, j ^xx Dx respo se. They opposed strategies of early
engagement, preferring an "absolute deterrence". The issue was com-
plex, because French military thinking regards nuclear weapons in two
45
^^^2 is based on Mery's address to students at the Higherinstitute of National Defense Studies, March 15, 1976. See DefenseNationale, June, 1976, pp. 11-3^+. ' —
47
At the time (1976) two French divisions, totalling 60,000 men
were deployed just over the Rhine into West Germany. Thp New York
Times, June 3
, 1976, p. 3. — —
Michael M. Harrison, pp. 29-30.
possible categories:
^ ^^£5tegie_^|emploi.
But When tactical nucXear weapons such as the Pluton arrived.
they created ambie:uitT pc, ^-f ^ 4- •^iiLu j.g x Lies or doctrinp Th^ a^-i-r me. The deterrence function of
Pluton. triggering the strategic bo™bs hardened into the Plateau d-
Albion, had heen revised. Tacticai nuclear weapons were now seen as
"weapons of battle" in a stste^l^^^e^.
The Socialists objected: lining Plutons with conventional for-
ces paral,.ed the latter in their maneuverability, creating the illu-
-on that nuclear power could serve as a for™ of super artillery,
.e-
.ncreasingly in NATO: that Giscard lost sight of the fact that U.S.
strategy of rigoste^^raduee was not one of deterrence, but a strategie
lliffiiai - which could convert Western Europe into a vast battlefield.
^^^^£L52iL«^^«!£02£i™- Co^unists held that under Giscard,
the nation was altering classic defense policies. General Aillerfs
Classic tous_^^
.^.^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
sumptions about the threat from the East. Mery's innovations were sub-
tly shifting France' s defenses from the Rhine to the Elbe,^\ubordinating
Le Monde July 20, 1976, p. 7. The Russians, too, were alert
card h
^'"^^ innovations. During Brezhnev's visit ^o G^s-
MtI: Zr23,°l977r;rB:^ participation ^n^
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the French ar.y to U.S. forces, and
.aking it a .ere forward patrol of
the Bundes^hr. Co^unxsts had no particular objection to tactical
Pluton missiles, but Insisted that they be based enolusively inside
France, ^or years, the PCF opposed emplacement of tactical missiles in
the FRG.=° PCF Deputy Louis Baillot even pointed out that these weapons
were good protection against Germany. since tomorrow, Germany "could be-
come the enemy of France p<^npnT;qi i,. ^ -f ny rxdu , eopecially if a Government of the Left arrives
in power here".^"'"
^I^:^^£:^SIlli2I^^ Except for les territoires d'outre-mer , spokesmen
for the left generally hold that national security extends only to the
"hexagon". But in broader discussions of national purpose, experts on
the left accept the need for some form of force d ' intervention
. Indeed,
France requires such a capability." And the Communists as well, accept
. . 53this view. The question, of course, is intervention on behalf of whom,
50
.
.
!^ interesting to note that a campaign had been coordinated
with the tmy German Communist Party in protest against delivery ofthese weapons to Land Hesse. L'Humanite
, June 24, 1975, p 3 Speci-fic modes of PCF cooperations with Parties abroad will be discussedm a further chapter.
51
^
Le Monde
,
March 8, 1978, p. 9. Mery has recently suggested
replacing the Pluton with the neutron bomb. The PCF rejects this as
a dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshhold. The PS has reached nodecision on the neutron weapons. New York Times
, June 12, 1978, p. 14.
52
.
This was a great lesson of the inter-war years. Non-interven-
tion in Spain did not prevent German aggression in 1939. See' Jean Pau-
cot's essay in Une Reflexion Ouverte
, p. 48.
53^ . ^ .Louis Baillot gives the PCF view in Le Monde, March 8, 1978
p. 9.
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such a force already exist., and is often used in operations that the
left opposes as neo-colonial
.
By i„e there was an intervention force
Of 35.000 troops in Prench spea.ing African states, aii
.nder „tuaX
arrangements.^^
In emphasizing the privacy of the hexagon, Socialists have not
overlooked the fact that PrancCs strategic position is at so.e of the
™ost travelled
.ariti.e-.one crossroads.
.aKing the nation vulnerable
to disturbances in the world. Any realistic defense policy „st consi-
der that France depends highly on the Third World for key imports:
.
Petroleum from North Africa and the Persian Gulf.
.
Uranium and other minerals from Gabon.
.
Phosphates and cotton from North Africa.
.
Wool from Australia.
Outside of the Third World, France's major suppliers are the
United States and the USSR.
Jean Paucot, writing in the 1976 study commissioned by the PS,
20, 1976, p. 15. And these forces are quiteactive. Thus 400 paratroopers were sent to Zaire to defend Shaba Pro-vince. Jaguar ^ets have attacked Polisario guerillas in western Sahara-
rebe°L' . rr^f'^ "'"^ ^'^^ ^° aid'^overnment forces opp^s ng'
of Ma^fl 1978 '^'^''^ New Yogk Tim'e_sy 21, , p. 19. For evidence that France is acting "officia~
S^^n^h r'"'"'^!^^ ^"^^^^ "^^^"^ States", see Jack Kramer, "Ourfle c Connection m Africa", Foreign Policy
. No 29, Winter, 1977-78,
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argues that Prance has only two
.a.o. choices." Either the nation
"accepts a satellite status to the American Empire, or, it un.erta.es.
withm a European framework, to defend thp inHo ^
,
Lu a r a e independence of certain
Third Worid states, namely those with a riparian location on the Medi-
terranean, those in the Indian Ocean and certain suh-tropicai states in
Africa". Paucofs study goes on to argue that the superpowers can gene-
rate and support local conflicts by sending in ar.ies, weapons and tech-
nicians
-
or act to destabilize regimes. Prance is directly concerned
by this: in fact, risks of confrontation are greater here than in Eu-
rope. Prance's vital need not to be cut off fron, supplies and lines
of communications, leads it to support the independence of peoples
of these regions against all oppression.
Further Defense Debates on the Left
We have reviewed some of the important debates of the period,
indicating how a Socialist-led France hoped to navigate between the two
blocs, avoid wars of remote interest, lead a nuclear (or non-nuclear)
defense, defend the sanctuary, conduct limited war or possible inter-
ventions abroad.
"Sliding back to Atlanticism". By now it should be clear that
all segments on the left embraced the idea of an independent defense -
55
"L' Organisation generale de notre defense ", in Reflexions
pp. 41-48. Paucot's essay is by no means an official "party line""'But It IS of interest and significance in that it expresses a generalpoint of view reflective of mainstream thinking within the PS
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the Old rallying cry of the Gaulli.ts. But in «v., the Co^unists
along with others, leunohed a campaign acousing the po.t-de Gaulle-
GaulUsts (namely Pompidou) of "sliding back into NATO".=^ The evidence
consisted of such facts as the regi.e had discarded tou^azi™ut tar-
geting; it was accepting the "graduated response" doctrine; French
units had joined with NATO ;qir- ::.r,^ nn l a and naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean,
and defenses were relvino- r^•n h-k^ ^ying on the equipment of the U.S. and NATO for
nuclear alert facilities.
This time, the PCF had evidence at hand. And as Kriegel notes,
It is the duty of any Communist party
.o. to influence the foreign policy of a particular
country m the manner closest to the interests ofthe socialist camp as a whole. In recent years," theFrench party has seen itself as a watchdog, working
to keep open the variety of options favorable to themby which General de Gaulle guided French diplomacy 58
Thus Pompidou (and later Giscard) was guilty of reinsertingFrance into NATO. Le Monde
,,
January 13, 1972, pp. l Ld 6. The Socfal-xsts tended to remain aloof from the Marchais-Pompidou polemics Le
of defense the disagreem.ents between France and virtually every other
PoScv"°fn
being reconciled". "French Foreignlicy m Foreign Policy in World Politics
, p. 112.
57^.
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_
the dispatch in the New York Tim.es : "France's Forces arequietly renewing ties for NATO" May 21, 1978, p. 19. "These arrange-
ments exist", an unnamed French defense official is quoted as saying
of course we will have to deny their existence in the Chamber ofDeputies".
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The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and
France
, p . 55 .
~
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Whether or not Kriegel is correct it, returns us to the formu-
lation stated at the stari- r^-F -hk-rt of this chapter: that the PCF had a certain
Identity with the Soviet bloc Hr^w^. However, unlike the PCF, the non-
Communist left was ever alert to the histor.V hrn n ic danger posed by post-
war Soviet preponderance in Europe.
'-^^^^^I^^^^^^^ One group which has directed its
analysis to many of the questions reviewed was CERES. This faction
within the PS (weakened or neutralized by Mitterrand at the Congress
Of Pau in 1973) accepts many of the Gallo-Communist formulations that
have already surfaced in this discussion.
.
France requires a national deterrent if itIS to transcend the dominance of the UnitedStates over Europe - and escape being aprotectorate.
.
One whose defenses are entrusted to another
can never remain free in such matters astrade, monetary policy or foreign policy.
So far, nothing much new: these formulations have the ring of
conventional Gaullism.
Pans as they had Prague. See Le Monde, December 10 1970 n T H.'.
L^^^h'el^viefth'r: t°^'^"
esse^^SIir^.i.eci by the'Yai::'f?;me;ork"AS t e Soviet rea appeared to recede during the vea-s of detent'^
pendence from the dominance of the U.S.
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CERES also accepts the Marchais view that Regime policies of the
1970S strayed fro™ basic Gaullist precepts. 1„ p„,i.„,,,^
,,3^^^,,^
brand of reintegration revives the Dossibnin^,, rLn p bility (or commits
"apocalyptic
-sks") that France will have to fight a war in Europe she would do bet-
ter to stay out of. As Jean-Pierre Chevine.ent views it, fiance has
"lost its margin of ^neuver stemming fro. an independent defense".
Mery and Giscard effectively repudiated de Gaulle's legacy of 15 years?"
Roundly criticized by the CERES spokesman is the doctrine of la
sanctjarisation elargie- th^-t- r-nr^r.^^i . a France can intervene in any zone whenever
the national territory appears threatened.
Giscardian doctrine has removed all rigorous significance from
the concepts of deterrence and sanctuarization. The root error of
Giscard was to design a strategy engaging in actual warfare. Such a
strategy is based on two pillars:
a) Tactical nuclear weapons.
b) The presence of U.S. forces in Europe.
Ideas summarized here are from "Strategie de rupture et inde-
^^^^^-^^ipl^"^ -h-h constitutes-O^ii^^^W^ffe^l^^
cation ^o thrp^
le4_communistes et le^^utres. It was also a communi-t e Comite Directeur of the PS on November 7, 1975.
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Ideally, deterrence requires some definition of what Chevene-ment terms a concept of non bataille (ie a criteria of when not to use
ws3.pons / •
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The supe.po„ers do not intend to e.ploy thei. st.ategio weapons.
But they would invoke theater^ nn^i^wjvc Liiedrer nuclear weanon<5 tk-,-^pons. This requires them to
call upon their aUles to strengthen conventional forces." Giscard
acquiesces in all this because he is wedded essentially to the
..eriean
bilization. The role of Prance is to Join, to the extent if its abil-
ity, in maintaining the status quo.^^
In Chevenement's applied Marxism, a confident rulin. class, se-
cure in its future, does not allow its vital goals and choices to depend
on others. A problem arose because the bourgeoisie of Western Europe,
having experienced two world wars, developed valid self doubts about its
own viability.^ -* m fact, since 1936 Prance has been living in the hope
cc-
conventional war broke out in Europe the II c; usufficient time rn ro^^io^+ . '< ^ i , xn u.b. would have
would devastate eIZI II ""^""^^^ tactical weapons
p. 336
Chevenement cautions against. Ibid.,
tu.al in'l9?rd ^^^""^It
^""^ ^i^^i^g^^ ^ould apply the same policy to Por-g m 1975 during the revolution. Or they could agree with other
eS::Ln'°:rthe'%cff^^
credits^advanced to^taly cofS:.:;fu o'n^^he
such a' th?f . ^ .
participation in Government. Subordinations. is are hardly an independent role for France. In fact thevcould one day be applied to France itself. And France would be compelled
effect 'n- h'"'"'
°" " -iddle-rank power ( une nation moyenne ) if, Giscard accepts the Kissinger formulaH-on: conceding onlv "re-gxonal^responsibilities" to Europe, while reserving global lu^Ss to
Of '"^r"'''?-
^^^^^ interesting point: that Lenin's concepto international politics, which envisaged warring capitalist states,never foresaw the arrival or ascendancy of a single capitalist super-power. Put another way, Lenin did not forese^lhiT Europe (or the ca-pitalist world) would be vassalized to the U.S., a subordination result-ing from World War II.
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the protector
.as .M.te.;
^3 UnUe. St«e.
..e PrencH r.Xi„,
'
-ass, sa,s CHev.ne.ent, sees i.s ^ture un.er the win, of an
..erican
Europe.
„
ia not a nation the, are
.e.en.in,,
.ut t.eir own privileges,
"here does this analysis of CERES leave the Left. Can it fra.e
a defense polioy. Chev^ne.ent notes that foreign policy has always heen
the .ajor arena of confrontation between Socialists and Co.unists. His-
torically, Co^nists could only conceive of the advent of socialise on
a world level: they relied on the achievements of socialism as realized
in the USSR.^^
Before signing the Programine coT.T.un
. as we saw earlier in this
chapter, the Socialists had not conceived any new framework for national
defense outside the liMts of the established international order (that
is, the dependency just described). The PCF, before its signature,
could only envisage progress towards socialism stemming from some rever-
sal of the relation of forces to the advantage of the USSR. Neither of
these two perspectives required France to conceive of policies indepen-
"^^^^ °^ The Programme commun gave no special priority
to national defense questions, contenting itself with general declara-
tions of intent. But the logic of the Program did compel reevaluations
5 5
They
_ only favored French interests if they did not contradictgeneral objectives of global strategy. This was the classic foreignpolicy subordination imposed by the heirs of Tours.
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the concept, of defense held by the two Parties. Por instance it
put sociaUs™ on the
.ore i.ediate agenda in Trance, hrea.ing „ith the
doomsday notions of socialis™ which haunted the eariier Xeft. The two
working-Class parties were thus compelled to reconsider their own
strengths and to endow an independent defense policy for France, if
their rhetoric about a "Europe of workers" was to rise above pious
Sloganeering. The ability of the two Left Parties to ha^er out a joint
defense policy was largely the ability to assume effectively the
national destiny. Success would signal a historic ^turity, overcoming
divisions that could not be healed in 1936 and 1946.
Reading Chevenement in the more detached light of today, one
cen see that he was unrealistically optimistic about the ability of the
two formations on the Left to transcend their world views. Super-
imposed over the historical split in the working class movement was
the division of Europe into blocs. The Parties in France could not
resolve this.
In the 1970s, the Communists appeared to be leading proponents
of national independence. To the extent that the Party separated it-
self from the interests of the Soviet state, it was able to revise its
classic opposition in principle to nuclear weapons (a legacy of the era
when U.S. strategic dominance perhaps justified this propaganda line).
In other words. Communist thinking evolved in France to the extent that
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or u.b. diplomacy.
Rocard and thp pc;
— l_ e_PS. Another tendance inside the PS - to h^° be exDlored
only briefly herp _ ; o ^^^y n e is represented by Michel Ror^r^Hy n i K card, an important, though
; 7
""^"^^^^^"^
*° -----
-
-.e...p.
.
ot the National Secretsion =, i- ds retariat, Rocard 's roots reach h^-^v ^^ n back to the old SFIO
-
«en PSU - „e
^
^^^^^^
one t.at is hopeXe.s.,
„.«,3t.„eea t.e superpowers."
.oear. sco^s
the force de frappe hecmi^^b ause it serves more -Fr>^+ , •as a factor making for vul-
nereMnt.,
, ,3,^^^. ^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^
powers.
..t hardl, n.elear enemies, Oespi.e these
.e«cie„cie3,
,e
stxll sees the nation playing an international role. Basic to the de-
fense Of Prance (or an.v socialist state, such as Vu.oslavia or Vietna.)
.3 a defense policy capable of denying intolerable provocations fro.
other states. The l»ediate task, according to the for.er deputy, is
to protect against two for.s of war: blockade and ground invasion. Thefor^er^^^e^^^
^^^^^^^^
disii.edlTdL^rSt\^d"by"pje^\rc^iu°:is::' --'"^
67^
Le Monde
, September 3, 1970, p. n.
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powered attack submarines.
^'^^'^''^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^
A.te.
.He coup inChUe, ,ax.
.He ce.e.s a.
.He Santiago War CoUe.e „e.e arrested a„a
con^e^e.
.o. tHei. ecpUcity in Mien^e^s Popu.a. Unit, Movement
over iOO o^ieers were i^piiea.ea. THe iesson was no. ios. on .He .e..
.n rrance,
„Here i. revived widespread discussion and deHa.e on .He roie
Of tHe .r.,.
.3 advoea.e3 o. a new sociaX order in .He i.vOs. reacHin,
toward power in .He s.a.e, i. was onXy prudent
.Hat
.He Lef. consioer
the Ar.y. Bu.
.He Lef. Had always considered
.He Ar„y in i.s oaXoula-
t-ns. in fac,
.He one ou.s.anding innova.ion in defense
.Hinking
conceived and origina.ed by .He Lef. was
.Ha. of tHe "nation in ar^s'-
the idea of
.-every citizen a soldier". Historically,
.His concept rea-
ches bae. to tHe Revolution: to assure
.He defense of a free nation, all
the^ns of FVance^ere to be enrolled in her defense.'" THis was the
58.^
Not missile-firing si]'hm3-m'noo tk t
before they even leave thl^^
uiD arines The latter are vulnerable
an enemy's anU-mLsIL de^^n^'^'-M ^^^^ -^^^^^ never penetrate
October grSo^ p 9. ^ " ''^"'''"^ I-Jonde,
69„
retired recruits 'an'd'of'ficer^'.''^""™"' some reservis.s,
repor.s back the p ! °™ ^""^^ "1^ periodic
the rSi'ary Que^.i^nford''".'-"^'
poin.-of-vil; o?"r^°ure\'e^l::e™r!^^'°" ^''^"^"^^
70
ITell argu^::";H:;1;ciaH:?:^^urd o"n?y
iden?ified wi^h th '1 "^""y Sre« reformist: when they
'
™ru';::;trdef:n:int'
°'
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Classic
.acoMn formulation. The Co^.nists, as self-p.oclai„ed hei.s
of this tradition, e*ra=ed the doctrine fully." Socialists, too
consider it .asic, yielding such notions as ar.in, the people, and
suppressing permanent, professional armies."
Historically, however, the doctrine posed certain problems for
the communists, since it collided with that other „ell-kno™ Leninist
formulation, rejecting all defense of the bourgeois state. The probl
Of reconciling the dilemma was much like squaring the circle (probably
explaining many cf the policy shifts, reversals and contradictions in
policy described here since the time of Jaures).'^
em
A corollary of the concept - as the coup in Chile seems to sug-
gest
-
was that of the Army (that is a professional army) as a possible
74
repressor. This theme surfaces often when spokesmen from the Left
,
•
1 .
^
^""""^ seeking to destroy the army, as our enemies nretenciwe wxsh to gxve tne nation the army it needs a^d to assure to ?t^?he'
from'^h: '.^''^'^'^'r conditions which wiS free itt e impasse (created by the present regime)". George MarchaL
livv! p. n°!'
''''' Cahiers du Communisme
.
No! 12, Dece^er,
. .
^
J^Some currents in the PS leaned toward a mobilisation popu-laire whxch they felt could replace nuclear weapons in halting anaggressor: Jaures synthesized into some romanticized Maoism.
73^,
^l^^
1920s the PCF rejected all militarism. In oppo-sing conscription. It was in effect rejecting the "nation in arms"Challener, pp. 165 and 207.
74
That a rightist professional army might try to prevent themfrom governing. Better to have a large army of working class con-
scripts. The Programme commun calls for six-month service for all
suggesting the citizen soldier theme.
'
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discuss defense policy.
When the PCP in 19V5 abandoned the classic formulation of the
dictatorship Of the proletariat, so.e Party
.e^ers feare. that (assu-
.xng Co^^unists ever achieved power) they would he leavin, their new
wo..ers. state without any
.eans of reacting against activities of the
bourgeoisie: that Co^nists would he yielding up their repressive appa
^atus and exposing themselves to counter-revolutionary risKs, hecause:
;ia;^T^''f ^"^^^ renounce theirplans for domination and for their privilegesThey will attempt a recovery through illegSi;;*
subversion and violence (making use of) anpossible means within the staff apparft^; ^among
eLmenJ^'s^^y
"^^^ constitute an essential
Hyperbole aside, such a view is widely held on the Left. Fur-
thermore, there is evidence that it is not entirely without foundation.
Thus Jacques Isnard, a strategic affairs editor for Le Monde
, set forth
evidence to document the Army's role as an anti-popular force.
•
The army as a possible means of last resort against
revolution
.
tor example, during the disturbances
of May 1968, de Gaulle withdrew to Baden Baden(where France maintains a military base across theKhme) for reasons never made clear.
me" Cahierr.' r'''^'^-' democratique au socialis-
'
"-an rs du Communisme. February-March, 1975, p. 187.
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_
Andre Fanton, who succeeded Debre as Minister of Defensenever concealed that the D.O.T. (defense operationelle du territoire)could be used as a means of preventing renewed incidents such as thecrisis of May 1968". Le Monde
,
July 25, 1973.
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are! tJ^T^J^^^^f^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
det^i-Th ti. evidence, followed in closeaxl by the military authorities.
•
Furthermore, the actions of various ,nt,-tary groups and
-volutionary^'e^Se^S "( ch
chi!ts n along with anar-n s , pacifists and members of the CDFT.''
The Left has focused not only on the potential for domestic
repression by the Army, but it has also generated discussion of the
serious morale problems, particularly among conventional forces, long
neglected during the de Gaulle years. J.P. Chevenement describes a
strong feeling among Socialists in France of a malaise in the Army.'^
Many of the youth consider it a waste of time. Chevenement maintains
that the Army should not be cut off from the people, as sho», by ex-
perience in Vietnam, Israel, Yugoslavia and Switzerland: a nuclear
deterrent has little meaning if not supported by a popular deterrent.
As another Socialist, Jean Marceau, expresses it:
77,
be Monde, October 17 iq7^ ik t jt .
Old one: thiFlh^French Army"isTcon ;iv bXe're^^^ ^i^ ^o^c': Z beused in possible domestic subversion. repress ve force to
78
Le Monde, November 9 197^ i o nu ^
arrangemenTT^ch
"evetrP^ench::^ ^ho d be' inle":"™'a"2;:i!"
a f^: ho'^r's'-^'H^"''
'° "^^^"^"^^
'^^ be mobSiSd in
ideas of tL'pcr l-T T ^""^ t*"^ anti-praetorianI he PCF, which also favors brief military training for all.
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Defense concerns all citizenc; •
abstract activity cut of^ in i.".
reserved for speciaUs^f V ^f.^"-^^^ ^^d
The car^it^i^.l I ^ ^ ^^i^Y activity,in pitalist system has divided men's hearts ^nHspirits and has smothered any sense Sf persona]responsibility. The task of Socialists'in aperspective of workers self-management is to insome way recreate these conditions and JesSre thespirit of defense in our people. 79
^^^^^
The critique from the Left goes so far as to suggest that
through malaise and inertia, Prance's territorial defense has been over-
looked, the nation remains as vulnerable as it ever was in 1870 or
19^0. ^°
Marceau's specific recommendations to the National Secretariat
call for a regional defense-in-depth to meet all risks of aggression,
infiltration and occupation, especially to thwart sabotage in the infra-
structure which might paralyze vital installations. This requires a
capability to oppose parachutists and light infantry. Civil defense
is vital to protect the population.
1) All citizens, of all classes and sexes, must
,
Marceau was Secretary of the Socialists' Commission ofNational Defense. See Le Monde
, December 3, 1978, p. n.
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According to one Communist source, lack of a large reservearmy led to the defeats of 1870-71 and setbacks in the early daysWorld War I. Communists invoke not only Jaures, but their own' exper-iences m rallying resistance in World War II. See Pierre Villon
ilcuTlitZ Z%tl2:' Co^unisme/No. 3,
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receive defense training for six months.Cad.es would then he sc:t;e;ed fo; s xmonths, and then spend si>
ally, close to home.
e
2) Administratively, territorial defense
"ould fall under the Ministry of DeSnsBut civil defense would be entrusted tolocal ministerial departments.
It could be said that many of Marceau's formulations are a oix
Of the practical and the Utopian. He believes, for example, that cit-
izen responsibility in defense can only succeed in a structure that
is decentralized. This requires a redefinition of hierarchical rela-
tionships and traditional modes of discipline in the army. Ideally,
(as most
-nation-in-arms- advocates urge) a people's defense force
would be based on a proximity of residence. Service should be done in
a territory that is kno™ and loved by the recruit. Military environ-
ment should be an open one, supressing the barracks-like qualities of
the past.
Bnse
Sale of weapons abroad
.
In concluding this review of national defe,
issues, we look briefly at the controversial question of arms exports
by France. France remains the world's third largest supplier of weapons
exports. The Left has generally been critical of arms sale policies,
particularly where sales have been to states whose regimes it opposes.
In one parliamentary debate Communists charged to Defense Minister Debre"
that since its inception, the Gaullist government had sold weapons to
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Spain, Portugal, Greece Rr^^ni d i •, B azxl, Pakistan and South Africa. Further-
more, these
.eapons
.ere used against liberation
.ove.ents in Angola
Mo.a.M,ue and Cuinea-Bissau ^ Oe.r. defended such actions h. pointLg
out that France was often solin>.Hcited as a supplier because she "did not
attach political conditions" in her sale of weapons, as other powers
dxd. The Caullist Minister
.ade the further point that France's ar.s
.estic sales. Thus without exports, the nation would he deprived of
its truly national defense. National independence was, of course, the
familiar rallying cry of the Communists themselves
.
Despite some of the egalitarian condemnations directed by France
against South Africa, sales by France to that nation and Rhodesia have
expanded over the years, filling voids in that market left by those
U.S. and British suppliers who had honored UN-i.posed economic sanctions.
Over the past five years, the French have soldnearly half a billion dollars worth of arms -from Alouette and Super-Frelon helicopters toMirage ^ets - to the South Africans... 83
L Human ite
. November 30, 1971, p. 2.
82,
persons are eZ.lL ^^PP^^"^ economy. Some 200,000
ITtTr^T ^^Pg^d 1" weapons systems of one sort or another in thena ion, according to Edward Kolodzie j , in an oral report at the S^N?Brockport Conference Two Decades of Gaullism, June 9-U. 1978
P^T • M K l?^''^^^'
f'^ench Connection in Africa", Forei^niolicy, Number 29, Winter, 1977-78 p 152 ^-
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e
ommu-
After Liberation, nearly the entire French ar^s industry was
Piaeea under Covern.ent eontroi. But today, it is ohar.ed by the Co™
n.sts. it regains dominated by so.e of the ™ost capitalist industries
in France. Thus virtually all aircraft are build by Dassault-Br.guet
Pushed under the Gaullist Government in 1951 with the creation of th
^^i^^StiHiiOniste,^^
^.^^^
^^^^^ ^
nists have been urging nationalization of the ar.s industry, including
Dassault and Matra. Their arguments are generally posed in ethical
terms: that the existence of such power in the hands of private arms
merchants is "a challenge to public morality"/'*
France is also an important supplier of arms to West Germany,
ranking second, just behind the United States. As Helmut Schmidt noted,
"we have imported 18 percent of our armament from France in recent
years".
L Human ite
, November 30, 1971, p. 2.
85,
Le_Monde, October 26, 1970. That very month DebrS concluded
To t^eTeT 1.2 billion fLcs worth ^f Laponft he Federal Republic, including Lance missiles and naval equipment.
CHAPTER VIII
COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
Historical Overview
Afte. the „ar, differences over the construction of Europe „ere
P^^ofound, dividing the Left throughout the decades/ Oespite aix pre-
tensions to internationalisn,,
„e have seen that the Co™u„ists staged
out an eariy defense of Prance's independence, posing as a nationalist
Party, „hile Socialists (along with the MRP, Radicals and other cen-
trists) consistently e*raced the European idea.^ These differences
were not fatal and „ould not necessarily prevent the two parties fro.
governing together afte-n ^ii ^ • •-,8 , tter all, a similar gap existed between the
Gaullists and Giscardians.
^^^^^^^221^11^1^^^ The early founders of socialism made
references to a united Europe .
^ Followers of Saint Simon and Fourier
idea into their socialist concepts. Auguste Comte
^See the section on the Referendum on Europe in Chapter V.
greatnes!'aLie'!' iLltlZr^Tttll f^^^^ ' -h--
Duroselle, pp. 346-347
transposed to the level of Europe.
gie soci^lS^e'^R^''^'''^' r""" ^'^^^^P^ dans 1 ' ideolo-
furoSenf L - ^^PP°^^^ ^ongres Extraordinaire sur les problemesn^u pe ns, Bagnolet, December lb- 16, 1973, p. 4" — -
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P-*,o„. in eX..oreti„, a x:E,;r2£._Peder|, insisted t.at the ve.y
notion nationaUt,
„as an a..tra«io„
.UXe. obscurities an.
-=uraiti.s..
.eoa.se it ai. not
.e.i.e .o. nat.e. in
.act,
.iso.ssion
Of a European
.i^ension in t,e
.ra„e„or. o. socialist ^etho^s an. action
persisted within the entire Social tc,^ t.^b list International up until the major
schism in 1918.
Despite all the internationalist language, nationalise continued
to constitute a potent factor in the integration of peoples in pre-1.1.
Europe. «e have already seen the .road national elan manifested hy so-
cialists rallying to war in 191.. It see.ed clear that the state had
not been replaced as a for™ of social organization.'' Even in the Mani-
fS£to, Marx had said that the proletariat had "to constitute itself as
the nation", hater, the Bolsheviks would claim to have raised class
struggle to an international level. But they too never renounced nation-
alls, when it was instrumental. And so too with French Co«nists.
Always sensitive to the charge of betraying their loyalty to another
power, they have been quick to assert their national patriotism.^
of caDir.H^rSi^^' P^^^/P'^' '^^'•t^" productive and technical aspectspitalism had managed to transcend the limits of the nation .tateBut why should the Left rally to that type of Internatio'llL.
Employing Tiersky's scheme of the four poles of French Com™,nism, one could say that the nationalist pull was strongest when ?heCommunists were enacting their "Governmen;" role, as during Lberationand the period of the Tripartite Government. ^
l^iberatio
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Ihe postwar^years. Given this natinr^^iional perspective. Communist behavior
becomes easier to understand. The POP H.. . •i CF described integration from the
outset as a device to extend U.S. hegemony over Europe. The close lin.
between the construction of Europe and the U.S. aid made both suspect ^
And When the early spokesmen for a United Europe invoked the danger of
a Soviet takeover, it only confirmed to the Communists that anti-Soviet-
xsm was the driving motor of the European construction: formation of
an anti-Communist bloc.^ Kriegel argues that French Communists opposed
unity of Europe not so much for national reasons of patriotism, but out
of their time-honored loyalty to Soviet interests:
The existence of a powerful Europe alongside
Ttate.'L ,, socialists tes would represent a distinct disadvantageto the socialist camp.^ ^
The Schuman Plan and all functional integration schemes were
_ _
Thus the Marshall Plan was not disinterested aid nv. ^
ested aid Blurfn f ^ h°"ever. were taken in by the myth of disinter-Vlf ™ 1" fa^t. signed the accords in 19it6 with Secretary of
ly" de^"!:ss?;"'?:h-'°«'d.h"'^-"' EuropS:nr«\°ana-
^ut^eTtllerfr^;:: IX "'"^ ' ^"^"^"^
"To construct Europe requires the rallying of forces in eachnation around Governments that can reduce the cLmunists to impotence"Rassemblement, March 20, 1948, organ of the Gaullist RPF.
'^^^''^""^ '
57 Wh.^^''^^
Kriegel, The Communist Parties of Italy and France
, p.. ether or not her attribution of motive is correct, the ins ightIS accurate In fact Communist gains have been most spectacular whenEurope was disunited: namely during the two world wars. See Adam B.Ulam, The Rivals (New York: Penguin Books, 1975) p 217
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seen as betrayals,^ "eoonoM. Munichs" that would de-industrialize
France and strengthen an aggressive Germany. 1° The Pleven Plan for a
European Army (EDO was also opposed during the Thore. era. After all,
the Defense Co^unity only extended fro™ the logic of the Coal and Steel
Community. The SFIO, on the other hand, largely supported EDC." At
the time, many considered it an international "third force", a counter-
-ight to l-entente atlanrigue." Partisans, such as Guy Mollet, felt
way rule'out^^Jr^o "^J'Tf" French capitalists would not in any
sSa^ed th^^
the possibility of a Franco-German war. History demon-
war itself saWL'H "''t-" M°"" "''"""^^^ the period thedi ±z ±r, aid L'Humanite
, May 17, 1950, p. 3.
T ""^^ ^^^^ "economic inferiority complex" regard-ing_ Germany Duroselle, p. 347. France's weakest firms would be Kc-rxfxced to those of the Ruhr in the name of the "European Idea" Jaccues
create jobless French workers, compelled to expatriate themselves to
^^ancfet la'^r "''i^^
'^^^^'^
-
^--hS en
l^f n n 1
^""^ i^:H£l^2ILEuropgenne: Positions 1950-1975: Ruhens P.-. t.
L Humanite
, July 8, 1963, p. 8.
'
11
To reject the military community would endanger the entireEuropean edxfxce, the SFIO argued. France would be isolated in Europe.Nevertheless, Socialists split on EDC in the crucial 1954 Parliamentary
vote. 54 voting for, 50 against. Opposition to German rearmament assem-bled many of the same political forces that had rallied to the Resist-
ance: Communists, neutralists, Gaullists and nationalists. AlexanderWerth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 177.
12
.
This formulation did not persuade the PCF. If Truman, Acheson
and even Eisenhower (the latter head of NATO) supported the European
Army, it was unlikely they were urging a "counterweight to U.S. influ-
ence
.
The ease with which France later approved the Western European
Union (W.E.U.) suggests a greater fear of supranationalism than' of a re-
armed Germany, according to Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin,
The Security of Western Europe (London: Charles Knight and Co. Ltd.,
1972), Chapter 11. Burrows was former British Permanent Representative
to NATO.
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that the soviet threat
.o„
.learly out>,elghed the danger of a revived
Ge^any. I„ f..,, rranoo-Ge^an cooperation would help Mod Germany
into the Western camp.
Ultimately, the Communists would relax some of their fierce
opposition to
.-Europe". Tactically, the POP was seeding new alliances
and furthermore, it could not deny realities on the Continent. But the
basic hostility would always remain: a capitalist entente could never
serve Prance and its working class.
The first break in European Communist opposition to EEC came
with the Italian Communists in 1952 "^^ Th^ pppxii xauz:. ine fLt was more cautious.
Only in 1958 could Rochet note that:
.
European integration, though dominated by
monopoly capitalism, was a reality. The
struggle was to democratize it.
But Rochet denied that any construction of Europe would ever
13^ . .
Ki
Originally, the PCI opposed "Europe" as a perpetuation of theblocs on the Continent. But by 1962, economic inte.ratLn seemed Lv f
har^essx^rino'^^VH""'''- ??~-^^ --^rol that development
oS?ce .t PP^ T H socialism. A year later the CGIL opened an
CGT and ^hf?
^^^^^^^^^^^^
'
Brussels, over the opposition of the Frenchthe Soviet-controlled World Pederation of Trade Unions. Today,
It/J ^""^^^ ^ ^ ^''''^ internationally integrated economies, sothat socialism cannot be built in one country, but must be built trans-nationally.^ R.E.M. Irving, "The European Policy of the Prench and Ital-ian Communist Parties", International Affairs . Vol.53, No. 3, July 1977
Pppvc
^^"^ earlier that this issue also divided the PS from
'
CLKhS, with the latter opting for a "socialism in one country" approach
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develop an independent Continent outside the 1^superpowers/^ Furthermore
the structure created at Brusselc, .sels was undemocratic (from a PCF point-
of-view^ since neither the Communist Parties nor lahor unions of Prance
Italy had received representation at that time, despite their de-
mands for a voice. ''"^
The Co»unists rejected any transfer, of sovereignty to what
they considered a super entity of monopoly capitalist. - SuprenationaX-
^ty would not he an effective road for achieving socialise a.ong the
advanced nations of Europe. Supranationalisn, would not allow for the
simultaneous passage of six or seven states into socialism." And
finally, there was the economic ar^ment: free circulation of goods in
Europe was only freedom of action for monopolies.
lit,,
the means of'p'ro'ducti^rLl'^nf • "'^'"^ -hom
See the essay'hy ^eTcilnX^^^^ °! ^^-P^"'
Sue Ellen MrChariton, The French Left ^nH p P' ^^^ed m
graph Series No. 4 in\^^^T^^^ n ^^^°P^^" Integration, Mono-world Affairs, University of Denver, 1972 n 5 7
L Human ite
. January 8, 1968, p. 3.
16
.
reject Eur^-c"i:mu'„1:fh^c^L^fr^L;1n\e*pr:?:d=t\2™S:": ^"^^
Of supranationalism. Private intervie^r^ebJuaryls, 1979?
to go sociaUs?'°"i? ""-""'^ ^^'•-"y - Britain
serve ?he , !
^PO-^tant, the Communists argued, to pre-
statL wherf ^"^<=P«"^'^"'=^
°f <=^<=h "orking class moveSnt in thoseates ere strongest. Pierre Joquin in Le Monde, March 9, 1968 p 7
exL^enceln' ' ™" SSHtFThat will ^ass out ifist in our era". Le Monde
. February U, 1970, p. 8.
Jean Claude Poulan, "Le Parti SFIO et integration europeeneV
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The Socialiste and Europ^
Frc„ t.e start of the post-war era. Integration was considered
urgent, the onXy „eans of reviving Europe."
.nd, economic union ™ar.ed
a step towards political union that nit-nn,.^, ultimate supranational construction.
The SFIO was not obsessed with the nationalxn n sovereignty issue as were
the Co^unists. Nationalist isolation, in fact, was a condition to he
avoided. The only condition Socialists insisted upon in accepting a
European construction was that it .e
..democratic", meaning that repre-
sentatives Of workers groups sit on the High Authority.
During the 1960s, almost the entire non-Co„unist Left continued
to favor remaining in EEC, although some had lingering doubts about the
direction toward which the Community was movinc ^° <;o™=tito g. bome currents on the
19^
rival on-hc.-;^^ 4-u . •^"-"^6"^ since it would be a greater
:Srt: t' ^ItL"1n;.na:°a"^^'t"- -^^^^^
But the babour Pa ty was^^ofl To^ZX^^^^^^^^^
ZtToVZTieltol "^rr '""'^T'' Parliamentary ins i-
VerdLr/?ah r\" ^Hist'o re-^^bf '^'T
nationaux" d qv
^FIO devant quelques problemes inter-r
, p. 97. Verdier was a Secretary of the SFIO in 1946.
20
old-line SFT^n
^^^^^^^ currents on the democratic left: the
order to
P^°Pl^ definitely supported a supranational Europe in
?IcuLJL hf
^^^^-l-n^- PSU and CERES were more distrustful, par-
overtones M?t?:r^"H'K°\' r^^^'' ^^^^^^-^ DemocrltL
hloJ! % i terrand backed a united Europe, but disliked the varietv
tLn o'uld be us d'f°^^'-
'''^^
^° European 'const^ulion c ul e to prevent a Socialist Government from carrying outIts goals of democratic planning. See Ellen M. Charlton, p. 30.
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democratic Xeft had always opposed
.^eauoratic eapitaU... And burea.
catic capitalism (or a technocratic variety, seemed to he the dominant
model for European integration. This undermined some of the enthusiasm
for EEC inside the Left.
'Jl^-S^llSIl,!^^ The Socialists favored the construction of
Europe for .any reasons. Historically the Party had an internationalist
vision, with aspirations that derived fro. the brotherhood of .an. And
democratic socialism had strong historical links to Western Europe. Then,
too, there was a conviction, described in the preceding chapter, that
closer cooperation between the nation states of Europe would make war
less likely. There was also a pragmatic conviction that there would be
tangible benefits to France in industry and agriculture. The slashing
of economic barriers could help develop Western Europe's prosperity . ^2
Then, too, as we will see, there were Socialists who resented the domin-
ance of the superpowers. To them, EEC was a realistic means for France
to remain aloof and independent from the Soviets and America. Finally
some held that socialism could only be built within a European frame-
work. France could not do it alone, since it was a problem of conti-
Ibid.
, p. 30.
22.
ri ^
^""^
integration as a means toward an end, namely theUnited States of Europe, much as the Prussian Zollverein fostered the
uniting of Germany. Others had less lofty notl^^^^T^^idering eco-
nomic integration alone a legitimate end. Duroselle, p. 349.
23
Thus there was a close link between the "struggle for social-ism and the struggle for Europe", said Report No. 2 of Les Socialistes
et 1 Europe, issued by the PS Congres Extraordinaire on Europe, Bagnolet
December 15-16, 1973, p. 69.
~~
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24mental dimension. An exponent of this view is Rocard.^^
Given these attitudes. Socialists strongly criticized de Gaulle
for having blocked and retarded the fusion of the European Community.
Socialists re jectde Gaulle's famous formulation of a "Europe of nations-
The unity of Europe was impossible among sovereign states operating in
a framework limited to intergovernmental links.
Rhetoric of this period sounds hyperbolic today. Gaston Def-
ferre spoke of a "socialist continent" operating throughout an indus-
trially developed European nation, a model distinct from American
capitalism or Russian collectivism;
24
.
^^""^y 13'^° ^ debate opened up on whether socialism was pos-
sible m a national framework - or did it require a European context
Robert Furon's Mouvement objectif 1972 took the latter view: the exist-
ence of Social Democrats in Britain and France was a plus factor in
advancing socialism. Others rejected the Social Democrats of other
countries, since many were not working to overcome capitalism, but tointegrate into it. Several PS federations sought to adhere to this
movement, but ultimately, it remained autonomous. Le Monde
, March 6, 1970,
25
"We seek to join rhe interests of all European workers, in
steel, autos and farms, who demand a common solution. This must be im-
posed on the capitalist states. A socialist regime in France will have
the task of proposing solutions that will allow for joint planning and
the establishment of Euro-wide public sectors, imposed by the joint
pressure of all states". Le Monde
,
May 28, 1969, p. 5.
25
Thus de Gaulle was particularly guilty, since he placed the
executives of ECSC, Euratom and the Common Market in positions of depend-
ence to the heads of states and ministers of the various governments.
Socialists also challenged his arrogant refusal to deal with anything
haying the remotest supranational nature. See Rapport General au Con-
gres Extraordinaire sur les problemes Europeens (Bagnolet) December
15-15, 1973, p. 13.
~
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.tel.st Giscardian
„odel would be aligned with the U.S. Only a so-
cialist Europe oould distinguish itself fro™ the American identity.
Maurice Duvere-^^r
-Fn-r.8-, fo example, saw Uttle purpose in struggling for an
autonomous Europe if the creation had the sa.e design for society as
the united States. It would only lead to an Atlantic entity directed hy
Washington. Why not have the Euronean ^t.±..r^urope s ates one-by-one join the U S
li^e Hawaii and Alaska., he as.ed ironically. That way, they coul/at
least enter in U.S. Presidential elections and receive directives fro.
a Secretary of State, rather than fro. an Arnhassador in Brussels. Inte-
gration would he a better for. of decolonization than le_protectorat
^iBSHfle. Better to be Texas than the Philippines.
'
Duverger meant that only a socialist Europe could develop independ-
ently of the. U.S. But he doubted that the EC of 1975 could build social-
ism in France, considering that the Community (particularly the SPD and
the British Labour Party) opposed the PS-PCF alliance of that period.
Thus the Marche commun and the Programme commun were incompat-
27
Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle p 137
Duverger, see his discussion, p. 139.
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ible: member states could not -rpn^nf- p^^xa reject Community rules considered con-
t.ary to their basic interests.^^ Only a Socialist Europe could be gen-
uinely independent; there was no superpower to which its society would
then correspond. But in calling for a socialist Europe, Duverger
rejected the social democratic model of the FRG and the Labour Party
.
In the short run, any strengthening of the European Community would
render socialism in France nearly impossible, because an authentic Eur^
pean Community would compel France to restrain progress towards social-
ism, awaiting the day when its other European partners could catch up .^^
One helpful way to understand the variety of socialist concepts
regarding Europe is to identify the many positions that surfaced at
Party forums. Earlier, I suggested that many socialists sensed a
malaise inside the EEC.'^ 1973 was a key year; the PS staged its Congres
Extraordinaire at Bagnolet devoted to France. This came only 18 months
after the signing of the Programmme commun
. and Mitterrand, now First
Secretary, remained committed to the European idea. But there was
dissent within, particularly in CERES.
29
logic is close to the PCF view: that the EEC would never
allow socialism.
He rejected a troika of Mollet, Schmidt and Harold Wilson.
A socialist Europe required leaders of the first rank, such as
Mitterrand, Brandt and Bevan
. Ibid., p. 142.
3
1
The sluggish socialism of the Nordic states would act as a
brake on socialism that was in full ardour in France. Ibid., p. 143.
32
^See the discussions in Chapter V noting the generation gap
in socialist and democratic-left thinking regarding Europe.
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2;^i!in~^2SitiH2. on Nove^er 1,. .SV3, Mitterrand proposed
sending representatives around to other European Socialist Parties to
coordinate concents Rn-t- >,-;^p . Bu his proposal received a lukewarm majority
fro™ the Executive Bureau. Mitterrand attached great significance to
the plan, and a week later he asked the Comite_Jirecte^ to arbitrate
the issue. If he lost, he would resign.^^ Europe represented a major
issue Of principle. He had gone to great lengths within the Socialist
International to tress Hts ^7^^,.r^ ^p hi views, nurturing special ties to both Olof
Palme and Bruno Kreisky. The Party, he felt, could not merely rely on
the European initiatives of Pompidou or Foreign Minister Jobert. Rather,
it had to launch its own initiatives. Nor did Mitterrand want to allow
control over these Party policies to be taken over by rival tendencies
within the PS. 3^ Mitterrand feared too much factionalism within the Party
on foreign policy issues, such as Europe, nuclear weapons and the Mid-
dle East. The Party risked being defused into a morass of currents,
33
r' ^ ,
proposed representatives were chiefly pro-Europeans-
latter of CERES Le Monde, November 17, 1973. p. 10. Mitterrand and
Labour pI"7 ^^IT""
^^1^^.^^" ^^at year to settle differences with theParty,, which was resistant to a supranational Europe.
34^.
Mitterrand's stature in the post-Epinay PS was high. He didwant his mandate on foreign policy, and probably had no true intention
or resigning.
35
t^^s'^ ^ fi^f" stand the prior month on the October, 1973Arab-Israeli War. Many in the PS felt the impotence of Europe in world
attairs. During that War, the two superpowers effectively settled theissues. Europe was mute, manifesting this impotence. Mitterrand was
seeking to change this.
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P^eve„«„,
^ ^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
put his own leadership on the line.^^
-re ™ovi„, sig^incantxy towards a .ore European posiUon t.an at
the t..e Of the signing of the Prog.a..e co..„n m 1972 '7
the crenohle Congress in
„73, an. at Bagnolet, the „o„ent™
continued. The construction of E^ope „as now descrihe. as a precon-
dition for Socialists in Europe. Indeed, the Co«nity required
What the left often ter™ a renewed social content, but Mitterrand was
prepared to carry this out through his good ties with other European
Socialist heads of state (an approach sure to arouse the suspicion of
Communist alliance partners).
After much internal dissent, several factors brought the PS
to a consensus on the European question. Certainly the oil crisis of
Autu^, 1973 and the lack of unanimity among the "Nine" were factors
co^elling the Party toward a firm stand on a supranational Europe. And
36
'
ic. o^^
The PS works under difficult conditions, and the leadershinIS ften overburdened. Coordination is noor^ ThI ^^'"^
/^^^er p
often generated hostilitv rJr.
p or The activities of CERES
J.
n i y. Two years after Epinav the Partv ti^cascending, yet still riven with tendencies. ^
3 7
tizn-na 't^
P^og^am called for participation in EEC, but a-democra-
woui'd'retain airo%''''°"''H''
'''''
' '^'^ GoverL^n?
transforLSons! ' '^^^'^ ^'^'^^ ^^^^^^^^ °- --al
38
"Decisive action toward socialism cannot be made within anational framework", said Mitterrand. Le Monde
. December l^ lSa! p.
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one
.,oul. not underestimate the e«ect of Hitterrana's earHer threat
"social de^ocratiC vie„ on Hurope: a return to the ori^inaX conceptions
Of the oi. SPiO. even oXd veterans, such as Hoiiet. raiiie. support
.or
Mitterrand for the first time since Epinay.^^
However, „e „st underscore one key difference. The original
postwar Socialist impulse toward a United Europe stemmed largely from
fear of Soviet and Communist power. But in the 19703 the impulse toward
Europe emerging at Bagnolet was more anti-American in tone: Europe had
to be constructed to resist U.S. influence. In Mitterrand's specific
analysis, the necessity for Europe stems largely from his critique of
America, which is chiefly economic in nature. Mitterrand describes a
U.S. system of free trade as one which operates with its o«, internal
coherence, and has an external tendency toward expansion. This expan-
sion often contradicts European interests. However, a nation (such as
France) cannot simply withdraw from this American system of free trade.
It must enter another system. In other words, socialism cannot be
established in France under autarchic conditions. Furthermore, a so-
cialist France designed on a purely national basis, would expose France
to the risks of a Chilean style coup. The foregoing analysis argues for
Europe. Mitterrand goes on to reject the CERES-Duverger-Communist
39
Le Monde, December 18, 1973, pp. 8, 9 and 10.
40
Ibid.
, pp. 8, 9, 10.
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analysis that EC still regains a capitalist project.
The attitude of the U.S. to«ara Europe has also changed. Amer-
icans tavorel unit, durin, the earl, reconstruction and cold-„ar
.ears
But toda. the construction o. Europe is
.eared as a rival in the ^orM
economy.
^S^^SiiteSEtion^Jor^E,^^^
^^^^^
a re.nvigorated European Cc-unity. Socialists repeatedly call for a
"democratization" tk^
.
The term xs vague. What is their alternative to a
neo-capitalist Europe of nation states^ Measure, h kLc L^b. u s nave been put forth
so^e Of Which are sketched out below. By no .eans complete, this UsL
some of the specific ideas and proposals French Socialists have devised
for the EC.
2}±S2iS^l^LPa^n^. i„
^ str„g*ened Commu-
nity, with broader powers transferred to the supranational level. So-
cialists would want to enlarge legislative powers of the European Parl-
iament in Community decisionmaking. Such a Parliament should be em-
powered to vote on the EC budget. The Council of Ministers should be
so theya:!^oftt^\L^«irt\%irLi?i?:?ijn:
:nn^s^":f:r^ent:
42
At Bagnolet, Robert Pontillon hailed the fact th^t th^ nq h anow come to -Ff^^-n h-k^ v-cn ^.^^.^^ luc rd r rna ne US had
Ouin "?he K • "P"" =°'"Pstitor to be reckoned with. J G
?971-197^" 7 ^°"alist Party and the EEC: Attitudes and Polio es
also that the pTre- t "° n°tes
sumers during the ^^vf
.
^ '° ""^^""^ '="''°P'=™1973 oil crisis forming multi-national negotiatingblocs. Europe should negotiate on its own, without U.S. inferferenL
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required to consult U ™o.e than is
.urgently the practice. To enhance
the stature of the Parliament, they favored elections hy direct, univer-
sal suffrage, and the granting to the Parliament of powers comparable
to a sovereign parliament
.
'^^
EB££SL^2licy. Decisions on energy cannot be separated from
political choice. They are not technocratic issues, but policy issues
to be defined within the framework of democratic planning. If the
people of Europe have all the facts, referendums could even be employed
on specific questions.^^ Within the EC there should be more coordination
to deal with questions of supply and research on new sources and forms
of energy. Speaking broadly, the PS seeks a greater energy independence
for Europe, and the esrablishment of new relations with producing nations,
favoring those whose political orientation is closer to that of the
French Left.^^
Monetary policy. Policies would no longer support the preemmi-
nence of the U.S. dollar. Formerly, the U.S. was able to maintain its
deficit balances through this preemminence
. Socialists would urge a
common European unit of account and common exchange reserves pooled with
a central monetary fund. This latter plan is not that different from
Bagnolet Report, p. 26. Socialists favor all proposals to
change the current institutional balance between the European Parliament
and the Commission. See Robert Pontillon in the above report, p. 21.
L Unite
,
February 23, 1979, p. 9.
Bagnolet Report, p. 10.
Bagnolet, p. 25.
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the Giscardian conceptions,
^^^^^^^^1^1121^^ Thesefi..sare,of cou.se, the
ti.e-wo.n Whipping hoy of Co^nist analysis. But Socialists, too, have
had to contend with the advent of multinationals to Europe, m so.e
ways, they a.e an important aspect of the anti-A.ericanis. just referred
to. The problem, in their analysis, is that capitalist exploitation
now transcends the national framework.^^ The resulting new form of en-
terprise, with its centralized management, essentially lacks any account-
ability. Many are, of course, American, and they add a new dimension
to the problem of concentration. The Socialists (who have spelled out
their nationalization policy in the domestic portion of the Common
Program) speak about developing a European public sector and expanded
planning under the control of the workers.
Agriculture po licy. Socialists call for greater participation
by farmers and consumers groups within the European Fund for Agricultu-
ral Guidance and Guarantee (reOGA) to provide for representation by far-
mers' organizations.^' They would also seek to change and redirect cer-
tain Community policies, including a reform of CAP, involving regional
problems. Agriculture is viewed as a Community problem. The U.S. view
that the CAP is too protectionist, is rejected. ^° To date, the major
Le Pomg et la Rose
,
August, 1978, p. 8.
48^ ^ .he Pomg et la Rose
, December 23, 1973.
49
.
Ibid., August, 1978, p. 11.
Qum, p. 217.
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burdens on financing agriculture have fallen on consumers through higher
prices. CAP has not benefitted the smaller farmer, only the larger
producers
.
^^^^i2££atized.^^^
^^^.^^.^^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
are designed to provide greater voice and control to workers organiza-
tions. The goal is to promote Europe-wide labor legislation, covering
such questions as equal pay for men and women, questions of vacation
time, as well as basic protections to migratory workers abroad. Social-
ists also seek the development of less favored regions of Europe. A
goal is full employment. Socialists also call for a strengthened soli-
darity of the labor syndicates of Europe.
Beyond the agenda sketched here, French Socialists seek to ad-
vance prospects for socialism throughout the EEC countries, establishing
some form of unity of purpose throughout the European Left, in both po-
litical parties and unions. The hope is to build a transnational collab-
oration of socialist forces: the pre-1914 cry of uniting the workers
everywhere in Europe. Inside the European Parliament, Socialist depu-
ties were a prime force for elections transcending national boundaries.
They were urging parliamentary groups to form and function without the
51^
Bagnolet Report, p. 21. Such a project is not as easy as it
sounds. The British Labour Party, for instance, is split on the ques-
tion of Europe, and it is far more suspicious of supranationalism than
French Socialists. Links between the PS and the SPD worsened when the
SPD established relations with the Gaullists, even going as far as send-
ing representatives to Gaullist conferences. See Le Monde, February
6-7, 1972. ^
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control of national parties But th^."^ OUT ese were o-nsi ^ r^^-t-goals, not accomplishments,
The disenchantment on the democratic left with the European en-
terprise came from those
- ii,e CEKES and PSU - „ho increasing!, saw
Europe developing strictl, on capitalist and technocratic lines. Inte-
gration only seemed to encourage the penetration of Western Europe hy
U.S. capital. The EEC was not encouraging national planning. (The PCF
Of course, accepted these interpretations.) The PSU, in opposing this
'
for. of integration, did not reject the principle of integration.
«
The Communists Reverse on "Europe "
The PCF opposed Socialist European policies throughout the post-
war years and up until the 1970s as class collaboration. But in the
1970s the ftrtybegan to take note of new realities. Certainly elector-
al strategy had much to do with the shifting of gears. We saw earlier
how the PCF wooed the SFIO towards a leftist alliance. At this point
it is necessary to examine in more detail reasons for the Communist re-
versal
It would be too simple (and cynical) to attribute shifting
Communist attitudes towards European integration entirely to tactical
electoral motives. There were some definite evolutions in their analy-
sis, stemming from changed circumstances in the international political
5 2^Communists went further, rejecting the entire integrationprocess. Charlton, pp. 71-72 ^t^grari
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configuration. By the mid-=;i v^.'^oy ^iic u xu S xties, even tho v>nv k-j
,
, ne PCF had been rethinking
earlier positions and noting certain international developments that
were positive fro™ its point-of-vie„." P.o„ 19.8 to ISV., one oould
note:
.
A stabilizing of the cold war; start of detente.
.
A completion of French withdrawal from NATO.
.
Start of the monetary crisis, which heightenedEuropean suspicion of the U.S. role.
.
Progressive settlement of the German question.
.
The enlargement of the EEC.
.
The signing of the Programme commun
.
'
iri972''55°^^^^°''
°^ existence of the EEC
The leftist unions in Europe were also seeing the need for
growing cooperation on the Continent, despite their ideological
53^
l,,tnV All
declared that withdrawal of France from the At-an ic Alliance and Common Market were not conditions precedent for an
lS!'l963" ^°™nists and Socialists. Humanite-Dimanche . October
Kor..t.H
^''^^^"g period, 1959, Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa colla-
tic^T rl // •^^'^ Pour- ou contre 1' Europe , setting forth PC? posi-ons. The official line continued to call for an end to blocs inEurope and the holding of a European security conference.
55^
Brezhnev said it was a reality, that the USSR had no inten-tion of undermining it. Le Monde
, March 21, 1971, p. i. And two yearslater, Soviet Academician Inozemtsev noted that an independent Europe
undertaking friendly relations with the USSR and the U.S. would be the
most^likey model for the 1970s. He saw no threat from European inte-gration.
_
Soviets describe European integration "as an attempt by mono-poly capitalism to reconcile private economic and productive forces
which had overcome national frontiers". 1952 thesis of the Institute ofWorld Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. See Cahiers d'Histoire
p. 110. '
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^Xtlnationexs and
.He increased Integration of European economies.
The various Co»unist Parties were also recognising this need (despite
eari.er resistance to participating in EEC forums,." Eor a brief period
there was a coordinated Europe-wide strate»v At kf vvj-ue ^L gy. Strasbourg, the PCE
and PCI forned a parliamentary group, hut it was ^re sy*olic than sig-
nificant, not always able to define joint Co^nist positions. By the
1970S the POP also saw a need to broaden contacts with other European
political forces: socialist and Christian as well as Co^unist. It did
not want to be isolated within the EEC.
Despite all of this, the fundamental hostility to integration
remained. However, it was only in 1978, when the Union of the Left
began to disintegrate, that French Communists could again openly express
their deep-seated fears of the integration of Europe. They made these
56,
Le Monde
.
July 26, 197H, p. 6. The PCF In it= „• ,CFDT, worriiT^t preserving it^ d;mi;ant influen e over hi ?Lde
CGlT rrr*- y'"^" '^'^^^^ *° "e Ixamp : Sitalv'sLblL, which was already oartici tinrr -Tr. rvn . ^ iraiy s
th«= PPT n ^^^^^'^iP^^mg m EEC organs. As early as 1959e CG sat on a consultive comiBittee dealing with the free mLrationof Labor See Charlton and the European Con^munity Quarterly No 40November-December, 1970, p. 24. ^
^^d c i
,
n . ,
Le Mo.J'jZT. T^T in the Parliament.
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,„,^« ^ . V^^
"^^"^^ earlier should not be overlooked: the PCFsuspected that a strong, enlarged Europe was a political device to wea-ken the large Communist Parties of Europe. The supranationalists
"^^eek
II ob?a1neTth'' 'h' '"'^ ^^^^^"^^ ^'-^-^ successes anbe t ined throug a national framework for the French or Italian peonle"Jean Buries and
_ Georges Cogniot, "Pour la veritable Union Europlene"
'
Cahiers d'Histoire
, p. 118.
'
22 3
arguments
wuSthf'T' ^''"^ compete
ine entry of Spam, Portugal and Greece, with theircheaper products, would endanger French farmers. 59
suorana^""
^^^^ situations where
^ionaf^nT f^-^^^°™^<-g would encroach on na-t onal independence. Currently, EEC had been oper-ating under a unanimity voting rule. A majoritvcould not enforce its will against a recalcitrant
ch^^e
But this situation couldC ang . The fear was that enlargement of EEC fromnine to twelve would lead to a majority-rule form ofdecision-making. 60
Some Doctrinal Issues Confronting the
Communists on European Integration
French Communists, recognizing a popular attachment to the Eur-
opean idea, have always been defensive about what appeared to be their
retrogressive nationalism, especially considering their original Marx-
ian calling for internationalism. Communists had long been charged
with defending an outdated idea. of independence. Development of a
modern economy required overcoming not only social division, but the
archaic national divisions as well. Why shoulld French Communists be
59
Nadine Bourdin, PCF official, in a private interview
February 14, 1979. Also see L ' Human ite
,
July 30, 1977, p. 3.
'
_
xhus the old argument: decisions affecting France will be madem Brussels, Madrid and Bonn. There was also a fear that with an en-larged EEC, French capitalists, seeking the most rational places to in-
vest, would seek out the cheaper labor countries, developing facilities
in Spain, Greece and Portugal. Since Spain was Fascist for 40 years,
It lacked the advanced labor conditions of France. Industry's search
for cheap labor would heighten the jobless crisis in France. These were
domestic politic reasons used to justify a PCF international position.
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blind to the original aspirations of their founders?
The problem was to reconcile traditional Marxian international-
ism with the more current insistence on a national France. Critics of
PCF policy could, for instance, cite Engels hiniself:^!
It is your great compatriot, Saint Simon, whoforesaw that an alliance of the three great
western nations - France, England and Germany
-
would be the first condition for the political
and social emancipation of all of Europe. This
alliance, tied to a European alliance, will
forever end the cabinet wars and ethnic con-
flicts: I hope to see it carried out by the
proletariat of the three countries.
One of the founders of "scientific socialism" is actually
calling for the unity of Europe. As in many doctrinal disputes, all
sides are adept at invoking the founders. Communists concede that for
both Marx and Engels an alliance of European states was indeed an idea.
But, such an historical undertaking could only be enacted through the
efforts of the proletariat. In many ways, it is a "cart-horse debate",
as we saw with Duverger.
.
Do you unite Europe first and then struggle
for social change within the new framework?
.
Or is it first necessary to do away with
bourgeois rule?
6L
Engels is quoted here by Charles Fiterman in his essay "Pour
une Europe independente
, democratique et pacifique", Cahiers du'
Communisme
,
April, 1968, pp. 14-18. Much of the analysis in this section
derives from his essay. Fiterman does not provide the source of the
Engels quote. Clearly it is addressed to a Frenchman.
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French Coininunists clearly invoke the latter interpretaion of
Marx. Charles Fiterman, for example, argues that Communists have never
challenged the need for close links between people, and would indeed
seek to build a stable human community transcending national frontiers,
which would allow full development of productive forces.
Communists do, then, claim a long-term commitment of gathering
together human society. But they doubt it can be done under a capi-
talist framework. As Fiterman expressed it:
(The nation remains) a historically and socially
durable phenomenon deeply rooted in reality.
(And it) remains within a national framework that
the popular masses continue to sense their needs
(and interests).
Communists legitimate this national idea by citing iMarx himself,
who, after all, had urged independence for Ireland and Poland in the
Nineteenth Century. But the argument is not a simple Gaullism; it is
posed on different terms. For them, the "economic and social content"
of a particular arrangement remains controlling. As they see it, the
current Europe is designed strictly to maintain the existing capitalist
arrangement. A supranational Europe, enmeshed in a social democratic
or Catholic Europe, would frustrate their ideas for social transform-
atioai.
Guy Mollet had once urged that a European Community be invested
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with the sa.e powers as an independent state. This was vital if it was
to channel citizen group efforts toward the general interest.
Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa challenged this view." Hcllet was
proposing a state independent of social classes, one that ruled as the
arbiter of conflict and as the guarantor of the general interest. But
in the analysis of the Communists, the Governments of the "Six" (or the
•Nine") were hardly guided by the general interest," since in Communist
eyes, they too served capitalist interests. Such governments inside a
community framework could only form an entente of capitalist interests.
Community institutions could never be more independent of class influ-
ence than the national institutions comprising them, making it illus-
ory to believe that a political community with joint planning could in
any way challenge capitalist rule. Socialists confused planning with
socialism.
The nation was hardly an outdated historical concept, said
5 2_
They had written Pour ou centre 1' Europe?, some important
excerpts from which are in Cahiers du Communisme
, No. 12, December,
-Laby, pp. 126-135.
In the Marxian scheme the state is never independent o.f
social classes, being an emanation of these classes.
Planning was not the issue. The Communists of postwar Europe
now accept the fact that capitalist economies and institutions can ac-
commodate themselves to a modicum of planning. It even provides pre-dictability. But when the constituent governments of EEC design a
political-economic community with a common plan, it will not have a
socialist orientation, but would offer policies emanating from the
classes that dominate the individual states.
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Kanapa and Denis, but regained a „ode™ reality. The idea, evolving
over centuries, had developed speciHe
.ar.s of cul.^e, language and
pontics. Even if the nation-building process had accidental, arbi-
-ary aspects, it still e>^ressed. a unity. Nations first forced chiefly
to unify markets and customs unions In certain regions. Today, the
trend was toward inter„ationaU.ation of these markets. But this phe-
nomenon had not led to the decline of national reality.
«
Thus the nation state framework had not been overcome, but re-
fined quite modern as a potential for progress: the national Idea,
born at the time of the French Revolution, continued to represent a
goal for Third World nations.
The European Parliament and the Left
This issue, and the question of direct elections, also raised
both political and doctrinal problems among the various groups we are
examining.
In the mid 1970s structural changes were proposed in the Euro-
pean Parliament. The EC had authorized direct elections to the 410-
member Parliament for 1978, to be ratified by member states. With
55
_
_
Even m the East-bloc, national realities persisted. Even ifintegration was the goal, strict precepts of national sovereignty per-
sisted. Supranational institutions are not imposed, but integration
IS carried out through international structures.
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the plan, voting would occur under national parliaments. Co^nists
at first attacked the plan as a Giscardian scheme of supranationalis.,
leading to domination by NATO.^^ Two years later, the Party again
latched one of its abrupt and dramatic policy reversals: such elec-
tions would not be categorically opposed; the method of voting was not
the problem.
^"^
The Problem is the rights and powers of theAssembly. We do not want it to overstep the
Durisdiction of (national) parliament(s) .68
The alliance politics of wooing the democratic left surely
played a role in the policy switch. But not all segments of the demo-
cratic left agreed with the Trains tream-Mitterrand acceptance of direct
6 B
Le Monde, December 5, 1975, p. 3. Kanapa cautioned thatFrance would become a "province of the European Empire of monopou'es"LJumanite, January 1, 1977. Also see Roger Trugman
,
"Quelqui aspect;du contexte international-, Cahiers du Communis^:
. JanuaryrS^sf
e^sav'in ?e Moni t'
""'^"^ ^ee Michel Debre'ss y m L^Monde January 11, 1979, p. 8, where he warned that auniversally elected Assembly would have "virtually unlimited powers".
67
PPR^^ ^ ^^/l
interesting that CERES followed the PCF lead. Generally,CE ES opposed traditional social democratic formations in Europe. The
l^''^ u
""^"^^ singled out as class collaborators. The zealwith which CERES harmonized its views with :he PCF is discussed critic-ally m Lazitch, pp. 82-87. Recall that Mitterrand had broken his
alliance with CERES (developed at Epinay) at the Congress of Pau, in 1975
^^L^^^Humanite, April 18, 1977, p. 4. There is evidence the rever-
sal came after discussions with the PCI. Stiefbold, p. 85. Marchais'true concern was the December, 1974 Declaration at the Summit of theNine
.
Competency of the Assembly will be enlarged, particularly by
the granting of certain powers in the communities legislative process"
This, he held, contradicted the Treaty of Rome, a view also expressedby the French Constitutional Council, a judicial body with review powers
remotely akin to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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elections. So^e interesting opposition a.^^ents „e.e advanced
Duve.,er,
„,o .eared that E.C „ou,d
.eco.e a tec.nocrac.. deprived o.
any popuxar
.ase. one „.ic. eouid su..it Europe to a ™a,orit. tor^ed ty
^"^^"^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^^
The
^road prohle. „as that institutions „ere heing created in Europe he.ore
a genuine co^unity of «n existed. Such a .ethod of voting in an insti-
tution that laced significance today, conferred on it "a democratic
legitimacy that it would only possess in a co^nity". By the nature of
things, it would i„pel the Co^unity in a supranational direction, al-
ways providing the "appearance of democracy... since it would be confused
with rule by a majority. Eegally, national organs of state power would
be diminished without being replaced by any effective federal force.
EC. after all, e^odied no genuine European collectivity. Fro. a policy
point of view, public power in Europe would be dispersed. And lacking
vigor, would be overwhelmed by the growing private sector." Perhaps, he
conceded, a union of Europe was required for the long-term development
of socialism on the Continent. But in the coming decades, a strong
Community would foreclose socialist possibilities in Europe. The only
collective consciousness existing in Europe persists within the frame-
at,,, t„ I t P^'-^ersion. he was arguing, would weaken the state appar-us to the benefit of the federal apparatus, the latter lacking anv
fZiTj:i:'tl^l7'r.- ™^ refect Vhich „ould etble^pn^ate
J e^f r. P™*""- D,iverger's interesting discussion
cra t c^ciarr'^r^"
socialistes
, pp. 1.3-1.6. For him. a'truirdemo-
neve'brLlablishJd T ^^^f^^^^^^ ^" ^ =i"gle country, or i^ woulder e establishe . Ironically, the issue of '.socialism in one coun-try.' opposes the PCF and PS much as it historically once divided theBolsheviks after Lenin's death.
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work of nation states Thn. i-^L . i us to undermine natinn;.!
, ^
ional consciousness woulddestroy the only fo.ce that could resist A. •xa merican domination.
CHAPTER IX
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE
LEFT IN FRANCE
I Shall eKamine only specific facets of Soviet relationships to
the French Left. Much of the broader subject has bean explored else-
where/ Throughout the post-1968 period, the PCF is moving away from
orthodoxy, gradually assigning a primacy to domestic affairs over inter-
national commitment to the bloc, yet never renouncing its International-
ist identity.
The Soviet Communists and the PCF
Earlier, we affirmed two basic formulations regarding the pre-
dicament of French communists.
A) That having fallen heir to a non-revolutionary situation in
France, they transferred hopes to the USSR: the USSR became the "embodi-
ment of a revolution France had missed".^
B) We also accepted Shulman's formulation that the postwar
Stiefbold. It has also been examined in this thesis See
Chapter II.
2r • ^ , .Lichtheim, pp. 70-71. This led to the "misplaced identity"
that Tiersky speaks of.
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Co«u„i.ts in Europe (given the above) had to substitute
..„bloc
politics tor revolutionary poUtics". The revolution was put aside, in
order to influence Eovernmentc; =,io-n.T i-g rnments al g Imes that best furthered Soviet
(or block) foreign policy.^
To work within these limits, and carry out item B, the Party
had to preserve its:
" ^^Sggyrgense: still appearing as the en*odi.entor carrier of revolutionary purpose.
2) Patrioti^visa^ still appearing as a politicalformation advancing French national purpose andindependence.
These two major strategies imposed three subsidiary strategies
and doctrines:
^^-—f InternationaUsm. Upholding and justifying
\. ^^"P^"^ repeated tarnishments , suchas Khrushchev's speech, the Prague invasion, or theGulag" revelations.
'+) Union of the Left. With the entrenchment (and legi-
timacy) of the Fifth Republic, they had to work toward
a domestic alliance with the democratic left against
Gaullism, despite a clear Soviet preference for the
latter.
5) Peaceful coexistence. Supporting a Soviet accommodation
with the United States, yet without foreclosing any pos-
sibility of changing the European status quo. Detente
should in no way imply a new Yalta or superpower duopoly.
Clearly, these five strategies created dilemmas and outright
3
Some might argue the PCF substituted an anti-fascist perspec-
tive for insurrectionary politics during the Popular Front.
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contradictions for Party doctrine and policy Manv hjjuix . y, we have encountered
earlier
„
How does a political party:
* ?^^h^H '^'''I-'^?"' ^'^^1 S^^^ ^-^dible support
lltl t^ T'''"^''^''
liberties required for any alliancewi h he democratic left?
-^- -xduce
*
a?r?ore?c^ supporting virtuallyll foreign policy goals of the Socialist Camp?
.
Justify pluralism within the world movement, yet denyIt withm one's own national Party?
.
Ally with reformist social democracy and still retain
revolutionary, avant garde objectives?
.
Maintain identity to a bloc (and world movement) which
was effectively, although not openly, rejecting a
revolution in the West?
.
Resolve the dilemma implied by item four above?
One could go on citing further dilemmas. Tiersky has designed
a framework which makes no attempt to resolve these dilemmas, but does
demonstrate the unusual adaptability of French communism, by identifying
what he terms its four faces or aspects: Government, Tribune, Vanguard
and Counter- community
.
To give an example at random, the PCF might oppose EEC in its
a) "Tribune" visage : supporting the interests of French
wine growers and small peasants.
b) "Government" visage
: protecting la patrie and
national independence.
c) "Vanguard" visage
: promoting bloc aims (or Soviet
diplomatic interests) which are defined ultimately
as radical and revolutionary.
One can advance various motives to explain foreign policy.
One might opt for "c" above, rejecting "a" ^nH "k-i K c a d "b" as demagogic. But
motive is inherently subjective.'^
:s revo-
.
The dilemma of revolutionary .o.l.- The PCF's dilemma over it.
lutionary nature in many ways derives from the Soviet dilem.ma. While
the CPSU must appear revolutionary to justify and preserve a leading
role in its movement, this stance, it has often been pointed out, con-
flicts with the USSR's acknowledged interest in detente and its wish to
acquire trade and technology from the West. Nevertheless, during the
1970s the Soviets did not ignore opportunities and unrest in Western
Europe: ferment in Spain and Portugal, stalemate in Italy, a renewed Left
in France, men the Soviet 20th Party Congress outlined a parliamentary
road to socialism. Western Communists interpreted this as legitimating
a kind of "socialist pluralism"^- a development the Soviets clearly
reject, as shown by their crushing of the "Prague Spring". There are
certainly motives (and evidence) to suggest the Soviets do not want a
revolution in the West. It would risk:
, Reactivating the Atlantic Alliance and destroying
detente
.
.
Spreading the pluralism infection to East Europe.
We reject here the ready-made notion that PCF International
behavior simply follows Soviet requirements. Such an explanation
would require no further analysis.
5
Joan Barth Urban, "Prospects for Revolution in the West",
Orb is
.
Winter, 1976, pp. 1359-1402.
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It would see., then, the Soviets seek orthodoxy, preferring
Parties they can control in Western Europe. All the evidence since the
war shows that those imposed in power are .ore reliable than the home-
grown varieties taking power on their own.
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Soviets lost control, as
the European Parties grew independent and critical of Soviet reality,
and sought power through elections and pluralism. ^ The risks of killing
detente (perhaps tilting the U.S. toward an alliance with China) or
spreading independent, pluralist-minded Parties within its own bloc
were too great to tolerate merely because independent European Parties
were seeking power. This explains, perhaps, the often open Soviet pre-
ference for de Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing. The dilemma was great: on
the one hand they could not tolerate seriously revolutionary parties in
the West (risking detente) I and they could not tolerate reformist Parties
(undermining their East-bloc Empire).
PCF-Soviet relations after 1963, After "Prague the PCF and CPSU moved
6.
Tiersky maintains that the embracement of pluralism by the Eu-
ropean Communists in the 1970s was genuine, but always "muted by aninsistence on the vanguard role, that is a directing role as an embodi-
rnent of the working class". Communists claim they alone are endowed
with scientific Marxism. In this sense, Tiersky holds that the Partyhas not de-communized
,
"but continues to claim a unique legitimacy apretension to alone decide the nature of the regime". See his essaym Problems of Communism
.
7
.
Admittedly, this line of argument would not explain why Soviet
Communists supported Cunhal in Portugal, who took an openly anti-
pluralist line.
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to repai. U„,3 strained the invasion.^ The PCP „as one of the few
(along With the Portuguese Co.unists) European Parties to aocept ali
the theses of the June, 1969 Moscow Conference of Co^unist Parties
(one Where the Soviets were notably
.escrihed as the principle force in
world struggle).^
e
When the PCP and CPSU signed their Co^on Declaration of July
7, 1971 (their first joint document since 1968), there was no mention
this ti.e of the "leading role of Co_unist Parties",!^ a concession by
the CPSU, since the French Co«unists were now embarked upon an allianc
with democratic socialists. Nor were the Soviets insisting that Co^ist
g
restated c^°nl^jg:L^e?^rwriLsi^?:-t\"^iL^;t:-
said Radio Moscow, June 27 1968 Al'l tM= ^
decisive factor"
when state relations bet^Ien'r^ice^'d'ti: USSR^SLTgoo^d^" IZTlrising considerably. Brezhnev noted at his Party's 25th cinJess that
TtrlAll:~t:,T de Gaulle,^Soviet-Prench L^it tai°s"^:rbec™:a r aaition. Vital Speeches of the Day
. February 24, 1976, p. 363.
9
asreementi^frI:-TpI;tSs™N.L=;eed"^^
in^:Ttoie:i^^i;'69r;"r°" ^^"-^
-
10
. ^
^""^^^
^ clarification of the Joint Declaration.Communxsts replied they would insist on their ties to the Soviet Co^.-munists; that this should not interrupt progress towards a CommonProgram Le Monde, July 16, 1971, p. 6. Claude Estier of the PS re-jected the PCF attempt to liken its international ties to those of thePS with other social democratic governments. The latter, said Estier
never prevented "us from expressing our own independent positionLe Monde
,
July 17, 1971, p. 5.
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Parties confo™ to a particular
.odel (as for.eriy). Rather, they
accepted diversities in how the various parties "struggled and fulfilled
their tasKs". The PCF and CPSU would see. co^on actions, and would
not be divided, it said.
However, in Fall, 1972, at the PCF's 20th Party Conference, re-
lations with the Soviets cooled. The Russians now appeared to disapprove
of directions being taken by the PCF after the Prog^aMn^^on^ Ten-
sions were only resolved later in the year,
.r.e7ZZ~rKan.,.
flew to Moscow to see Brezhnev and his Central Co^ittee advisors, Boris
Ponomarev and Vadi. Zagladin. In the joint con^unique, the Soviets
agreed to support the PCF strategy of working out joint policital ac -
tions with other parties, especially Socialists
.
But a year later, relations again skidded. This time, Soviet
Ambassador Tchervonenko had paida visit to Giscard d'Estaing (Finance
Minister in Pompidou 's Cabinet) between run-off rounds in the May 7,
11
. ^ ,
.Soviet press gave less space than usual to the PCF Congressand deleted all attacks by PCF leaders on French Government leaders
socialism, and wanted to preserve their ties to the Pompidou Government.
12
^,
Soviets handled the Joint Communique discreetly, it beingthe^eve of Pompidou's visit to Moscow. But it did confer stronger
^
Soviet support for PCF alliance strategy, unlike earlier ambiguities.Le Monde
, December 20, 1972.
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1974 Presidential Election. The PolitiV.l rca Bureau termed it "inopportune"
t.ons,
.eing merely an exploration of economic questions.- Nevertheless
evoked memories of the well-Known earlier incident of Dece^er, i.S5
'
where the Soviet press had indicated support for de GaulJ e h m-yy r a l w en Mitterrand
was campaigning with PCF support.
Disputes again surfaced in Spring 1975 nn ^y.j- iig, ia/:D. O the eve of a trip
to Pri.e Minister
.ac.ues Chirac promised to raise directly with
Brezhnev certain issues concerning the PCF. The Co„nists, enraged,
warned against any attempts by the French Government to have Brezhnev
pressure the PCF." Detente was fine, but could not be used for restrict-
ing the actions of French Communists. Peaceful coexistence in no way
implied an economic-social status quo in Europe. It should be noted
that this marked a period when the Soviets were growing increasingly
critical concerning French Communist behavior, particularly their alli-
ance policy. A Soviet handbook on Communist strategy, edited by
.ighrankSfun-bt-s^::
-"cL^S? ^T^^l ^Z^/^^ If,1
SS:rel^^t !,^e?p!l3!^^"" °' Centra/col'itte.
14 rLe Monde
, May 10, 1975.
15.
Lejtonde, March 23-24, 1975. Chirac threatened to discuss
certain contradictions in PCF policy: on the one hand supporting anindependent defense for France, yet taking actions weakening thatdefense. Chirac later denied such intent and never did say whether hedid m fact take these issues up with the Soviet Party leader.
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Konstantine Zagladxn, had urged vigilance by the
.o-unist Parties
entering leftist aXiiances. Clearly it applied to the PCP. But the
Soviets were probably overreacting in this case. The Soviets issued
a strong critique a month later notina th;,f- .L i, g at a genuine revolution
was impossible
outside the hegemony of the working class (Th^t)modern-day conciliators were preparedlo dis^
^
solve Communist Parties into ideologically
amorphous entities under all sorts of unity
arrangements, regardless of the price. Tacticalunity with social democrats requires a simul-taneous struggle against united front
partners . 1°
Chevenement notes that while this critique was couched in
ideological terms, it concealed the genuine fears of the Soviet Union
which were strategic: namely that bids for power by the Left could
endanger coexistence."'"'^
.
flench Communis ts and Sovie t domestic repress.'on Stalinis
was another perennial issue. And the PCF increasingly criticized
reassure tlTpTty.^t^'^'"''^^''''
Stiefbold, p. 45. Marchais moved to
17
J. P. Chevenement, p. 188. That successes by the Left in ParisRome or Madrid could upset detente. '
18^ u •Marchais had argued that Communists could not be faulted for
itv'hld f '''''' '""'"^ ''^^'^ Soviet vulnerabU-
nn^, I T P^^^^^^'^^ from socialism; that Communists wereu aware of what was later revealed. L'Humanite
, June 9, 1975, p. 5„
19
iQp^
^'"'"^^ criticized the trials of Soviet writers as far back
as lybb. Jhe one-time unconditional attachment to the USSR would now be
a conditional attachment. On the other hand, the Party insisted it would
never sink to "anti-Sovietism"
. See Stiefbold, chapter 5.
21+0
aspects Of Soviet reality during the 1970s." Kanapa, speaking at the
Party's i:eco le centrale
,
asserted the right to challenge violations of
hu^n rights and liberties. "These are not merely (Soviet) wrongs, but
wrongs done to socialise itself". Hence, French Co^unists had a duty
to criticize. The Soviets, he added, were often blind to the signif-
icant democratic liberties, describing then, as bourgeois and for«l.
"Actually, these are acquisitions „e call upon the working class to de-
fend".
coun-
Open PCF rejection of Stalinist practices in the East bloc
tries, often served PCF purposes within France. The Party could show
that even L'Humanite protested outrages in the East. But in establishing
this distance from such Soviet practices, a confusion was created. In
the minds of people, Stalinism became identified with something that was
merely a governmental practice, something remote. It was never described
as an outright deviation in the class struggle. Thus French Communists
were refusing to describe Stalinism as a possible current within their
own ranks. Most Frenchmen did not make this distinction. For most
people, the phenomenon remains the Stalinist Party holding state power.
They do not distinguish between repressive practices of a government and
19
The Party criticized the trials of Soviet writers as far back
as 1966.^ The one-time unconditional attachment to the USSR would now be
a conditional attachment. On the other hand, the Party insisted it
would never sink to "anti-Sovietism". See Stiefbold, chapter 6.
20
Le Monde
,
December 14, 1977, p. 15.
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behavior inside the Partv Rn-t-y. Bu guarantees by the PCF of democracy are
not sufficient.
Debates over Stalinism and the extent that the PCF could eritl-
cize soviet practices were never fully resolved. Soviet experience was
venerated because it had socialized the economy, built up what they saw
as a new society. Even if it was deforced, that was not essential. What
was given priority in the Co-unist mentality was the emergence of this
new society. But as Party historian Elleinstein pointed out. „any on
the Left challenged the socialist credentials of the USSR. If it was a
socialist state, it had to be defended. Once conceded it was not. it was
"ide open to any critique. Elleinstein incurred strong Soviet wrath
because he:
.
denied the socialist nature of the USSR.
.
held the Soviet model of tansition inapplic-
able to France.
.
urged the PCF to "disassociate itself in prin-
ciple" from Soviet experience .22
Ilje_persi_stence of PCF-CPSU links. The force and persistence of the ties
The PCF ^ftPn^"" r^^"'"'' "''""f''
°" guarantees inside the Party as well.o en makes spectacular demonstrations of abandoning Stalinism(like rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat) which suggesSlhat
?he te'rm'sri ^^''T
'"'^'^
^ ^^^^^ P-^- But'fo many
of issues use";r ^^^^^^^^^f arbitrariness, a lack of di^cussioi, e of expulsions. These are the real vestiges of Stalinismstemming perhaps from Leninist principles of centralism!
^"^^"^S"'*
LeMonde, April 13, 1978. The Soviets responded that Ellein-stein wanted the PCF to renounce its essence and to "disavow the deci-sions of the historic Tours Congress of 1920..." New Times, No. 22May, 1978, pp. 14-15. ' '
between the French Communists and the Soviet PoCommunists has preoccupied
-ny observer.. PCP perpetuated tMs XinKage, instead
breaMn, aecisive..
„,tH t.e USSK Has, o. course,
.ee„ a central aspect
Of this i„vestigatio„.^3
„^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^
had repeatedly embarassed and injured the PCF A„H .J a n . nd during the years re-
Viewed here. Trench Co»unists adopted a critical stance toward the „ore
outrageous and repressive Soviet practices. This distance fro™ the
Soviet Party earned the French Party a certain respectahiUty. Often
it served as a good-conduct pass, allowing it to develop new alliances
with other leftist forces. Nevertheless, the ties to the Soviets re-
gained. Clearly, the Soviet and French Parties (as well as all of the
European Parties) continue to have reciprocal and overriding needs for
each other. Annie Kriegel ™akes the central point: that without its
links to the USSR, the PCF loses all of its political force. Hence,
"the world «ve.ent enjoys an absolute priority. .. "^^ Marchais once ex-
plained the tenacity of the attachment. At the 23rd Congress, he noted
that the very existence of the USSR and its bloc established a relation-
ship of forces and conditions which guaranteed the life of the French
Party.
Can one imagine that it would be possible for
us today to discuss a peaceful, democratic
road to socialism in our country if the world
23
.
,
„
"^-"-^ explored further in the section on the Inter-national Movement. iiiLe
2t
Kriegel, in Blackmer and Kriegel, p. 37.
21^3
relation of forces was in favor of imperialism?
Marchais' explanation implies a debt to world socialism. The
French road, different and less costly than that taken by existing
socialist states, is only possible because of the existence of those
states.2^ Namely, that the French and Soviet Parties remain together
much like an old married couple, "for the children. A break would
create internal problems, leading to factions", he holds. There still
being a significant pro-Soviet current within.
These, then are some of the reasons for the links, even though
the PCF is condemned to repeated embarassment by Soviet repression.
Kriegel makes the interesting point that PCF relations with the Russian
Communists vary inversely with their links to other political forces
within France. 28 As the PCF recedes into its ghetto, as in 1978 (or 19.8),
and places itself at odds with four-fifths of the French electorate, as
when it revived its fierce rhetoric with the PS in the late 1970s, it
cannot continue its conflict with the Soviet Union. It cannot afford to
L' Human ite
.
May 10, 1979, p. 6.
The mere existence of the USSR will not protect Parties abroadfrom
_ destruction The undoing of Parties in Spain, Germany or Indonesia
remains a live, historical memory, Marchais' reasoning somehow makes the
cTx^lly
gu^^antor of opposition party rights in a Western European
27
Andre Harris and Alain Sedouy, Voyage a I'interieur du Parti
communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974), p. 272.
28
"L'Euro-Communisme 1978", Table ronde entre E. Bettiza,
Frangois Fejto et A. Kriegel, Commentaire
,
no. 2, Summer, 1978, p. 147.
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close itself off on both sid-s Tt. ^. . In terms of international behavior
Kriegel is arguing, there will be a kinH ^i^e d of normalization alongside of
the international Communist Movement: that the PCFLiiar n cannot continue to
conduct a two-frnnt tt^vi k •r o war, being at odds with the USSR ^r.^ .n and simultaneously
w»h its
.roa.e. potential alUes and constituents at
.o.e.
.a.itoh
soviet
.eiationship.- The „X between Marchais and the Soviets had
^he
•san.Lfrere^oviet^
"S-£ad^^ocialiste...^°
The Soviets, too. gain fro. the bargain of having dose ties to
the European Parties. They oan present themselves to the world with an
ideological fajade and justify their power position inside their bloc
and even strengthen their negotiating position with the West. They do
not
.erely present themselves to the world as a classical power
.hich
dominates a certain number of states. Rather, they are a force and an
29
L hchec permanent
, p. loi.
ence for ^^uTrd.'n^^
Communists, who openly proclaim their prefer-t b ildi g socialism m Western Europe rather than in ^^^^^^
trtZ]t'-^t'^ "''^ Raymond Arc t ribu = 1hL
them on ±L . ^P^^^^^-^^^m; . This global concept automatically ranges
Vol. XLIX No. : epSLe^ 19^7 p fa "'-a r £il22H«£E,M^^^^ J =H'-t;iiiufc;i , la//, . 48. "A Communist oartv's TTnirTT^
aut'onoV^" ?hus r^'^r:
^^^^ ^^^^ andVodaiL it
^l^T^^ : ^h^^g^ its views on Angola or Israel orlabel Soviet domination of E.^ern Europe as imperialist.
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idea that has
.uppo.t outside their frontiers, outside their re^io-
To expend Tiers.^^s
.ra.e„or.
.
the Soviet Union represents not ^ust a
governmental force or a nnnm+^v,counter-community. But 1 1- ;pH,r^^y- iiut It advances the pretense
of acting as the vanguard and tribune for vital .r.^^ .le r worla forces. Thus links
to an important European Party such tho rx , as e French, are a useful asset
to Soviet power.
^£^^^ll£LM£ti£ILs with the Soviet Party
3^^' political force with ties to the
Soviets. It Will help to examine as well some of the links established
by the socialists. After the War, the SFIO, understandably, had been
hostile towards the USSR, bike most groups in the West, they saw Soviet
expansionism as messianic and military, employing ideology to cover
i.perialist-like actions. No one on the democratic left could forget
that the Soviets had been the destroyers of social democracy as a poli-
tical force in Eastern Europe. As a result of this history, relations
between the two languished during the first two decades after the War.
Only when the Socialists loomed as possible candidates for power inside
France, did the Soviets take notice. For example, a Soviet delegation
attended a Socialist Party Congress for the first time at Pau in 1975.
31
P^,,
is sensitive to Soviet links with non-leftist forcesin France, viewing them as disloyal. When a Gaullist youth affiliatetraveled to the USSR, the Communist's youth affiliate objected. It was
^Mond m"" k or — ^ionary organizations in other countries"Le Monde
, March 26, 1976, p. 30.
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The PS was a renewed political fetation, a force to be reConed with."
Earlier effort, by Mitterrand to form so.e ties with Soviet
authorities
.et with little success. ^3 soviet aloofness invited specu-
lation that the CPSU was signalling disapproval, opposing a victory
of the Left. We saw ^arlier th;=,-t- th^ c • ^e rn ha the Soviets never rejoiced over the
Programme commun, but thev diH t^^:,.. i-It. ^
.
i xjuL Lii<dy a a pay lip-service to it.
The Moscow .eetin,
.
The significant breakthrough in relations came in
April, 1975, When the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to welcome
a delegation headed by Mitterrand .^^ I^is ^rked the first important
contact between the two Parties in 12 years, since Guy MoUefs visit
to Moscow in 1963.3^ The high-level meeting dealt with international
, ,
hl»onde, February 2-3, 1975, p. 1. Both superpowers pru-dently keep irnes open to opposition parties having a potenuS
^
government role. uL ;uL±ci±
33
^-n iQvu ^
^^^^ ""^^ cancelled by the Abrassimov incident. Anotherm 1974 was cancelled by Pompidou's death. The Russians did not want toendanger conciliatory steps made by Giscard regarding hopes for aPan-European Conference on European Security.
34
Fr.n.oT K^"".^?^ °f ^^^P P^ayda hailed the Union of the Left asa ce's best hope. L'Humanite
,
A^^23
,
1975, p. 3. The 1959 WorldConference of Communist Parties called for cooperation with Social De-mocrats where possible, so that the CPSU was now acting within theseguidelines. The PCF welcomed any broadening of ties between Communistand Socialist forces. "They'll see there is such a thing as socialismm the world", said Marchais. Ibid.
i
35
The Russians gave the airport arrival full TV coverage. Alongwith Mitterrand were Claude Estier, Lionel Jospin, Pierre MaurSy andRobert Pontillon, all of the Secretariat national
. Others includedChevenement, Didier Motchane and Michel Rocard of the Bureau executif
and Alain Savary, ex-First Secretary. Along with BrezhT^iT; they met
'
M. Suslov, B. Ponamarev, responsible for Party relations in capitalist
states, P.N. Fedossiev, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism,
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,.esUo„.. rather than domestic issues or matters eonneeted to Prenoh
aUianoe poUtios. Mitterrand reassured His hosts that a Cover„.ent of
the Left would continue the French-Soviet cooperation of prior Govern-
ments. So.e Of the issues discussed included the Conference on Security
and Peace, EEC. Vietna™. the Middle East, Cyprus, Greece, Chile and
rvench-soviet relations, as well as relations hetween the two political
parties
The meetings were reportedly lively and frank, with ™uch good
hu.or on all sides. Socialists felt, in fact, they often received hotter
trea^ent and airing of their views than they had been getting recently
froB, the PCF. It was agreed that future talks would be held."
The Soviet side gave the impression of being almost "obsessively
concerned" about the Conference on European Cooperation and Security.
Suslov asked how the PS envisaged building a Europe conforming to their
aspirations in a hostile and reactionary environment? (A question often
posed by the PCF. ) Mitterrand explained that since 1965 he had always
sought a simultaneous liquidation of the two blocs in Europe. With or
Inosemtsev, Director of the Institute of World Economy, and Vadim Zagladin.
36
Jewish emigration issues and Czechoslovakia were not discussed.
37
The hope was to institutionalize contacts, A year laterRocard and Pontillon did meet with CPSU representatives. In 1977 'cPSU
observed the Nantes Congress of the PS. The PS is the only SocialistParty in the Internationale
-ocialiste to institutionalize its links
with the CPSU on an international level. Lazitch, p. 231.
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wxthout a Co^on Market, the Left wo.Xd take power in a capitalist en-
viron^ent, one har.X, favoraMe to sociaUs™.
,e e.piaine..
.he Soviets
were further tol. that any leadership takin, po«er in a nation of SO
n^Ulion people could not casually withdraw fro„ one defense systen,
without establishing a new arrangement in its place.
Disagreements at the meeting centered on problems of Portugal
Where the Soviet side felt the Trench Socialists were lending support to
a "slander campaign" against the Portuguese Co^unists. Ponomarev refer-
red to a particularly dangerous role of the Socialist International in
that country. Mitterrand replied that it was puzzling for the Soviets
to reproach one Socialist Party for defending another.'^ The Soviet side
also raised questions regarding the "role nefaste " of the Socialist Inter-
national in the Middle East, keeping in mind the close ties between the
Israeli Labor Party and the PS.^^ Disagreements also arose over EEC. The
Socialists were astonished at the extent of Soviet hostility toward the
40Community
c
38
• ^
Mitterrand was reassuring: (We) always urged Portuguese Soc-xal.sts to remain allies of the Communists. Lazitch, p. 23lf Questionsrelating to the Socialist International and events in ?ortug;i wi!! bediscussed later.
39O 3
The final communique ignored differences, calling only forIsraeli withdrawal under the UN Resolution of 1967.
Fb representatives received the impression the Soviets actuallypreferred a Europe anchored to the United States, rather than an indepen-dent Europe. Le Monde
,
April 27-28, 1975, p. 3.
CHAPTER X
GERMANY AND THE TWO PARTIES OF
THE FRENCH LEFT
Central to French foreign policy has been Germany. And the
German problem has never been distant from the international behavi<
of political parties in France. Following Liberation, it was under-
standable for Gaullists, Socialists and Communists to align with the
broad designs of Bidault, creating, as we saw, an essentially Poin-
cairist solution: keeping Germany down, internationalizing the Ruhr and
putting the Rhineland under Allied control.^ Despite a later rapproche-
ment with the ennemi hereditaire
. inspired by the "Europeans" Monnet
and Schumann, the essential Franco-Soviet relationship described in
earlier chapters persisted. It persisted largely because of shared per-
ceptions concerning Germany.^ Even with de Gaulle's strong ties to the
Bonn Republic, he never ceased to view Germany as an inherent rival.
This was a nationalist line, one with which Soviet or German
Communists did not necessarily agree. Contrast this with World War I,
where the PCF opposed Versailles and the Rhineland occupation.
2
Soviet commentators hold that French-Russian interests merge
on controlling Germany. Both seek to prevent the FRG from acquiring
muclear weapons or seeking territorial changes. See International
Affairs
,
No. 12, December, 1955, p. 13. Debre concurs, see Le Monde
,October 24, 1975, pp. 1 and 5. De Gaulle had accepted the Oder-Neisse
line as far back as 1944 in discussions with Stalin. This was con-
firmed at a press conference 15 years later. See Grosser, p. 77.
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The French-Soviet link was, in effert ^ r.r.i ^ ^
,
m tt c , a policy for encircling Germany.^
Germany Dominant^jrhe
_French Communist View
until the 1970s, there were many on the Left who feared that
Germany would be an inherently destabilizing force until she accepted
the realities of the territorial changes wrought by World War 11.^ At
the start of the period reviewed here, one can observe a steady Communist
preoccupation with the Bundesrepublik
,
as manifested by the Party press
and journals as well as Central Committee statements and other actions
of the leadership. In 1959, much of the obsession focused on Franz-
Josef Strauss. Thus the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.)
was described as intent upon revising the Eastern frontiers , ^or nurturing
dreams of a "European" atomic force to be shared by the Bundeswehr .^
The Party press repeatedly cited, and often exaggerated neo-Nazi tenden-
cies said to be rampant across the Rhine. Marchais himself provided a
3
^.J^^'^^^
Aspaturian, Soviet Foreign Police Since Khruschcbev (NewYork: Vikmg, 1972), p. 169.^ —
i+
.
This was the specter of a revanchiste Germany, kept alive bv
many Communist Parties. '
5
,L'Humanite
,
September 25, 1959, p. 3.
5„
. o .possession of atomic weapons is a moral duty of the nation"
said Strauss. Ibid. After "Prague", the PCF feared that Germany would
'
use the events to strengthen itself and acquire nuclear weapons. L'Huma-
nite, September 20, 1968, p. 3.
7
Much was made of an NPD victory in Baden-Wurtemburg during
1968. The issue was international, in that the rebirth of Nazism affect-
ed peace in Europe. Fred Fischback, "Neo Nazi Tendencies and Revanchar-
des in West Germany", Cahiers du Communisme
,
January, 1959, pp. 64-74.
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a suinmary of Commnist grievances: the Potsdam Accords had been ignored,
the German Communist Party (D.K.P.) had been banned since 1955,^ and the
Bundeswehr was headed by ex-Nazi generals, such as Speidel and
Heusinger .
^
In assessing this list of grievances and Communist purposes in
drawing it up, it should be kept in mind that French Communists cannot
be understood as merely another political party on the domestic spectrum.
It has been shown throughout here that they are capable of behaving as
a broad, and sometimes dynamic, actor in the international system,
bringing weight to bear on behalf of policy positions crucial to them-
selves and the world movement with which they identify. Perhaps nowhere
was this more evident than on these grievances regarding Germany.
Below are some tangible actions they took to influence policy.
.
When the Bonn Government moved to hold Presidential
elections inside West Berlin, the Political Bureau
of the PCF issued a strong statement calling upon
the French Government, one of the four powers with
special responsibility for Germany, to have the FRG
renounce the election.
By" not legalizing the German Communists, Chancellor Kiesinger
was stifling a genuine Left. The argument was made that a reconstructed
German Communist Party was somehow related to France's own security.
Perhaps the PCF was repeating its role during the 1920s when it did
seek to aid the forces of the Left across the Rhine, doing whatever it
could (in those years) to keep France's occupation out of the Rhineland,
9
L ' Human ite
.
May 10, 1958, p. 6.
'^'
^L'Humanite
,
March 3, 1959, p. 1.
252
.
In 1970, the Party launched a widesnread Hv^n... ^have Pompidou 's Government recognize the gS Tfinally took such a step on FebSary 1, if,t
.
With the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty ofFrxendshxp, August, 1970, Marchais wrote WillyBrandt dxrectly, urging legalization of the Ger-man communist Party.
H
.
That same month, the PCF welcomed a lar^e Social ic;tUnxty^Party (East German Communist) delelaS^n ^o
.
Social Democrats in Germany were attacked for notopposing the U.S. role in Vietnam.
The major softening in the attitude of French Communists toward
Germany occurred when Brandt entered the Government of the Grand Co-
alition. This marked the first Government role for the SPD in the
history of the Bonn Republic. The CDU had led nowhere, from the PCF's
point of view. The hope now was that there would be some tournant a
Bom.. Perhaps the new Government would now sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Or perhaps it would annul the Hallstein Doctrine, requiring
Bonn to sever ties with those states recognizing the GDR. Most of all,
there was a feeling of momentum, of a new orientation, now that Social
„ , .
stressing the positive character of Germany's new poli-iesMarchais asked why neo-fascists should be allowed to openly engag.inthe political process, while the "Party of Thaelman" remains illegal.He adroitly called Brandt's attention to the fact that the only CommunistParties illegal m Europe were in those states with fascist regimes-Greece, Spam and Portugal. He further explained that the PCF. in its
new program was committed to a pluralism of democratic parties, attaching
significance to the cooperation of Communists and Socialists in France.
^Mitterrand also opposed any restrictions on Communists in the FRG anissue he took up with German leaders at Socialist International forums.
Le Monde
, December 13, 1975, p. 12.)
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Democrats were in the Government L' HuTT,;.niWluinan te even reported that Brandt
now favored negotiations with the GDR. And on November 16, 1969, the
PCF issued a joint statement with the DKP, setting forth common pros-
pects. Events dragged for the balance of the year; talks even broke
down between the two Germanies. On August 12, agreement was reached
with the Russians, exactly 25 years after World War II. The FRG recog-
nized the Oder-Neisse frontier, launching a new situation in Europe. ^It
was a fulfillment of a long-time obiective of the French Communists, and
unquestionably a victory for Soviet policy.
While in no way diminishing the extent of this victory for the
Communist camp, French Communist hopes were over-exuberant, and even
naive. Surely there were broad possibilities for detente. But it was
unrealistic to describe an end to confrontation on the Continent, or an
imminent withdrawal of all troops from foreign territory in Europe.
Nevertheless, the drama of developments when the SPD negotiated a detente
with the East did lessen the credibility of a revanchiste Germany that
Communist propaganda had constructed over the years. Party media, of
course, had to welcome the realism and sagacity of Willy Brandt. But on
the other hand, the specter of a dominant, aggressive Germany would never
disappear from Party propaganda tracts and media. Even under the new
Social Democratic leadership, Germany would soon be described as "the
royal administrator of the interests of capital ... the vanguard of
12
Jacques Denis had suggested this in Cahiers du Communisme,
February, 1971, pp. 68-79.
"
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U.S. imperialism"
.
The .ore nationalist appeals designed to revive the ancient con-
frontation between France and Germany were firmly rejected by .ost polit-
ical groupings in France, and definitely by Giscard d'Estaing. ^ One
reason for the continuing hostility by French Co.unists towards Germany,
despite Ostpolitlk and the new realise, ste_ed fro. so.e new develop-
ments in defense policy. It win be recalled that under Giscard
cJEstaing collaboration between the defense forces of France and Germany
had been strengthened, which undid so.e of the .ore aloof arrangements
that had prevailed under de Gaulle.
There were even deeper and more basic reasons. Some were doc-
trinal in nature. And as the 1970s progressed, French Communist disen-
chantment with the SPD heightened. Early hopes yielded to more basic
historic antagonisms. It should not be forgotten that French Communists
had a deep suspicion of German social democracy. They considered it to
be the driving force behind 1' Internationale socialists
, the force that
was seeking
-to reorient the Socialists Parties of Europe to the right -
13
_
So said L'Humanite editor Rene Andrieu in an interview withPer Spiegel
, February 23, 1975, pp. 89-92.
Le Figaro
,
February 15, 1979, p. 1.
15
See Walter Schutze's discussion in Le Monde Diplomatique
,October, 1975, pp. 12-13. German and French Governm.ents had agreed on
the emplacement of Pluton missiles inside Germany. Both the PCF and
DKP coordinated a drive to prevent this action (without success).
L'Humanite
, June 24, 1975, p. 3.
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ana certainly away f.o.
.oUaboration. with Co-unists.^^ Helmut Sch^i.t
for example, confined the worst nightmares of the Co.unists in a TV
ntsts had to be prevented fro. assuming power in large European countries
that there were no significant Communist Parties where social democracy
• 1 7remaxned si^ificant.l The SPD was suspicious and critical of Mitter-
rand's cooperations with Communists. Specifically, he was yielding too
much terrain to them and betraying his commitment to Europe."
The above were some of the political and doctrinal considerations
that engendered hostility between the PCF and ruling Government in Bonn.
Along with these arguments, the Communists also invoked economic objec-
15
its capitans%'reaU?v' '?he''?f °5 only to conceal^ xLdix x ality. The oldest and larsest Marxi-^t P^r.i-,r ^-f r
waTno? ^?,d?n ? ^- ^'"^ndoning =lass collaboration. Brandt
gest?™ For ?he'fM ^"'""8 through pseudo-reforms of co-
f "-^^ indictment, see Gerard Cornillet and Claude"Tlnn
JaSI'a?:?£™rp'''''^1d-t:"'^"^^^ la :oc?arde-mocf 28 of the S^' T"' sociales, 1979, pp. 77-97. Also see
s^ir l.aftualiti"!
''"""""^"^^ Voul.iu's essay "Points de repere
17
L'Humanite, May 7, 1976. The PCF strongly protested the remarksChevenement went so far as to describe Schmidt as tL "new Metternich"threatening a "holy alliance of capital if the PCF joined the ItaUan
'
IZlTolTl^ '''' ^^^-^-^ D^..ocratL leaded
were t. n p^k"^""^
withhold any future new loans, if Communistso occupy Cabinet posts in any new Government. Schmidt, whoseGovernment had ^ust authorized a $2 billion loan to Italv, made this
commitment to Henry Kissinger at the Economic Summit Conference in PuertoRico, June, 1975. New York Times
, July 18, 1976.
18
Le Monde
, June 30, 1972, p. 7.
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tions to Germany and its designs towards hegemony in Europe.
. Jhus the malaise in the Lorraine steel industry wasattributed to Germany. Germany's steel industry hidoutdistanced that of France two-fold in the pas^quarter century. ^
.
Germany, because "it does not have to channel a
significant part of its resources into weapons or
expenses
_ for war or colonization" is at an advantagebecause it
_ can devote a greater share of its resourcesto productive investment. 20
.
The same forces that brought the Nazis to power remainm the Federal Republic. Thus the Coal and Steel
Community reconstituted Hoechst, Krupp, Stinnes and
Ihyssen m the years 1954-1958.21
.
Chemical firms such as Bayerwerke, Farbwerke and
Hoechst were suppliers of poison gas for the U.S.
Army.
.
Germany ranks as the banker of Europe, with monetary
reserves four times that of France. Thus the franc
has steadily been devalued in relation to the D Mark
since 1959.23
19
L'HuTTianite
,
February 20, 1979, p. 4.
20
This demagogic argument was made by Franc e Nouvelle No 1735February 12, 1979, p. 38. Thus the PCF on the-^l^il^d-Tiji^^s a'cermary
that IS militarily strong and aggressive. Yet it complains that the lack
of resources devoted to such efforts coiBtitutes an advantage for Ger-
many in its competition with France.
21^
.
Fred Fischback, op. cit,
22
L' Human ite
,
February 6, 1968. A journalist in the Communist
press was apparently citing a West German publication from Berlin,
Extradienst
.
There is no way to verify the accuracy of the report. It
is only cited here to demonstrate the international perceptions and per-
spectives of French Communists regarding the role of West Germany,
23
L'Humanite
, February 20, 1979, p. 4. Communists argued that
any European money plans pursued by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing
would only serve to legalize and heighten this domination by the Mark.
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in conclusion, it can be said that prior to SPD participation
.n the rederai Repuhiie, the PCP echoed the Soviet line of a revanchist.
neo-nazi Ge^any that refused to renounce nuclear weapons and^^^ZT^
refused to allow a genuine Left opposition to develop. It „as the only
state in Europe which did not accent I'to o„,-o*-r p ts existing frontiers. Following
the normalization in the East, the hard-cutting edge of th» German
threat was blunted. =^ The danger was now the SPD, playing a Hetternich-
like role through its control of the Henshevik Axis embodied in the
lHi™£Hi^^2£iiUi!H- It would seek economic control of Europe and
deny any social change (ie Communist advances) on the Continent, as
dem.onstrated by its role in southern Europe during the 1970s. In fact,
the Communists distrusted their alliance partners' links to German
social democracy much as French Socialists distrusted PCF links to Moscow,
There was a basic symmetry: each rejected the international movement of
the other.
Socialist Party Perspectives on Germany
Before examining specific Socialist attitudes, it will help to
outline certain historical perspectives regarding the Left in France and
social democracy in Germany, One can properly note certain similarities
between the working class movements of the two European states. Certain-
24
It cannot be proven, but it is an arguable hypothesis that
once ^ the revanchiste military threat receded, the Communists were able
to yield some of the concessions to the PS in foreign and defense
policy cited in earlier chapters: on EEC, nuclear weapons and on the
European Parliament, to cite only a few.
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ly both had been sto^-tossed hy events at the ti.e the Second Inter-
national had spaced the Third. And it is obvious that the Socialists
of France would develop quite different relations with German social
democracy fro. the PCF (although the former, too, could be quite crit-
ical of its brother Party across the Rhine). A„d it should be no
.urprise that SPD spokesmen
.ight react critically to the 1960s dia^gue
in France between Co^unists and Socialists." Of course, the talks in
France were occurring at a time when Willy Brandt was himself talking
to Willy stoph in Erfurt. This is not to suggest a parallel in the
substance of the respective dialo^es, but only to note the sy..etry,
perhaps symbolism, of the two events.
What then were the similarities of the working class movements
in these two key European states?
.
Both had been led into a Union sacree in 1914,
Ignoring the anti-war declarations issued at
Basel, Stuttgart and Amsterdam. ^6
.
Both had remained essentially divided in the
face of Fascism during the war,
.
Both had emerged as antagonists in the cold-
war era
.
25
a Vienna gathering of Social Democrats, Brandt, along withOlof Palme and Bruno Kreisky, strongly rejected the idea of collabora-tion by Social Democrats with Comm.unists. This was clearly in opposi-tion to the view of Mitterrand and certain Southern-European Socialists
such as Mario Scares (of the Portuguese PS). Le Monde
,
May 2 7-2 8, 1975,'
p . 3 . ' '
See Chapter II.
259
But the differences, as a.P. Chev.ne.ent notes, were prCab.,
Sreater. Thus the decisive and
.icient defeats of .he Ce^an Kevoin-
tion in ieiS-iS.O under the Sociai Democrat. S.stav
.csKe. resulted in
a fratricidal st^ggie between Co„unists and Social Democrats that
Ultimately led to Na.is.f „ar. and a redivision of Ger»ny-a redivi-
s.on Which ironically
.ade that nation the effective frontier between
Communism and Social Democracy in Europe.
on the other hand, the split in the working class movement in
France during 1920 was essentially peaceful. And it was followed by
those celebrated moments of reconciliation, that we have reviewed hire
in prior pages: Popular Front, Resistance. Liberation, and Union of the
Left.
Chevene.ent argues (and it is a view widely shared by the CERES
faction in the French Socialist Party) that somewhere in the soul of
the French Left, the hope still flickers that the working class
.ove.ent
can be reunited: that Tours can be transcended
. There is at least a
memory of a common struggle (which the SPD and KPD would be hard put to
27
1= •
^^'^ called out Reichswehr and Freikorps units to put downthe
^^---^^^^^^^ pos^ibiSSes
dreamnna^!^''
Mitterrand to the contrary: "Obviously many Socialists arex g of reversing the break of 1920. I understand these people.But we are far from that. Communists and Socialists, separated fornearly 50 years now, have crystallized their characteristics in
contradictory fashion". Paris-Match
, October 30, 1976 pp. 56-57
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evoke )
.
If Cheve„e™e„t is correct, the stakes for Prance and Ger^nv are
Ultimately the sa.e: overco^in, the dile»as inherited fro™ the Second
and Third Internationals.^^ Spokesmen for CERES hold out the hope that
the advent of a Western European socialise, oriented towards plurali..
and workers
.anage^ent, could exercise influence over the Cer^n problem
somewhere in the future there could he a spectacular rapprochement he-
reon French socialism and German social democracy. Such a development
according to Chevenement. would create conditions favoring a subsequent
rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR.^° Germany, despite its energy
and hopes, remains a prisoner of the international situation. And the
social democracy within, remains divided in Its perspectives, with
various factions and generations pulling in different directions. What
Chevenement has to say is often provocative and speculative. But it
does represent the interntional perspective of one important segment of
French Socialism.
So much for CERES. There remains the attitude towards Germany
held by the more mainstream segments of the P.S. Following the War.
29
Chevenement, pp. 282-288.
. .
_
argument is that the natural drive for Germans to findtheir unity-if it is not to erupt in a world war-can only be normal-ized by the two Parties themselves. It cannot be done through aKapallo arrangement or a variation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact
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ties between the SFIO and SPD were not Pood p tg . Policy disagreements arose
on some key European issues. The SPD opposed EDC, whereas the SFIO
under Mollet ultimately declared in favor. On the other hand, a large
group in the Party (and in Parliament) rejected the Mollet line, contin-
uing to see Germany as revisionist. A rearmed Germany would easily domi-
nate a France that was so preoccupied and dispersed defending the French
Union. Others made the argument that to support EDC was to support a.
non-democratic Germany. Far better to identify with the positive Ger-
inany embodied in the SPD, the trade unions, and the Protestant Church,
rather than that represented by Catholics and the old Ruhr magnates.
But this stance did not prevail. The SFIO supported the European Army
(certainly with the understanding that the U.S. would continue its
presence in Europe).
Relations with the German social democrats declined ev^ further
when the French Party reconstituted itself as the Parti socialiste in
1969. As noted, its political and alliance strategy was considerably
to the left of the SPD. Also, there was a strong suspicion of close ties
between the FRG and the USA, especially in defense. Schmidt's statement
opposing Communist entry in West European governments irritated PS opinion
being a direct challenge to their left union strategy.
^"^There was a domination by the FRG in the Euro-Group of NATO.
Dieter S. Lutz, "Eurocommunism and the Federal Republic of Germany",
Co-existence, April, 1978, Vol. 15. No. 1. p. 61.
CHAPTER XI
THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
This chapter will examine some internatinn;.! H.-r.J.11 Lei iiarional dimensions of the
French Socialists, focusing on their links to the broader base of social
democrats in Europe. It will also examine the critique by the Co^u-
nists of social democracy at the international level, particularly in
the continuing North-South dialogue. The thesis will be further develop
that because of certain irreconcilable perspectives, ultimate cooperat
between the PCF and social democracy is likely to fail.
ea
ion
Perspectives of the PS since th. W.. with the collapse of Tri-
^rtisme in 1947 (and the fear of Communism), the SFIO understandably
identified its more reliable friends in the wider world to be the welfare
capitalist states of the West, allying itself with such forces as the
British Labour Party, the Truman Administration and many of the emerging
social democracies in Europe.^ Despite this post war link to the West,
the renewed Parti socialists
, born at Epinay 25 years later, shifted
perspective significantly: declaring its opposition to the "reformist"
^This identity is described by ex-Minister Jules Moch. Le
Monde, February 21, 1968, p. 7. • —
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nature of social democracy.
It must be stressed, however, that in rejecting classic social
democracy, the PS was not revising its essential identity with the West
not changing its foreign policy. Nevertheless, these new perspectives
did create tensions between the Party and other social democratic
forces in Europe. There were sharply differing evaluations concerning
the wisdom of the new alliance strategies that the Socialists in France
were developing with the PCF. The more mainstream European social
democrats opposed these alliance experiments by their French colleagues
One might even note a certain symmetry here. Socialists outside of
France were playing a role not unlike that of the World Communist
Movement. Much as orthodox Communists abroad, particularly in Moscow,
distrusted the PCF's alliance with social democracy, so too, the inter-
national socialist movement distrusted the French Socialists' new
flirtation with the PCF. If Communists and Socialists were to join
together as domestic political allies, they were likely to generate
disturbances in the respective international constellations of which
they formed important components.
There is no doubt that the more successful Socialist Parties of
The Party affirmed its Marxism at this historic congress,
claiming to reject much of its reformist behavior. A motion callin
for withdrawal from the Socialist International was only narrowly
defeated. Frank Wilson, The French Democratic Left
, p. 24. This
constrasts with the SPD, which rejected its Marxism in the 1950s.
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les in
northern E^ope welcomed the emergence of renewed Socialist Part
southern and Latin Europe. '
,,,,
_ ^^^^^^^^^^
alliance with Communists Tn -hk-:^. I this sense they oddly mirrored the
stuhhornness of the CPSU, which we saw repeatedly cautioned the
fraternal Parties against contamination from Menshevik forces. The
Mitterrand strategy seemed likely to conflict with mainstream social
dem.ocrats of the Internationale socialists (I.S.).
Thus at Epinay, the Socialists of France established a certain
distance from the I.S., despite the fact that Mitterrand remained one
of the 14 vice presidents of the international body.''
The disputes with the I.S. regarding Mitterrand's alliance arose
from a deep distrust by officials of that organization of Communists
and their "new look" in the West. At a Vienna Congress of social
democrats in 1975, Bruno Kreisky, Olof Palme and Willy Brandt (all of
whom led successfull ruling Parties) voiced opposition to collaboration
P^, y^^^l
feared
_ that French politics would fragment into two blocs,baullists and Communists, without any intermediate force of socialdemocracy. Andrei Fontaine, Le Monde
, June 28, 1958, p. l HelmutSchmidt noted that Communist Parties exercised influence only where "old
To ^Q?f ^^^^ s^^^k f^s^ decades". The New York Times, Mayxa, ly/b, p. 15. ~ — —
4
A language of Marxism was now replacing that of reformism. AsMitterrand noted at Epinay, democratic reforms and improvements' in thelot of the workers were not enough. It was necessary to "penetrate theheart of the current system, power in the economic enterprise". Lazitch
p. 234-235. ^ '
ial democrats with Communists.^
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In describing a sy«try between the behavior of the two inter-
national
.„ven,ent. of the left, I a™ not suggesting an exaot parallel.
The l.S. Clearly lacks the discipline and central coordination that the
Co™„unist
.ove.ent once had so.e pretense of maintaining, m fact, one
.ight say that the Co«.ists manifested
.ore disarray internationally
than did the Socialist-^ At- -t-hno • ^alist.. this point it will help to examine briefly
some historical aspects of international social democracy.
^h^Jl^l^EI}^!^^ Heir to the original Second
International, this body has survived through difficult historic periods?
The original organization, as shown in Chapter II, almost disintegrated
during the First World War, when the various national components rallied
to the trenches. Lenin's formation of a rival International constituted
the next blow. The l.S. managed to survive World War II years largely
through efforts of the British Labour Party. After the War, the l.S.
for the lltZT? ' ""7 2^-28-1975, p. 3. At other moments spokesmen^ International propounded a more tolerant view of PS behavior
Tn tll'iT'^'^r^ -'^ Socialists of Europe held no uniform 111:Z ^he ssue of _cooperation with Communists; alliance decisions would
197B n I M
^I^^Srnent of individual parties. Vienna Kurier
, March 12,
dist^us; o; vrl^ .u^^^
International appeared to have a particularr t f the PCF. Thus Brandt openly indicated a preference for thest>le of party run by Berlinguer over that of Marchals. Der St-rnAugust 9, 1977.
_
When the PCF renounced its doctrine of the dictatorshipof the
_
proletariat, Kreisky dismissed the reversal as a trivial- actDer Spiegel
, March 7, 1977,
_^The organization included such early socialist figures as EduardBernstein, Jules Guesde, August Bebel and Keir Hardie. Individual
members were grouped in national sections.
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was reconstituted at the Frankfurt Congress, 1951. East-bloc parties
that had .erged with the Co„nists were expelled. Kurt Schumacher and
Guy Mollet emerged as president and vice president respectively, on a
program pledging a democratic socialist order.
—
i:rench_p^^ Identity with an established social-
ist movement, representing many ruling European Governments, is enhancir^
for French Socialists, particularly in their competition with other
parties. Just as Communists acquire stature through links to powerful
forces on the Continent, so too do the Socialists. On the other hand,
I.S. activities can also intrude into domestic politics. For example,
when the I.S, convened in Paris in the midst of January, 1973 legisla-
tive elections, it generated considerable stir. I.S. organizers in-
sisted, correctly, that it was a routine meeting, scheduled well before
the French elections had been called. But heightening the controversy
was the presence that week of many heads of state, including Golda Meir,^
7
Eight post war Congresses have been held in Europe. A general
Council meets between Congresses. The 20-member Executive Bureau is
headquartered in London. There is both an Asian organisation and a
Latin-American affiliate. Le Monde
,
January 12, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.
In 1978, the I.S. met in Dakar, the first time in the Third World.
L'Humanite
,
May 15, 1978, p. 5.
g
There had been disagreement on Mid-East policy, and the Israeli
Labor Party had been told that Meir's presence during an election would
be construed as support for Mitterrand, perhaps influencing the
250,000 Jewish voters in France. Le Monde
, December 28, 1972, p. 5.
Generally, Jews in France do not vote as a bloc.
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Bruno Kreisky, Olof Pal.e, Ja..s Callaghan and Pietro Nenni.'
Since other
.en*er parties of the l.S. rejected cooperation with
Co^ists. Mitterrand, presiding at the meeting, feit the need to justify
h.s policies,
.uch as he had done earlier that year in Vienna before
the same body.
The PCF was also sensitive to this l.S. Conference in Paris, a
-etlng of parties judged reformist by their standards. When finally
staged, the meeting itself was more an exchange of views than a for^l
conference reaching conclusions.^^ If today the Socialist International
is hardly the disciplined army many had raptired in during the last cen-
tury, neither is it an impotent debating forum. Socialist Robert Pon-
tillon terms it a "collective laboratory for reflection", one that could
from time-to-time "bring world pressure against dictatorships of Western
Europe or against repressions in the East bloc." The l.S. had a role to
play in the construction of Europe. Encouraging to many in the Inter-
national was the assumption of power in Germany by Brandt, an event seen
9
. ,
. ,
'"^^^^^ Brandt, due in Paris for an official visit two weeks hencadeclined to attend. He did not wish to compromise his links with the
^
eZTtTnT r'^'^n^
inviation from an opposition Party during anlec io . Le Monde
, December 28, 1972, pp. 1 and 5. ^
&
10
See the chapter on the Programme commun
.
11
The Vietnam issue dominated dis:ussions, with the l.S. callingtor a halt to bombings and urging elections in the South. Mitterrand
and the Scandinavians took a stronger anti-American stand; Kreisky,
Callaghan and Meir demurred. There was little discussion of the Middle
East. Various Socialists urged the Labour Party to enter the European
Parliament.
268
at the ti^e as enhancing detente and fostering an intra-European
12
normalxzation.
The PS and the Socialists of Southern EuronP
Southern Europe has unique problems, for example, underdevelop-
ment relative to the countries of the north. While the southern nations
affirm links to northern Europe, they have not foreclosed certain
special ties to the Third World, particularly Africa. The divisions
and affinities experienced on a nation state level in Europe are also
felt within the I.S. Recognizing this, Mitterrand, Mauroy and Jospin
in May, 1975 organized a conference, inviting socialist leaders of
Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Belgium. There
were several purposes behind the conference.
Defining future policy
. The countries of southern Europe
constitute an area of historical and political interest to France. Thus
it was natural that Socialists anticipating a future role in government.
12
Le Monde
,
January 12, 1973, p. 1 and 8 . Perhaps this chapter
has ^overemphasized some of the distance between the I.S. and the
Socialists in France. A few years later, Mitterrand said in an inter-
view "We are members of the Socialist International along with Kreisky,
Brandt and Palme While there are obvious differences between German'
or Swedish social democracy and French socialism, we still belong to
the same family, the same international movement. There is a socialist
group in the European Parliament comprising Germans, British and French-
men. Perhaps we represent different wings of the movement". Paris
Match
,
October 30, 1976, pp. 56-61.
13
There was some fear in Belgium and the Low Countries of a
Europe divided into Latin and non-Latin regions - then falling under
possible German influence. See the analysis of Thierry Pfister in Le
Monde
,
May 24, 1975, p. 11.
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would be seeking to define policy toward that region.
^I2--i£^i£2l^. In 1975 Mitterrand sensed that the PS was
isolated politically. (This was shortly after his visit to the CPSU,
also an attempt to overcome isolation.) The other social democrats of
Europe had not rallied around the perspectives of the PS. Socialists
in Scandinavia, Austria, Germany and Britain all had a certain con-
fidence, all carried a certain global weight as ruling parties. Because
of this, Mitterrand sought new ties southward, toward states which in
the 1970s were shedding rightist or military regimes. In Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece Socialist Parties were beginning to assert themselves.
Thus it was natural for Mitterrand to seek support in the south.
Airing common problems
. Many Socialists in France felt an
affinity for the Socialist Parties of Southern Europe because they faced
similar circumstances.^'' Unlike the social democrats of the North, these
parties confront large, active Communist Parties. Often the social
structures of these nations are more archaic. The Southern nations are
mostly Catholic and more agrarian. The persistence of traditional
elements has prevented the working classes from being integrated fully
into society, an integration process which did occur in the Anglo-Saxon
countries. The PS had strong ties with the Spanish Socialists during
the 40 years of the party's exile. Similar years of exile also
14_
The analysis here derives from Pfister's essay, ibid.
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strengthened ties with the party of Mario Soares in Portugal." Mit-
terrand was thus invoking the Southern European Socialist Parties as a
counterweight to the social democrats of the north. By 19V5, Mitterrand
was concerned about the possibility of an integrated Europe, and he
wanted to increase the options of his own party in such a political
structure. Details of the discussions at the meeting need not concern
us. They dealt with a range of problems: collaboration with Co«nists.
attitudes of socialist parties towards their countries joining NATO,
and other relevant topics. The important fact is that the meeting was
held, defining a Southern European point-of-view within social demo-
cratic ranks.
Social Democratic International Perspectives:
a Critique from the Left
Thus far we have established that socialists and social democrats
in general manifest a particular world view. Many of the perspectives
as they apply to French Socialists have already been examined herein.
The important question now becomes: how compatible, or incompatible,
were such perspectives with those of their Communist alliance partners?
The answer here would largely determine how one views the ultimate
^
similar reasons the PCF forged close ties with Cunhal andthe Portuguese Communists. The risk was that the two French Parties
would tend to identify with their respective ideological allies,
threatening the ^already delicate balance in their relationships! In
fact, such a spillover did occur when the communists and Socialists of
Portugal entered a sharp dispute. The dispute soon erupted inside the
two French Parties.
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viability Of the left alliance. This chapter began by noting the
general affinity and identity of Trench Socialists and European social
democracy with the Western ca^p. Or in Brezhnev's ter^s,
..social demo-
cracy became a hostage to bourgeois imperialism... But it is not only
Co^unists who hold this view. It will be helpful to explore briefly
some of the arguments and apprehensions of those who challenge the
social democratic world order. At the same time it will help clear up
the Communist point-of-view, and help explain the virulence of their
attacks on social democracy.
The historical argument has been made that it was the post-war
Western international system itself which required or encouraged the
formation of social democratic coalitions in the European states. These
coalitions were formed as a force to preserve the vulnerable post-1945
capitalist order, according to the argument. Thus it is said that the
CIA subsidized social democratic parties as far back as 1947. The U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency placed Willy Brandt on its payroll.
^'^
Wolfe
makes the argument that
...the centrality of social democracy to the
^^'So he told the World Conference of Communist Parties in 1969.
Le Monde
, June 10, 1969, p. 5.
17
Morton H. Halperin, et al.. The Lawless State (New York,
1974), p. 37. Cited in Alan Wolfe, "Has Social Democracy a Future",
Comparative Politics, October. 1978, p. 104. "What is surprising about
social democracy", says Wolfe, "is not that it exists in a capitalist
world system, but that in some ways it actually organizes that system
and defines its priorities", p. 103.
272
political organization of advanced capitalism
entlv ToTe
^^^^^^-^-^ e'd, inadvert-y t b sure, when they tried to organizethe world capitalist system under American
negemony after World War II.
Whether or not such a broad thesis is valid is not the point
here. Tne point is that it attempts to implicate social democracy in a
political design. While those creating a political order in the West
might have preferred Italian Christian Democrats, Adenauer, or Ludwig
Erhard, rule by these political segments alone was untenable in the long
run, since the very growth and success of European recovery under
capitalism encouraged expectations in the post-war working classes that
only social democratic parties could fulfill. Furthermore, if the whole
edifice was to survive, it required some planning apparatus and state
interventionist manipulations."'"^
While French Communists would probably accept much of the above
analysis, they would carry the argument one step further. Not only was
(and is) social democracy the preserver of the capitalist order, but it
is also the destabilizer of any radical (that is Communist, ) attempts
Unce m power, social democrats, having raised expectations,
sought to fulfill their promises. But they could only deliver on these
promises by mortgaging the future in the form of inflation. The quag-
mire led to the difficulties experienced later by such parties in Britain
and Scandinavia. The state-managed order of social democracy was thus
viable during the pro-growth era of the 1950s and 1960s, but vulnerable
thereafter.
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to Change that o.der. Thi. interpretation explain, the sinister nature
that Co™™uni.ts attribute to social democracy's international role
And it is this fundamental interpretation by the. of social democracy
Which I believe ^,es any alliance between the two forces ultimately
untenable. Chapter X discussed the PCF-s suspicions of the SPD that
emerged from Bad Godesberg Therp w;.c: . h^^^s* iiiere as a deen fpa-n -hKn-t-uc p rear ma German social
democracy would act to stabilize a Ipftici-oxix le ist government that might someday
come to power in France. '^'^
French Communists in 1978 considered the PS to have realigned
itself with European social democracy. 1976 marked the end of
Mitterrand's brief and ephemeral tactic of attempting to distinguish the
Socialist Parties of Northern and Southern Europe.^^ And Communists, who
long took pride in their own internationalist orientation, looked with
deep suspicion upon the harmonization of policies among the socialists
in Europe. In fact, the situation contrasted with the lack of harmony
19
^ „
.^^^ ^^"^ example Ralph Milliband, Marxism and Politics (OxfordOxford University Press, 1977), pp. 183-185 . These fears were inten-sified by the role of the SPD in opposing the quasi-insurrectional
activities of the Communists in Portugal. For a French Communistdiscussion of the role of the SPD in the I. S., see Louis Althusser, "on
the Jwenty Second Congress of the French Communist Party", New LeftReview, No 104, July-August, 1977, p. 6.
20
^
^
^^^^ PS joined in the Elsinor Conference, convened to
elaborate a European-wide Socialist program. This confirmed to themthat the PS was conforming to the SPD's vision of Europe.
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lemo-
between European Communists in recent years.
One important instrumentality of international social d
cracy, according to Communist sources, is the Triedrich Ebert Foundation
Directed from Bonn, its operations are said to promote the international
purposes of social democracy, not merely in Europe, but in the Third
World as well. 22 p^^^y journalists and researchers have been critical
of the Fund for several reasons:
1) Important members of German industry sit on its
board.
^
2) It serves as a source of financial support for
other Social Democratic Parties, as in Spain
and Portugal. Furthermore it is active in
France, Italy and Greece, namely those countries
where change is taking place and where
Communists are active. In France, both non-
21^
European Social Democrats in 1974 formed an office of co-
ordination for Socialist Parties in the EEC Parliament and Commission.
22
The Fund serves as a research and archive center, offering
seminars and conferences to 100,000 participants a year. Data is from
Claude Montagny, "La fondation Friedrich Ebert: efficace demarcheur
de la social-democratie allemande". La social-democratie au present
(Paris: Editions sociales, 1979), pp. 101-122. "
'
23
These are said to include directors of Volkswagen, Hoechst.
and German banks. Two board members are also members of the Trilateral
Commission, making them suspect. La social-democratie a u present,
p. 30. The Swiss journalist, Jean Ziegler, reports that funds from
the SPD control the entire Socialist International, with the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation serving as the primary source of financing. Le Monde
Diplomatique
,
January 16, 1978.
~
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Coi^munist trade unions, the F.O. and the C F D Treceive support. 2*+ ^.l^.lJ. .
It operates with Governmen-i-c:
the Third World, in~XZL''"ZTZSenegal and Indonesia.25 L 1973
"'Brussels oS!'
ZZlt Sadf°™ 2::t E C
Do^r , !• ""^^^ ==P°nsor seminars. The pur-
?Srd 1'' '° - ^° move theThir World states away from Marxian solutionstowards social democracy. J-ucion ,
T^ls is the critical Co™,unist evaluation of social democracy's
actions at the international level, a mixture of truth, demagogy and
conspiracy theory, m the Communist belief system, the class struggle
has moved to a world level, manifesting itself today in the struggle
between rich and poor nations. Leaders, such as Brandt, are alarmed by
the destabilizing possibilities inherent in this struggle at the world
2 6level. Social democratic policy, therefore, is one of reducing tensions
between North and South in the world. It is in this sense that the I.S.
24
th. • r • "^^11^°^
"^^^ks were transferred from the Foundation toe bank m Lisbon of the Socialist Party and its journal RepubMca
Burnfr
?-ganizes seminars for journalists in S^^epurpose, of course, is to preserve capitalism and prevent chang; in
social'democ;"* T ^'"""^^ ^^'^ movement'towardsl mocracy, to ultimately create an enlarged Europe with apolitical center m Bonn. Ibid., p. 118.
Montagny, Ibid., pp. 109-110.
26
Ibid., p. 133.
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Lsease and
has continued to intervene in North-South relations.
The goal, then, is to avoid class struggle at the planetary
level and attenuate the national liberation struggles. On the othe.
hand, if the social democrats of Europe do nothing, famine, di.
overpopulation will endanger the entire edifice. Given this situation,
the Brandt solution calls for an enlightened generosity in the
developed states: certain sacrifices to be made now. But it is the
working people of the Western countries, the supposed constituency of
the PCF, who will be paying for this generosity. This is the inter-
national order that social democrats have in mind. Communists, however,
are confident that the working people of the developed countries will
not pay the costs of salvaging this particular crisis of capitalism.
A final note
.
Social democratic perspectives cited in this
chapter on North-South issues do not always reflect the views of the
French Socialists. Neither the l.S. nor the Ebert Foundation speak for
the PS, a Party which formulates policies independently on such questions,
The next chapter will examine policies toward the Third World by both
the PS and PCF.
27
Thus the Commission formed by Robert McNamarra of the World
Bank, to resolve deadlocked issues between North and South, designated
Brandt as its head. If the Third World was making demands, it was
Brandt's role to determine methods of attenuating these demands by
fostering class collaboration and defusing the world from dangerous
social upheaval in the less-developed areas.
CHAPTER XII
THE THIRD WORLD:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS
The Common Program
The French left brings its own perspectives to Third World
relations. But Communists and Socialists, given their different con-
ceptions, do not always align on questions relating to underdeveloped
nations. Each interprets events through its own prism. The two parties,
m the time frame examined here, were in the process of redefining
proposals for a Government program. And while 19 77 negotiations to
update the Program failed. Third World policies did not appear to be at
issue. Nevertheless, events in the Third World could in the future
divide the two coalition partners.
A sensible point of departure for analysis, then, is the
Programme commun
. It can shed light on certain broad shared per-
spectives. Further on I will examine PCF and PS positions on specific
Third World issues. Then I will examine some specific Socialist
proposals on "the new economic order".
The Common Program commits a Government of Left Union to seek a
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major restructuring of relationships with the underdeveloped world,
calling for cooperation based on genuine independence and non-inter-
ference in internal affairs.
^ While the document urges an end to
colonial domination, it recognizes that France holds special links to
its former realm, especially in Africa. The two parties call for an
aid program favoring public development over the private sector,
directing benefits towards the needs of the recipient states, rather
than the narrower requirements of French investors. The Program also
calls for a revision of the Association status arrangements negotiated
between EEC states and the developing countries, the so-called Yaounde
Agreement.
Nothing is said about national liberation movements, other than
brief reference of support for independence struggles. Nor is there
any reference to France's dependency on the Third World for raw
materials (the document was drafted before the oil price rises). In
sum, the Common Program tends toward generalities with respect to the
Third World; one must probe elsewhere for concrete perspectives. But
first it will help to sketch some historical background.
Historical Overview
Third World problems are not peripheral to French politics.
"
^Le Programme commun du Gouvernement de la Gauche (Paris:
Flammarion, 1978), pp. 120-123.
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It was de-colonization and the ensuing new nelationahip. to Indo-China
and the African states which so upset French political life in the Fourth
Republic. The parties of the left also grasp the political, economic
and cultural ties binding France to Africa. Asia, the Caribbean and the
Middle East.
For the past 25 years, the PCF has essentially accepted the
general world communist line towards the Third World: supporting the
Tiajor national liberation confrontations of the period. Although not a
governing Party, the PCF has mobilized its resources, taking the
political action steps available to it. This includes issuing
pronouncements, acting in parliament, or participating in world con-
ferences
.
While proud of its anti-imperialist record, the PCF has at times
equivocated on issues of colonialism. The classical doctrine was not
always helpful in sorting out the issues, for Marx rarely dealt with
issues of national liberation. Only
: late in life did he interest himself
with the independence problems of India, Poland and Ireland. Lenin had
wanted to bring the revolution to the colonies, but was unsure if
colonial liberation was a one-stage or two-stage operation. Would
colonies move to socialism directly, or did they first require development
of a national bourgeoisie? Even Stalin was suspicious of independence
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leaders. Men such as Ghandi were vassals of capitalist, leading
independent nations, but dependent on their ex-colonial rulers. It was
probably Khrushchev's insight to accept the non-aligned states as
basically compatible with the socialist world.
It should be no surprise, then, that a form of revolutionary
paternalism describes ear]y French Communist attitudes toward backward
lands. Socialism would come to the colonial lands, but derivatively:
through the French people themselves achieving socialism. The Empire
would be socialized rather than de-colonized.^
Furthermore, the USSR approved these conceptions. At the de
Gaulle-Molotov meeting of May, 1942, the Soviet Union pledged to support
a post war framework where all the peoples of the French colonies would
yield to de Gaulle's leadership.^ Early PCF policy conformed to this
scheme: urging retention of colonies in the French Union, but paying lip
service to some autonomy. Algeria was not seen as a national entity.
In 1945 Thorez spoke of a "union of freedom" between French and colonial
peoples, holding out some vague idea of self determination. During the
early stages of the Indo-China War in 1946-47, Thorez, then a vice
president in the Tripartite Council of Ministers, supported credits for
2
On the other hand, the PCF was instrumental in the formation
of revolutionary parties in the colonial countries.
3
Claudin, The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominform,
Vol. II, pp. 336-7^; ~
"
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the war on the insurgents.^
.
Socialists and the Th1^;^World. The SFIO too underwent painful
adjustments to France's declining influence. Guy Mollet led France in
the 1955 Suez War. He went on to become a major supporter of the war
in Algeria, despite an earlier repudiation of the A lg^rie Frangaise
slogan.' These actions of the SFIO during the Fourth Republic did
tarnish their image as friends of the Third World.
^
Today, however, the Socialists have fundamentally revised their
conceptions of the Third World. They recognize the urgency of a new
economic order, attuned to the demands that the underdeveloped states
have made on the industrial nations."^
Mitterrand's program in 1972 was highly critical of France's
4
Claudm, p. 338. Some hold the PCF accepted more mainstream
views on colonial questions in order to gather allies in the struggle
against EDC, which they gave a greater urgency to.
socialists operate m a pluralist framework, where factions
could oppose or support various colonial policies. Many who had a
falling out o-n the Algerian question later joined with Mendes-France in
forming the PSU.
The PCF continues to cite the role of SFIO in various past wars
to demonstrate its historical opposition to liberation movements. See
L' Imperialisme frangais aujourd'hu i (Paris: Editions sociales, 1976)
p. 75.
7
Socialists evoke an historical parallel, analogizing Third World
demands for a new economic order with the 19th Century struggle of
workers to form unions for their rights. See Lionel Jospin (ed.) Les
Socialistes et le Tiers Monde (Paris: Berger-Levrault
,
1977), p. 120.
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past dealings with the Third World. ^ Existing • ^iiu L stm policy favored French
business interests over the reauirpm^n+cLn q e e ts of the poorer nations. Policy
was Often subordinated to U.S. interests (a the.e often stressed by PCF
pronouncements). Below are some other themes of the Mitterrand program:
.
The Third World must reach its own developmentgoals, without particular western models imposed.
.
Abandonment of priviliged zones of French influence.
.
Promotion of a legitimate French-speaking culturalpolicy, in no way tied to development aid.
.
No sale of arms to repressive, racist regimes.
.
Developed nations must contribute one per cent ofGNP to development aid.
French Communist Perspectives
In the last chapter certain broad ideas were sketched. While
the Communists accept the legitimacy of national liberation struggles,
they reject the conception that there will be violent explosions arising
from the Third World confronting the rich nations. Contrast this to the
Brandt Report, which is predicated on the possibility of such confronta-
tions. As Marchais told a press conference in Mexico City, the inter-
ests of the people in developed countries cannot be contradictory, but
must complement those of the poorer countries to form a more just order.
Imperialism spreads the idea that there is a
contradiction between the aspirations of the
French people and working class regarding their
Frangois Mitterrand, Chanp:er la vie: Programme de Gouvernement
du Parti Socialiste (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), pp. 193-197.
283
toe CaribbeL^SLa'a^S AS?::?"'
°'
Co^unists also reject what they ter„ demographic theories of
catastrophe. Thus some of the poorest African states, such as Gabon and
the Congo, have a zero rate of population growth. Industrialization of
the Third world will not lead to extreme population explosions. There
will be increases, as mortality rates decline, but population will
Ultimately stabilize, as in other industrial states. Thus problems of
population growth and food shortages are judged false problems. The
PCF is confident there are rptir,n^T T7=i,rc. -i-^Liier a io al ways to organize social and production
relations to avoid these crises. "'"^
The PCF critique of French policies
. French capitalism emerged from
the Second World War in a state of dependency, stagnation, indebtedness,
and general political impotence, according to the Communists. To regain
9
. .
_ Visits such as this are one of many forums used by the PCF topromote its views on the Third World. Marchais had been invited by theMexican Communists, who had been legalized after nearly 40 years in1978. Marchais was also granted a 45-minute visit with President JoseLopez Portillo. L'Humanite
,
see the issues of May 15, 16 and 17 whichgave wide coverage to the visit.
10,
^^^2 proper models for development, not surprisingly, arethose of the Central Asian USSR, Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan and others whichhave developed far more than Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan, having
moved from
^
feudalism to the modern era in a matter of decades. AndreMome, "Points de reperes pour les problemes du Tiers-Monde", Cahiers
du Communisme
, May-June, 1958, pp. 110-125.
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position
.e,ui.ed a la.ge. base.^^ Caullis. beca.e the political We
to accomplish this, drawing upon the Treaty of Ro.e and the new relation-
ships deriving fro. it. Pro. the viewpoint of the communists, the new
Fifth Republic went on to establish stable positions, strengthening the
currency, reducing debt, developing a nuclear force, disengaging from
NATO and encouraging advanced sectors of technology.
At the same time, Gaullism required a Third World policy to meet
new realities. Its solution was to enter into agreements of cooperation
and aid. Actually, de Gaulle was establishing neo-colonial relations
with the newly independent states. The goal was to:
1) Keep them within a capitalist mode of development.
2) Extend French economic penetrations.
3) Overcome France's backwardness in relation to its
rivals.
To achieve this, France had a number of foreign policy assets
at its disposal: its Security Council seat, its nuclear arsenal, and its
network of bases capable of deploying forces in Africa, the Indian Ocean
and the Caribbean. Thus France pursued its penetrations through its
policy of "cooperation". The Third World states were seen as "privileged
zones" for commercial activity. French capital flowed into the Ivory
L imperialisme franqais
. Much of the analysis here is based
on the opening essay by Martin Vorlet, pp. 11-33. It presents a good
outline of some Communist positions.
Vorlet, p. m.
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Coast, Gabon, the Zaire of Mobutu, or South Africa, Iran, Egypt, even
'J^^
^--1- Raw materials were also a prime
target. Despite its penetrations, imperialism ultimately confronts (or
even engenders) the inexorable liberation movements. These then are
some of the perspectives that emerge when one examines the seemingly
endless pages of Party journals and tracts. Through this Leninist pris^
imperialism appears as a force consciously seeking to destroy the unity
of the younger nations. The developed countries go so far as to
manipulate the more reactionary regimes of the Third World against pro-
gressive ones (that is those with a socialist orientation)
„ Thus Zaire
or South Africa is summoned to defend a faction in Angola, or Hassan's
Morocco is employed to preserve the status quo in Zaire.
Some French Communist assessments in the 1970s . The communists were
cautiously optimistic in 1975. The MPLA in Angola had achieved a
liberation victory. The Party noted that the U.S., frustrated over Water-
gate and Vietnam, was powerless to intervene. Imperialism's means of
direct intervention had been diminished. "^^ Furthermore, the political
weight of the Socialist-bloc countries (namely the ability of the Soviets
13
Verlet, p. 13
14
The PCF does not support every indiscretion of the liberation
movements. The Central Committee condemned the killings at the 1972
Olympics as adventurist, "ill-serving the just cause of the Palestinian
Arabs". Cahiers du Communisme, October, 1972, pp. 127-128.
15
Cahiers du Communisme
,
July-August, 1977, p. 82.
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and Cubans to aid liberation
.ove.ents) had to be taken into greater
account.
.
ilBPg.r'ialist rivalry. Vfhile the Co.munists applaud any with-
drawal by French forces fro. areas of for.er interest (as happened with
certain Indian Ocean outposts), there is one caveat: rival imperialist
powers might step into the vacuum. It does not promote socialism if
France withdraws, only to have the U.S., the Federal Republic or Japan
supplant the former role of France. Thus Madagascar, independent since
1950, has tripled its trade with the dollar zone. Evidence of West
German penetrations into former French Africa is a particular irritant.
Communist analysts make the case that the U.S. has stepped into many
former French (and British) realms in the Indian Ocean. Soviet penetra-
16tions are ignored.
The Communists, in their role as a vocal opposition Party, oppos
Government military initiatives .in the Third World, such as Giscard's
threat, in May, 1975, to dispatch forces to Lebanon. In fact, the PCF
rejected any attempts by the Giscard Government to assert France's role
in crises. At the same time, it ridicules any signs of impotence by the
regime. This inconsistency gives them the flexibility to be critical
where they see fit. When Giscard did assert a role in Africa, as shown
15
South Africa's de Beers now prospects on the island. Japan
has secured fishing rights off-shore, and the FRG has extensive invest-
ments there, the PCF particularly objects to the SPD's links to the
social democrats on that island.
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by the airlifting of Moroccan t-Pnn^Q -t-^ v •^ iiurocc roops to Zaire m april, 1976, it was
dismissed as an American-inspired adventure.
These, then, were some perspectives of the PCF concerning the
Third World. Next, it will help to examine some problem areas.
The Indiai. Ocean reeion. Despite withdrawals from this region of one-
time Anglo-French influence, France retains a residual force. (And the
PCF retains its own influence through its own extensive contacts with
Communist Parties in the region.) French outposts lie along the sea lanes
from the Suez Canal and the Cape route. Major oil supplies come from the
Persian Gulf, and they require protection. France also conducts atomic
tests in the Indian Ocean, requiring monitoring stations. Until 1975,
France retained its large air and naval facility at Diego Suarez and the
island base at Tananarive. When Madagascar insisted on full neutrality
in 1975, the Navy shifted to a new base at St. Denis on Reunion, still a
Department of France. Bases on the Comoro Islands were yielded, but the
one at Mayotte, on the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel
(opposite Madagascar) has been retained. The area has strategic value
in any conflict, since it dominates the sea lanes along the eastern
coast of Africa. The significance of this was not overlooked by the
Communist press, which noted that a million tons of oil flowed through
the channel daily, destined for Europe and the U.S.''"'^
17
L'Humanite
,
April 5, 1976, p. 2.
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Djibouti, at the mouth of the Red Sea, is a further strategic
site noted by the Communists. In June, 1977, this area of the Horn
received independence after 71 years of French rule. The event was wel-
comed by L'Humanite, but the press report noted many "remaining booby
18
traps". Thus Giscard was seeking to manipulate the government struc-
ture, and was intent on retaining the French base there. At the time
this was viewed as a threat to socialist-leaning Somalia.
The Communists believe that both the U.S. and France would oppose
any leftist-oriented regime installed in that area of the Horn. They
also suggest that strongly anti-socialist Saudi Arabia would willingly
play the role of protector for the new state of Djibouti. In terms of
overall Indian Ocean policy, the PCF appears convinced that France is
determined to maintain what influence it can, a viewpoint confirmed by
Vali. By maintaining a permanent military presence capable of inter-
vening in crises, France is opposing the right of new nations to settle
20
their own affairs. The Communists claim they would offer a "more democ-
ratic policy in the Indian Ocean, a region where France could make a
positive contribution towards peace and security".
^^Ibid.
19
. .
The base is operational, say the Communists. This is confirmed
by Ferenc Vali, who cites its excellent military harbor, and notes that
its garrison is reinforceable by a force d' intervention. Vali, Politics
of the Indian Ocean Region (New York: Macmillan, 1975).
20
See Michel Chariot in L' Imperialisme frangais, p. 65.
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The Middle East, Africa
and Energy Issues
The PCF had been critical of Giscardian policy toward the Middle
East, a region furnishing 85 percent of France's petroleum. For in-
stance, the Government favored certain oil producers, such as Iran and
the Arab states of the Gulf, over the more socialist-oriented Algeria,
Iraq and Libya. While the Communists may dislike certain Arab regimes,
they are in no position to close off supply sources. But they would
prefer to increase imports from the latter nations listed above. (The
Mitterrand Government has shown signs of agreeing with this policy.)
The Communists also hope that the Left Government will expand
trade with the Soviet and East-bloc states. However, I have nowhere
located the suggestion that the Soviet Union could itself supply petrol-
eum to France, being already over-extended in Eastern Europe.
Relations wi th Algeria
. Communists always viewed the Evian Accords as
a device allowing Franco to control Algerian national wealth. But the
Boumedienne Government was said to be leading a legitimate independence
struggle for control of this wealth. The PCF welcomed Algeria's decisive
nationalization of the oil and gas facilities of ELF-ERAP and Compagnie
21
Jacques Goulard, L' Imperalisme franqais
, p. 59.
22„
But see Bernard J. Crescenzo, "Quelle Politique Energie pour la
France?", L' Imperialisme frangais
, p. 108. He suggests that cooperation
with the East-bloc could provide France with natural gas and oil.
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fransaise des pe'tPoles in 1970-71.« Algeria was carrying out policies
in 1971 that Mossadegh had been powerless to do in Iran in 1951. This,
in fact, confirmed the notion that the world relation of forces was
shifting, further demonstrating the ™yth of the invulnerable monopolies.
There was also the hope that such nationalizations would inspire Syria
and Iraq to take similar steps.
Ties to the FL N,. One of the more interesting aspects of the
PCF's involvement with the Third World is the network of proto-state
relations enjoyed by the Party and its leading functionaries with
various heads-of
-state
,
political parties and liberation movements arouni
the globe. The Communists, if not a government, are a potential govern-
ment, standing ready in the wings. Thus the Party has carefully guarded
its special links to the FLN. Ties, strained after 1965, have since
improved. In 1972, Raymond Guyot of the Political Bureau led a delegation
to the FLN. Among other things, he spelled out what a new energy policy
would be under the Party's democratie avancee : namely that FRAP and CFP
would be nationalized. Future agreements would be negotiated fairly,
without any suggestion of neo-colonialism.
Two years later, Boumedienne invited George Marchais and Jacques
Denis to Algiers. The wide-ranging talks had almost the flavor of a
23
Robert Lambotte, "L'Algerie dix ans apres 1 ' independence'
Cahiers cu Communisme
,
October, 1972, pp. 88-98.
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gove.n.ent-to-gove™.ent parley. =^
„,rchais noted that France had
retaliated Because of certain Algerian nationalizations: limitations
were placed on l^igrants co.ing into France, and restrictions „ere set
on the import of Algerian wines. Such neo-co]on,-.lcolonia pressures would not
be applied by a Government of the Left, he said. In April, 1977, C.G.T
secretary George Seguy visited Algiers to discuss racism toward ^Igerial
workers in France.^^
When PCF delegations
.eet with their Algerian counterparts, it
is not .erely to support issues of interest to their hosts, nor to issue
resounding pronouncements on the urgency of Third World liberation.
Often, there is some important quid pro quo, with the Algerian side af-
firming positions more crucial to the Communists. The PCF, after all,
is a non-ruling European party, excluded from various world forums.
By lining up governmental support from a friendly Third World state, it
increases its prestige and leverage as a political force. For example,
in 1971 the PCF held consultations with Algeria's Parti Avant Garde
Socialiste (PAGS). Typically, the joint declaration included certain
ritualistic Third World positions: condemning Israeli expansionism and
the South African regime; supporting the PRC in Vietnam, the MPLA in
Angola and opposing Portugal's activities in Mozambique. But the
24
L ' Human ite, September 12 through 16, 1974 „ Links to the Third
World were active that year. Earlier, Marchais journeyed to Hanoi to
summon a world front against imperialism.
L'Humanite
,
April 7, 1977, p. 7.
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declaration went on to support certain nth^^PP -t: o er mainstream Communist
political obiectives snrh ^ r, uc as a European Security conference, recog-
nition of the GDR, and a de-„uclearized Mediterranean.
Sub-Saharan Africa. In thp iq7no -hk •e 1970s this region became an important arena
of anti-colonial actwii-sT- ti^^ ni t vity. The Communists are on record as having
opposed:
.
French Government collusion with Portuguese forcesm furnishing aid to South Africa.
.
French military intervention in Chad and the
sending of paratroops to Gabon„
.
Expanded French investments in Africa under the
cover of aid and cooperation agreements.
.
Accords between France and African states, if they
were imposed in negotiations that were unequal.
In cultural relations with former French areas, the PCF remained
suspicious of the official policy of Francophonie
, in that it masqueraded
neo-colonialist objectives.
Policies toward African liberation movements
. The PCF resented the fact
that the PS (like most European social democratic parties) supported
the FNLA and I'Unitas against the M.P.L.A. in Angola. Communists
opposed Giscard's efforts to salvage the Mobutu regime in Zaire, seeing
both French collusion with Belgium and attempts to solicit U.S.- inter-
vention, l^men Giscard provided French transports to King Hassan II to
airlift 800 Moroccan troops from Kinshasa to Shaba Province, the PCF
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reacted strongly.^^
,^3,,,, ^^^^.^.^^
^^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
international law. and acting without authority of Parliament. Social-
ists, too, opposed the venture, but softened the tone and substance of
their objections.
The Soviet role in Africa could also generate differences b
t.een the two coalition Parties. The PCF justifies Soviet and Cuban
penetrations, while the Socialists oppose these ventures^
e-
The Left and Latin America
While Latin America is not a major area for French penetrations.
Communist sources note that of all the colonizers in that region, it is
France that retains virtually the only toe-hold. The important outposts
are the Overseas Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Both the PS
and PCF urge immediate self-determination. Communists have also chal-
lenged aid programs: a ruse to offset the large payments deficits of
these islands. The funds are used merely to finance French imports, ul-
timately returning to France as private capital, perpetuating the depend-
27
ency
.
26^.
Giscard argued that he acted on behalf of "Europe". See
discussions in L'Humanite of April and 11, 1977.
27
Cahiers du Communisme
,
January, 1977, p. 121. Also see L'
Imperialisme frangais
, pp. 153-154. The PCF maintains ties with local
Communists on the islands. Thus in November, 1976, PCF leaders and
corresponding leaders in the Departments met in Paris.
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Allende's Chile and the L^ft in Francice
Domestic events in Chile during the 1970s had strong inter-
national ramifications because the Left in France drew many lessons from
them. These lessons strongly influenced strategies and political re-
lationships inside France. Chile, even though a Third World country,
had important symbolic value: Communists and Socialists had, after all,
achieved power through an alliance. This appeared to confirm the strat-
egy of the Left Union in France. Furthermore, the Popular Unity forces
had accomplished their victory through the electoral process, and by
preserving democratic liberties, policies that both signers of the
Programme commun were committed to,,^^
After the coup, much of the euphoria surrounding Allende's ex-
periment of course sounded naive, and each segment of the Left drew its
own revised conclusions. All agreed that it revealed the vulnerabilities
in the Left alliance. Some in the PS were confident that the French
Party was in a stronger position than Allende's Party. Mitterrand con-
cluded that it was vital to broaden the base of one's allies; that a
truly majoritarian movement was necessary. And the Communist Parties of
28,,.
Mitterrand admired the Communists of Chile as more realistic
and moderate than the French variety. They would not try to dominate the
coalition, let alone attempt a coup de Prague . And the PCF admired
Chilean Socialists: they were more Marxist than the European variety
(and were not linked to the I.S.)„ And they had been favorably disposed
toward liberation struggles in Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria. See Le Monde
,
November 17, 1971, p. 12 and L'Humanite , November 25, 1971, p. 1.
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Europe drew siMlar conclusions on the need for broader alliances.
Co^unists also revived an old the.e, the need to prepare for various
kinds Of struggle; counter-revolutionary violence was always possible. 30
Events in Chile increased Socialist suspicions of the World
Bank. The Party had long been critical of IBRD as manipulative in its
loan and development policies to Third World states. Socialists claimed
that Robert MacNamarra and pressure from the United States played a con-
tributory role in financially singling the Popular Unity Government,
Both the PCF and PS agreed that France would halt all aid to the
Pinochet Government, particularly the sale of arms.^^ ^.^^^^ ^^^^
criticized for providing such aid.
Berlmguer said that drawing 51 percent of the votes in an
election would not sustain a government. This was the logic which in-duced the PCI to design its Historic Compromise. Rinascita, October 12
1973. The PCF agreed: a left government was not viable if 49 percent ofthe electorate was hostile. Le Monde
,
July 4, 1974, p. 6.
30
Lazitch, L'Echec permanent
, pp. 48-51. Socialist Deputy Jean
Poppern also supported this view, but did not have the backing of his
Party. The PS did not want to identify rule by the Left with civil war,
always a latent possibility in France.
31
Les Socialistes et le tiers monde
, p. 173.
32
The PCF would cease all commerce in arms to states that are
fascist, racist or aggressive. (The PCF would, of course, be defining
these categories.) The Party has opposed sales to Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Morocco. The Socialists have been outspoken against sales to South
Africa and Rhodesia. Ibid,, p. 173.
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Support for Liberation Movements
The two left Parties could probably agree in most cases on which
regimes to withhold weapons sales from. But could they agree on which
regimes or groups to supply arms to? Probably not, if they disagreed
on the validity of a particular liberations struggle, or were backing
different factions (as in Angola). And here, it would seem, is a likely
or possible source of disagreements for the Left Coalition. I would
assume that French Communists, like their Soviet and Cuban comrades,
would be eager to supply certain liberation forces. The Socialists
would not, if it interfered with overall relations with their allies or
the West. This conclusion stems from the point established earlier in
these pages: the French Socialists remain fundamentally bound to the
33Western camp.
The "New Economic Order"
The concept of a new world order in trade and economic relations
33
The Socialist Government has agreed to sell 15 trucks, two
Alouette III helicopters and two patrol boats to the Sandinista Regime
in ^ Nicaragua
.
Le Monde
,
January 9, 1982, pp. 1 and 3. The country is
said to receive weapons from the USSR and Cuba. (In August, 1981, the
Mitterrand Government also deviated from U.S. policy by recognizing the
Liberation Front in El Salvador.) Charles Hernu noted that France did
not ^ have "to justify its plans", since France was not part of the
military command integrated into NATO. "The United States should be
pleased that this Government (Nicaragua) is addressing itself to France,
rather than the Soviet Union or Cuba", the Defense Minister added.
Socialist policy is to free the Third World from being dependent on
one or the other superpower.
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was originally put forth by the Third World ^.t^-^,,J 11XJ.U w ia states at various North/
South conferences. Both I.efi- p^-n-i--;^^ •L t Parties m France support these demands
to re-structure relations. Both describe this new economic order as
representing the legitimate aspirations of the Third World to Indus-
trialize and develop.
Yet differences in policy can be discerned. The Socialists
support export stabilization programs between EEC countries and the
Third World, for example. The Communists do not. T^ese programs, a
concession to developing countries, are intended to reduce the sharp
fluctuations in the prices of raw materials exported to Europe. The
Communists, however, counter that they are merely a device to assure a
steady supply of raw materials to the EEC countries. That they preserve
the developing nations in their role of supplier of raw materials at
low prices. They have the subsidiary goal of preventing the formation
of Third World cartels, such as OPEC.
The call for a new economic order is not a demand for immediate
equality among all nations, rich or poor. Rather, say its advocates, it
is an attempt to reverse the overwhelming dependency that has character-
ized the Third World's relationship to the industrial states. Since
World War II and the advent of the Bretton-Woods framework, they argue,
the industrial states of the West have managed both the rules and
functioning of international economic arrangements. While the formal
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aspects Of Western political domination collapsed with colonialism, the
substantive aspects of this domination have persisted into the e.a of
de-colonization: the so-called neo-colonial relationship.
In France, the two mass Parties of the Left have apparently
embraced this Third World conception-as well as the demands that flow
logically from it. They begin with the assumption that the relationship
between the developed and underdeveloped nations is inherently inequit-
able. One must recognize this assumption to understand their policies.
Thus, as we have seen, the PCF argues thar many of the past accords
reached between France and various African states should be revised: they
contain clauses that restrict the sovereignty of the developing states.
Furthermore, runs the argument, they were imposed in negotiations that
were unequal during a period when these states were arriving at indepen-
dent status. And finally, the PCF and the PS insist on disinterested
aid: political conditions tied to aid as a means of pressure must cease.
Only in this spirit can there be valid cooperation between France and
Third World states.
The Socialists and the Third World
The weight of analysis this far has emphasized PCF policies and
perceptions of the Third World. It remains to show how the Socialists
envisage France's relations to the underdeveloped nations.
34
Most of the following analysis is based on Les Socialistes et
le tiers monde.
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They begin with the assumption that investment and financial
decision-making in the wo.ld is generally determined by the developed
nations. Because of this, the new nations a.e forced to conform to an
international division of labor enforced to their detriment by an
exploitation of their natural resources. As a result, the modernized
sectors of their economies are largely shaped and controlled from
abroad. Some pf the poorer developing states have become so totally
dependent on the industrialized nations that they no longer control
their development. For example, the need to import elaborate techno-
logy from abroad forces them to acquire foreign exchange. Hence the
poorer nations must develop their owr. exports and accept the establish-
ment of foreign firms on their soil. Furthermore, the pattern of world
trade imposed by the dominant countries forces them to be suppliers of
relatively simple commodities.
Then, too, the Third World nations are burdened with foreign
debt, which, it is pointed out, has risen from $51 billion to $119
billion between 1957-1973.^^ Debt service alone had reached $11 billion
annually (in 1973), compelling these states to assign an ever-growing
share of their export revenues merely to the servicing of these debts.
The accumulated debt could exceed the net transfers made to the Third
World: "The Third World states will thus be aiding the developed states,
an absurd situation", say the Socialists.
35
Ibid.
,
p. 58.
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First, the socialists as. that steps be taken to lighten the
burden of this debt.
France in 1975 contributed private and public aid of 17 billion
francs (over 1.0 percent of its GNP) plus an added H.2 billion, if the
overseas departments and territories are included. France's public aid
to the Third World is approximately O.H percent of GNP, well below her
goal, which was 0.7 percent.
This aid chiefly goes to states recently administered by France,
70 percent to Africa. Private aid, on the other hand, is more divers-
ified: only 36 percent going to the French Zone and North Africa. In
other words, the Socialists argue, French capitalism has a well-protec-
ted preserve in Africa, yet it does not reject other profit opportunities
in areas such as Latin America (a point equally noted by the Communists).
The Socialists, like the Communists, have been critical of
certain French public aid projects. Often they are designed to further
French cultural interests by encouraging language and schooling under
French methods, based on modes of instruction introduced in the colonial
era— ill-adapted to the needs of modern Africa.
Below is a summary of certain critical evaluations the Socialists
Ibid., p. 63
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have „ad. of certain international agencies dealing with Third World
development:
• g^JMt^lNati^ Not only is it weak, but it isfar more political than it pretends. The U.Schxef
_furnx3her of funds, has an inordinate viLe indecision making.
• ItSWgldBank. IBRD imposes unreasonable conditions
afflZ It rlT' i«<=-feres in their internalrrairs, as m Chile.
.
EEC Socialists are more tolerant here. They approvethe Association status accorded to African states at
iTlT ^""t
^^"^^"^ extended at the Lome Convention in197b. They favor the STABEX mechanism to protect
against the fluctuations in exports. Certain duty
exemptions on goods coming into EEC countries are also
approved of.
The Communists would most likely agree with the first two evalu-
ations, but challenge the third given their basic suspicions about EEC.
The Lome Accord is viewed here as an innovation between under-
developed and industrialized states, since it attempts to correct im-
balances in relations: giving the Third World non-reciprocal advantages
on the export of products into EEC nations. Nevertheless, Lome does not
respond fully to the requirements of the new states, which seek long-
3 8term development agreements. They require a basic redistribution of
world wealth, not based on capitalist rules of international exchange.
37
Ibid., see the discussion starting on page 86.
38
.
Ibid, For a discussion of the Lome Accords see page 98.
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Capitalist and socialist development mode.l.s : Socialist Party
analysis distinguishes between capitalist model and socialist model
states. The former:
.
are states such as South Korea, Singapore and Brazil.
.
tend to develop export goocfe economies
.
.
are wide open to multinationals.
.
ignore the needs of the bulk of their populations
by developing a comprador class, fostering wide
inequality.
Socialist model states are such states as Algeria, Cuba and
China. Their policies seek more than mere increases in GNP. They are
also attempting to meet the broader aspirations of the great majority
of their people. To attack the roots of misery, they will accept a
less dramatic rate of growth.
Breakdown of the economic order
. The Socialists argue that the
capitalist world economic order is beginning to alter. Economic
liberalism or the laissez-faire rules of world trade, as conceived at
Bretton-Woods and further developed by GATT, along with the entire
structure designed on post war U.S. hegemony— is weakening. It was a
liberalism designed to prevent the narrow protectionism of the inter-
war years; but it still signifies the old world order to the Socialists
Several factors are operating, in their analysis:
1) The rise of Japan and Europe as powers in their
own right.
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2) The loss of dominance by the U.S., particularly
with the "77" making broad challenges at worldforums
.
3) The U.S. defeat in Vietnam.
^) yhe coup de grace provided by the oil price
increases of 197M-.
Given these developments, the Third World is demanding new rules
of the game. The old economic order, postulated on unlimited access at
cheap prices to the world's natural resources, is now undermined: the
industrial nations are now compelled to negotiate.
The OECD states confront an array of coalitions: the non-aligned
countries of 1973; the bloc of "77" at the United Nations; and the
OPEC states. By the 1980s these groups could compel the United States
to attend a North/South dialogue , And they were strong enough to
expand the agenda beyond a discussion of the energy crisis, raising
questions of equality, despite the objections of the United States.
Such, then, is the Socialist Party's description and analysis of
the Third World's confrontation. They are in essential agreement with
these demands to restructure the rules of international exchange. To
stabilize raw material prices, they propose a system of "stockage", the
storing of surplus produce to regulate the tensions between supply and
demand, they would further extend the policy of "generalized preferences"
-- establishing a system of non-reciprocal preferential tariffs to
allow Third World nations to export their manufactured goods to indus-
irial nations. (This would extend an already-existing EEC mechanism.)
They propose some novel reforms of the world monetary system, modify-
ing the voting system within I.M.F., giving these countries a larger
voice
.
In financing development aid, the Socialists would emphasize
public funding. It would be multilateral in nature, not bilateral.
This would preclude the donors using it as a means of influencing the
beneficiaries
.
The Socialists are also proposing an unusual (perhaps Utopian)
system of communal ownership of unexplored territories, such as ocean
explorations. Profits would be used to finance Third World development.
And finally, they set as a goal for France: the achievement of
a rate of public aid at 0.7 percent of GNP. It is now at the 0.39
level
.
Some Conclusions on Third
World Policies
When beginning this project, my judgments on future policies of
a Government of the Left toward the Third World were subject to some
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intervening unknots: would Co^.unists or Socialists dominate the ™ii„,
alliances How .uch leverage or veto power would the Co™nists have,
Today, the answers are clear: Co^.unists are ™ore of an appendage to
the Mitterrand Government.
It would also have been helnful to knnrr ^i-iicj-pLUj. CO K ow at an earlier stage the
mandate of the Left. If strong the Government would be able to mobilize
public opinion and undertake initiatives in foreign policy, more so than
a weak regime vulnerable to an articulate opposition. Given that the
mandate was sl^ong, one still wants to know: can the two Parties carry
out commitments and programs? Can they be translated into policy?
Electoral restraints. Programs enunciated before taking power
by parties in opposition are not to be taken as literal commitments.
Many of the PS and PCF proposals outlined in this Chapter favor Third
World aspirations. But would these proposals be popular with the French
electorate? A party does not necessarily please its constituency in Pas-
de-Calais by furnishing more development aid to Chad, or by seeking to
fulfill a Utopian "new economic order",
Jahangir Amuzegar has posed some questions regarding the indif-
ference of voters in Western democracies towards the demands of the
J • 39developing countries.^ If he is correct, many in France view the "77"
"A Requiem for the North/South Conference", Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. 56, No. 1, October, 1977, pp. 136-159. Amuzegar was formerly Iran's
representative to the I.M.F.
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as demanding unacceptable sacrifices of jobs and living standards. If
there are to be changes, it will require new public attitudes, accord-
ing to Amuzegar. Electorates
.ust be convinced that the present world
pattern is still fundamentally colonial, with unequal partnerships
between the have and have-nots: that the North's prosperity increasing-
ly depends on the resources of the Third World.
-ze
The question, then, is can the Parties of the Left mobili^
their working class and other constituencies behind the changes they
are urging?
The Socialists, we have seen, at times invoke a moral fervor,
likening the struggle of the Third World to that of the workers in the
Nineteenth Century. At other times they invoke an enlightened self
interest, suggesting more efficient uses of world resources. Communists,
too, in what Tiersky calls their "tribune" role, have not hesitated to
appeal to self interest. Thus a policy that allows multinationals to
operate freely abroad can also result in pockets of unemployment in
specific regions of France. This harms the constituency whose interests
Communists claim to embody, suggesting that there are perhaps prudential
reasons for limiting the monopolies. The point is that success in
carrying out the plans of the Left will depend much on the Government's
ability to persuade Frenchmen that a "new economic order" will be to
their benefit.
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lE^I1^2FII^tion^^ When a nation adopts a socialist orde
one can reasonably anticipate changes in its international behavior.
(Castro's Cuba backs policies unthinkable for the pre-1959 regi.e.)
This is not to say that a Mitterrand Government, with Communists in some
ministries, will be dispatching troops into liberation wars. But other
means of support cannot be ruled out: thus one can supply or withhold
weapons, as France does with Nicaragua.
But it is doubtful that a Left Government in France will risk
an adventurous policy in the Third World; there are too many constraints
1) It would upset existing alliance ties.
2) The more radical Communists will be held in check
because of their very junior status.
3) Both Parties will be preoccupied with domestic
problems. Domestic social change holds a priority
for the new regime.
Nevertheless, Third World problems would be decisive to the
. . 40
coalition. The PCF continues to conceptualize in Leninist terms. Its
affinities still lie with the broadly defined anti-imperialist camp.
But it is wedded to a Socialist Party which, in the final analysis,
identifies with the West. In Duverger's phrase, it is not a "mariage
4-
1
d 'amour, mais un mariage de raison".
4-0
Recall that the PCF and SFIO had a major falling out over
whether to furnish the Spanish Republic weapons in the 1930s. (Spain is
not in the Third World, but the lesson is relevant.)
41
Le Monde, January 9, 1982, p. 1.
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Continuities in policy. Perhan^ i-h^ ^ ^. •y y. t^ernaps tne emphasis on transformation
has been too great herp ti-,=.v,^e. There are certain permanent fixtures in French
policy toward the Third World. Access to energy and resources will he
a permanent requirement of any Government, left or right, fiance's
dependency on the Middle F^i<=;i- h^c r^^-t- ^•y ^ ijiaai hast has not disappeared with the arrival of
the Union of the Left Government. The Government must devise tolerable
relations with regimes it disapproves of. ^^at is most likely is that
the Government will continue to flaunt its radical bahavior and
egalitarian credentials in Third World areas remote from France, such
as Central America, where there can be no real risk to France. But it
will manifest prudence in more vital regions, such as Saudi Arabia or
the Gulf States.
CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
The Communists
1^^!^J^I^122.J^±^^^ The contradictions in French Communism
arise from the ambiguity of its identity. Draped in the Trdcplo_re, the
Party during one phase proclaims its national or patriotic aspect. At
another, it displays an international face, defining the advance toward
socialism in terms of the interests of a world movement. Its reference
point is a broad anti-imperialist bloc and other fraternal Parties. The
fact is, the PCF is implanted in two constellations: there is first this
world movement, loosely headed by the USSR, and second, there is the
domestic political system, of which it is a component. It can act on
behalf of each and form alliances within each, as we have seen. But
from the start, maintaining membership in this world movement was
assigned a primacy. It was intimately linked to the major millennial
goal, worldwide social transformation. The progress of socialism proceed
at a global level, deriving largely from the achievements of socialism
already realized in the USSR. Proceeding within this framework, I have
elaborated tvra further ideas, namely that the Communists:
1) thwarted in making their own revolution merged their ' identity
with the Soviet state;
2) confronted with the Yalta settlement, accepted Stalin's post-
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war injunction to substitute power-bloc oolit^V. f •x p ics or insurrectionary
politics
.
But the USSR Ha. Us o» requirement.. It assi^ed primacy to
.ts raiso,^
,,,,
.ine»i.,.a.s. require, o.e.ient
parties in .he West, an. the PCP eompiie.. Respite this co^piian.e, the
xdea
.eveioped here has been that the French Co»unists never stifled a
capacity for radical action, their vanguard pretension. Rather, their
ability to substitute an internationalist purpose or ideal over domestic
advantage was, in their o™ eyes, a manifestation of radical capacity.
A long period of exile from the mainstream of post-war life led
to some new conceptions. By the 1960s it seemed that the efficacy and
legitimacy of the PCF depended more from its ability to link up with
broader social classes and strata inside France, rather than in following
a world movement which was losing some of Its coherency. This realiza-
tion ar^ed for a weakening of ties with the world movement, the establih-
ment of a format that the Italian Communists prefer to term "unity in
diversity". Once the USSR was no longer the embodiment of the new
society, the unconditional unity of the entire edifice was under a
challenge.
I have shown how the new domestic politics strategy of the PCF
became imperiled in 1968. That was the year the Russians again invoked
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power-bloc politics; all Western ^^r^i-^c^ •X w
.arties were enjoined to support the
invasion designed to preserve the bloc. However, obedience by the PCF
would have shattered its "peaceful road'' strategy, then ripening into
a union of the Left (.uch as the earlier obedience Jettisoned insurrec-
tionary strategies in 19.6-^7). The PCF refused this obedience. It
rejected this second post-war atte.pt by the USSR to thwart a strategy
for achieving power. Ignoring Soviet r^ispn_d:^ the PCF for the
first tir^e acted to further its own domestic legitimacy.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ level
. But
it is this domestic legitimacy, endlessly pursued, which is so elusive
to the Communists. Their vanguard pretensions, their internationalist
identity and their insistence on democratic centralism have left many
Frenchmen sceptical of the Party's loudly proclaimed commitment to
pluralism, democracy and the electoral road.
Questions of pluralism and democracy can be analyzed on three
planes
:
1) th,e international movement
2) the domestic politics
3) the internal party.
Pluralist mechanisms are denied on level three, we said. Demo-
cracy is not practiced inside the Party. On the other hand, pluralism
(that is the coexistence and tolerance of diverse views) is practiced.
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indeed insisted upon, on level three, the international. Such widely
divergent parties, as the Italian and French both proclaim that there is
no longer any center to the movement: each party, they insist, is in-
dependent and sovereign
- and arrives at its o.n. conclusions. But this
raises a question. If there is no longer one central line binding all
parties, why such a Leninist procedure internally? The contradiction
is glaring: if there are many truths internationally, why but one inter-
nally? Pluralism at level one suggests the introduction of pluralism
at level three. This is an area where further research would be helpful.
An equally interesting question concerns level two. Would the
PCF in power respect the values of pluralism in domestic politics? Would
it guarantee basic rights and tolerate alternation of power, diversity,
ambiguity and opposition groups? Observers differ. It might during the
transitional phase now postulated by the Party as "advanced democracy".
But after that phase, it is not clear.. This vanguard pretension remains
a major obstacle between the PCF and its alliance partners: the insist-
ence upon the idea - deriving from Lenin - that it alone is the histor-
ical emanation of the working class. This insistence of a uniqueness
and a leading role is distrusted.
In most normal circumstances, the PCF will continue to support
Soviet raison d'etat
.
It will challenge Soviet authority only when in
its judgment, orthodoxy would endanger its own viability (Czechoslvakia,
for instance). Or, if the interests of France are clearly at variance
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with those of Russia, it will offer a challenge. (Even such a loyalist
as Thorez challenged Molotov's position on the internationalization of
the Ruhr in 1945.) One can now expect policies to be calculated in-
creasingly with domestic considerations in mind, as in 1965 and 1968.
However, since its electoral setback in 1978, the PCF has been far more
supportive of Soviet foreign policy initiatives. This shift will be
discussed further on.
_Regionalism: the Eurocommunist phenomenon
. Pierre Hassner is probably
correct in describing Eurocommunism more as an attitude toward the value
of Western democracy, pluralism and internal dissent.^ Employed in this
sense, the term suggests the Parties of the OECD states: Parties which
felt they would be isolated so long as they were identified with the
despotism of the East bloc.
But these Communist Parties of Europe lack any coordinated
strategy or any coherent doctrine of what their final societies will be.
They may have some partial convergencies , but that is al±. The only
point where they probably all agree is on the desirability of reaching
out to broader alliances beyond the old proletarian constituency.
(This was one important lesson of Allende's defeat.) Thus all Parties
insist on their own identities.
French Communists continue to reject conceptions that impose a
"L ' Euro-communisme : stade finale du Communisme ou de 1' Europe?"
Commentaire
,
Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, 1978, p. 135.
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regional unity. And this is consistent with thei. well-known defense
of national Independence, their strict assertion of national sovereign^.
This can he ter.ed their Gaulloco«nist manifestation. Euroco«is.,
like the European Comity, is viewed as another supranational entity.
They will neither accept regionalism (or regional decision-making) in
a capitalist framework, nor in a Communist body. We have seen that the
PCF has held widely diverging views from the PCI on many questions,
ranging from the integration of Europe and the validity of NATO, to
judgments about the tactics of the Portuguese Communists. As the
capitalist world moves toward supranationality and the abandonment of
sovereignty, the Communist world moves in reverse, towards less supra-
nationality, toward what is termed polycentrism. This may defy their
classic dogma, which promised an international vision, but they insist
on this.
This does not mean that the PCF rejects all cooperation at the
regional level. It will act jointly if there is no danger of a center
forming. PCF activity on the regional level was well-reflected at the
Brussels Conference of European Communist Parties, January, 1974. This
foreshadowed the type of cooperation that existed until 1978, but which
seems less likely during the 1980s, as certain European parties drift
apart. The agenda at Brussels was broad, the monetary crisis; migrant
labor, multinational corporations: in short, problems peculiar to Europe.
The PCF was not seeking any special relationship to the Parties of the
2
Le Monde
,
October 5, 1973, d, 10 and January 20, 1974, pp. 1
and 2.
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EEC states. Some document might emerge with action proposals, but any
statement issuing from Brussels would have strictly the status of re-
commendations. The PCF, along with the other parties, preferred con-
sensus rather than majority-rule decision-making. It sought a vol-
untary coordination in which parties would exchange information and
experience. However, the French and other Parties will evolve common
strategies on questions peculiar to Europe. The internationalization of
production requires some internationalization of struggle, given the
progress of the integration process in Europe. For instance when two
European Parties are dealing with the same multinational, coordination
is feasible. A resolution was adopted at Brussels supporting 75,000
workers on strike against Michelin in Britain, Ireland, Spain and
Italy. On more basic issues no regional positions emerged. Thus an
attempt to set forth a common strategy for dealing with social demo-
crats proved elusive. Discussions were frank, with no attempts at a
cosmetic unity, which suggests some democratization of old Stalinist
practices, at least at the international level.
The Soviet connection . It was suggested earlier that Euro-
communism implied a certain distance between the Western Parties and
the USSR. Indeed in the 1970s all of the Parties in Europe insisted on
a broadened licence to criticize repressive aspects of the East bloc.
The PCF was more muted than; some of the other Parties. But Marchais has
moved far beyond Thorez, and has persuaded his membership "to abandon
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the illusion that so.ewhe.e in the East there exists a perfect society".^
On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish between what is a
fundamental, a priori anti-Communist choice, and what is instead, a
reservation, a demur, a disagreement, a dissent on certain positions.^
Kriegel has gone so far as to argue that Eurocommunism does not mark a
break with the Soviets. In her view, it is still very much Communism.
The Western Parties require the Soviet Union; they are powerless
without it.' Whether such a view still applies to the Italian and
Spanish Parties, which have broken with the CPSU on major issues, is
open to question. But it still applies to the PCF. Tiersky, too,
doubts that there would ever be a full break between the PCF and the
Soviet Communists.
The im.portant point is that the PCF continues to conceptualize
in bloc terms and it rejects the West in principle. This distinguishes
it from some of the other mass Comm^onist Parties in Europe. Paradoxically,
even its repeated insistence on national independence has an international-
ist dimension: the goal being 1) reduce United States influence on the
Continent, and 2) to prevent Western Europe from evolving into an
economic, military and political community that might imperil the Soviet
3
Annie Kriegel, French CP Regroups", The New Republic
,
September 15, 1978, p. 10.
4
Antonio Rubbi in Rinascita 6, February 6, 1976, pp. 17-18.
5
.
Private discussion, November 14, 1978.
g
"The French Communist Party and Detente", Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs (Vol. 28, No, 2, 1974), p. 205.
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bloc
.
In fact, I can locate no actions or strategies of the PCF de-
scribed in these pages that would in any way contradict either of these
two propositions. On the other hand, one should not distort this inter-
nationalist dimension into the misconception that the French Communists
are seeking a reversal of alliances, a joining by France to the Warsaw
Pact
At its Twenty Third Congress at Vitry in 19 79, the PCF realigned
itself closer to the Soviet Union, declaring its overall judgment of the
Socialist states to be positive, "le bilan globalement positif ". By
1980, it would be difficult to speak of a genuine Eurocommunism at all.
The PCF went on to ccnsumate the break with other European Parties by
supporting Soviet action in Afghanistan in 1980 and by its acceptance
of the military takeover in Poland in December, 1981. Italian Commu-
nists, on the other hand, have undertaken a possibly historic break
with the USSR, going so far as to suggest that the propulsive force
issuing from the October Revolution is exhausted.
For the Soviet Union the dilemma is real: as it stuggles to
preserve empire in the East, it loses the allegiance of its pro consuls
in the West. The process of regaining Czechoslovakia and now Poland
back into the bloc has induced the Eurocommunist parties of Spain and
Italy to break with Moscow. The PCF continues to walk a tight rope.
318
juggling the arnbiguities of independence and loyalty.
The core of the proble. arises fro. the fact that the Co..unists
long ago designated the nation state to be the vehicle of social trans-
formation. When there later ca.e into existence a plurality of Commu-
nist states, it was no longer feasible to preserve the single center
of ideological authority in Moscow. This led to the divergencies in
the system which today are progressively disintegrating the world
movement
.
There is a further problem. As the reformist parties of the
West, those that have broken with the USSR, enter into a government role,
they generate dangerous revisionist tendencies in the East European
states. This could be destabilizing and even lead to the dismemberment
of the entire edifice. This remains speculative at this time, but it
does suggest areas for further exploration.
Detente and the status quo
.
Clearly, then, the USSR has valid reasons
to be wary, of the reformist Parties. But it also has reason to restrain
the more progressively revolutionary Parties, such as the Portuguese.
These parties could endanger the status quo in Europe
. And during a
period of detente, the USSR is eager to preserve the existing balance
in Europe. Why risk the tangible benefits of detente for a possible
victory in Portugal? Recognizing this, the PCF in the 1970s repeatedly
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remnded its adherents (and the USSR) that detente in Europe in no way
implied acceptance of the status quo in France. It reserved the right
to make its fransformat ions
.
This was important during the years re-
viewed here, essentially years of detente. The issue is more muted
today with the passing of detente in the 1980s.
One must conclude that the PCF remains ambiguous about the
desirability of detente. Officially it supports detente, and for valid
reasons: many historic achievements have occurred during periods of
relaxation, rather than when East and West were clashing. In fact,
most Communist Parties, including the PCF, developed their national
and international strategies on the assumption that detente would be
lasting. A more benign USSR makes the PCF appear less menacing, more
legitimate
.
On the other hand, detente suggests to Frenchmen a superpower
condominium, a freezing of the status quo, evoking the Yalta style of
decision-making over the heads of Europeans, This is rejected by all
political groupings. Even today, Mitterrand identifies the Yalta
7
Agreement as a ma^jor source of tension.
A further factor concerning Communists and the East-West balance
is that the PCF (and the PCI) has grown so powerful in its own right,
that it is a complicating factor in East-West relations. The Soviets
^Die Welt, January 2-3, 19 82, p. 1.
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must deal with it not merely as a fraternal party, but as a political
force in its own right, influencing government policy, and therefore
interstate relations. In this sense as well, the entry of a Communist
Party into government could be destabilizing to superpower relations.
The interplay of domestic allies and foreign support
. Following the
collapse of negotiations over the updating of the Programme commun in
September, 1977 and the electoral defeat of the Left in Spring, 1978,
the Communists re-enclosed themselves, if not in a ghetto, in relative
isolation. The strategy of employing the PS as a stepping stone to
power had failed (largely because the Mitterrand forces were enter-
taining the same strategy in return - successfully). The Party acted
to renew ties to its traditional working class base, continuing to
attack the Socialists, now increasingly described as social democrats.
It av/aited better days. And while it awaited better days, it conceded
vague allegiance to the Union of the Left. To employ Tiersky's terms,
the Party was shifting from its "government" aspect to its "tribune"
function, rallying Frenchmen around various popular domestic themes,
unemployement , the drug danger, and the problem of immigration. Some
demagogic and even racist themes emerged. What is significant for our
analysis is that in a period of domestic isolation such as this, the
PCF has a continuing need for allies. This suggests an interesting
dynamic in their behavior.
1) Cut off from domestic allies, the Communists will move to
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strengthen ties to the USSR.
2) Conversely, when isolated from the Soviet Union, the PCF
seeks broader domestic alliances. Thus the search for new allies at
home varies inversely with the closeness of the relationship to the
USSR.
With its domestic alliance disintegrating rapidly in 1977-78,
the PCF in isolation prudently edged closer to the USSR and the foreign
policies it proclaimed. Thus the Communists:
.
Issued their positive judgment on the Socialist
countries at their Twenty-third Congress.
.
Supported the Soviet interpretation of the
Sino-Soviet War.^
.
Organized in April, 1980 a Paris conference of East
bloc and Western Parties to mobilize support behind
Soviet positions on disarmament in Europe: opposing
the NATO decision to emplace cruise missiles in
Europe
.
. Supported the Soviet Union, isolated by its invasion
of Afghanistan.
In edging closer to Soviet foreign policy the French Party was
growing increasingly out of alignment with other European Parties, par-
ticularly the Italian, which was itself developing some novel perspec-
tives. The PCI declined to partici in the 1980 disarmament con-
ference organized by the PCF. In fact, that week Berlinguer pointedly
held discussions with Mitterrand and Willy Brandt, pursuing his new
Le Monde, May 10, 1979, p. 10,
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strategy of the •Euro-left", opening
.p a broad dialogue with social
democratic forces in Europe.^
The crisis in Poland, following upon the Afghanistan crisis,
undermined still further the solidarity of Western Communists. The
PCI, in condemning that East bloc repression, moved toward its historic
break with the Soviet model. The PCF was one of the few major Western
parties (and surely the only one linked to the exercise of power) which
defended the dictature militaire in Warsaw. The Party displayed its
readiness to provoke a possible first split inside the Government since
the joint victory of the two parties in May, 1981. The PCF, as so often
in the past, was prepared to endure unpopularity to regain its inter-
nationalist identity, which, we have seen, it interprets as a capacity
for radical action. Having 14 years earlier condemned the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, why did it now not assert a similar stand for independ-
ence regarding Poland? In the latter case, the Soviets were implicated
less overtly, less brutally than in 1968. The PCF could uphold the
fiction that it was a purely internal affair. More important. Rochet
and the PCF leadership could never accept the Soviet argument that
Dubcek was a threat to socialism. Com.munist leadership however does
1
1
today "judge Solidarity as an anti-socialist force.
International Herald Tribune
,
April 2, 1980, p. 1.
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Le Monde
,
December 17, 1981, p. 1.
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,
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Intr^socialis^^ These various conflicts and crises around
which the Russians attempt to line up the loyalty and approval of
various Communists, suggest a new factor in international relations,
what Kriegel terms the Guerrejr^^^ p,,g,,^ Budapest,
Somalia, Afghanistan, Poland, and the Sino-Vietnam war: the PCF h
variably drawn in to take a position on these conflicts. Sociali.
has not solved the problem of war and peace, which had been the great
hope of 1920 when Lenin founded the International. Generally, the PCF
has supported the Soviet view. Thus China was blamed for the 1979 war
with Vietnam.
The durability of the Left coalition
. It is too soon to make an
informed judgement, but some observations can be made. Chapter IV on
the Programme commun noted that it was invariably foreign policy
disputes that had shattered the great historical alliances between the
Communists and Socialists, whether in 1939 or 19'+7. Thus it would be
imprudent to ignore the latent possibility, particularly since each
coalition partner conceptualizes and draws its values from a different
international bloc. The PCF enters the new Government in a diminished
position, having dropped to a 15 percent share of the electorate in
1981. Nevertheless, the two coalition parties, despite sharp foreign
policy differences, manifest a shared interest in preserving the co-
alition intact. From 1978 to 1981, the PCF had maneuvered itself into
12
' Le Figaro, February 26, 2979, p. 5
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isolation, resulting in its weakest electoral performance since the
Third Republic. Rigid structure, and dogmatic behavior are growing
archaic; a renewed tilt toward adventurist Soviet behavior is also
damaging. The PCF risks being marginalized, as it persists in pre-
serving its identity and its uniqueness.
The Socialists:
Some Concuding Observations
Since World War II, the Socialists have recast international
perspectives fundamentally. The more crucial areas I would list are
the following.
Alliance policy
. After some agonizing, Socialists accepted the
post-war consensus of the Center, adhering France to Germany against
the continental threat from Russia. This was a historic reversal.
Defense policy . After some confusion, the PS has devised a
coherent policy overcoming the pacifism that had been so self-destruc-
tive in the Third Republic. This too I would label basic.
Third World policy . Earlier Socialists accepted the essential
framework of Empire and French Union. They lacked any persuasive
summons to the emerging colonial world. This has been reversed. The
post-Mollet Party emerging from Epinay has gone on to elaborate some
broad humanist policies to deal with basic inequities in a post-
colonial era. Under the direction of Lionel Jospin, these have even
evoked some of the fervor of the Nineteenth Century struggle for French
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workers. On the other hand, policies are tempered by realism in
regions vital to France's requirements.
Independence. Socialists continue the Gaullist legacy of
national independence and autonomy from the United States. In their
own manner, they appear committed to dislodging the hegemony of the
superpowers
.
Europe. They appear committed to the view that a Socialist
France requires a socialist and integrated Europe (although there is
disagreement here). Like the Communists, they have taken a critical
distance from the larger international movement to which they adhere.
Tempering the Communists
. Since 1968, Socialists have helped
integrate the PCF into France's political system, negotiating them into
the acceptance of realities of European integration, a more objective
view of the USSR, and a more realistic view of certain defense questions.
These too would have to be cited as tangible achievements. Admittedly,
this is a broad listing of general achievements. All have been
examined in the foregoing chapters.
The PS and the dilemma of bipolarity
. In reviewing the above accomplish-
ments, there is one area where I would note some confusions. This
concerns the adjustment to a bipolar world. On the one hand, the PS,
in its Gaullo-socialist aspect, aspires to escape the dominance of the
United States over the West. Yet it recognizes some risks in accom-
plishing this. The ability of the United States to dominate or mediate
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the rivalries among the states of the industrial West has provided a
framework of world order. Left to themselves, capitalist states might
war as in 1914 and 1939. Even Lenin did not anticipate the order-
producing effect of a hegemonistic superpower. If I am interpreting
Mitterrand's design correctly, this framework is to be dismantled.
Instead, there would arise autonomous power centers among the capital-
ist democracies, with all the instabilities inherent in such rivalries.
Here too there is room for further investigation to discern what
exactly the PS has in mind - and how it differs from Gaullist conceptions.
View of the United States
. By 1974, the Socialists had moved
far from earlier Atlanticist positions. Despite the end of the war in
Vietnam, there was a deeper suspicion of United States objectives on
the Continent. It was described as seeking a hegemony through the
penetration of its multinationals and through the Kissinger doctrine
1 o
which described Europe as a mere "regional power" during the oil crisis.
Party pronouncements warned of becoming a satellite of the United States
and termed, American power a destabilizer of the Third World and a
14
supporter of totalitarian regimes. Mitterrand was sharply critical of
15America's unilateral renunciation of the Breton Woods framework.
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^ocialAst_2olAc^^ Despite rhetoric, one would have to
conclude that the PS has never renounced its commitment to identify
France with the West, which in the final analysis rests upon a shared
value system. The mainstream of the Party does not challenge this.
One can, though, distinguish policy areas where the new Government may
assert independence.
At this point one may discern some broad patterns to Socialist
Government policy since May, 1981. For instance, there has been a
consistency in opposing all super power interventions
, whether in Afghan-
istan or Central America. And it is highly significant that the presence
of POP ministers in no way hindered the Government from registering a
firm opposition to the military takeover in Poland, a stand which marked
the first foreign policy dispute among the two coalition Parties. They
have agreed to disagree, which may provide a formula for handling such
disagreements in the future, suggesting a certain stability to the
coalition.
The regime seeks to avoid giving offense to either super power,
a goal which is probably illusory, if genuine independence is to be
pursued. Nevertheless, President Reagan at the Ottawa Summit declared
himself"pleasantly surprised" with policies of the new Government. And
the Soviets through Pravda cited the "positive but limited nature" of
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PS performance. IS
^^e statement was nuanced, approving areas where
Mitterrand was continuing established Gaullist positions (remaining out
of NATO and furthering the development of ties with the USSR) and
where he was launching new initiatives, as in Central America. They
criticized his support for NATO rearmament. (France has approved the
emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe, but they would,
of course, not be placed in France.)
Mitterrand has been reassuring verbally toward the United
States, always careful to avoid genuinely angering the Russians. Thus
he has not supported sanctions against the Soviets regarding Poland.
And he has signed a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline project with
the USSR. By pursuing such initiatives, Mitterrand could collide with
some of the more crusading aspects of anti-communism manifested across
the Atlantic.
A new, Gaullo-socialist independence is discernible in Third
World policy. Sale of weapons to totalitarian or racist regimes will
be halted. On the other hand, a favored regime, such as India, will
17be sold Mirage aircraft valued at over three billion dollars.
16
Analysis was by Pravda Editor-in-Chief Victor Afanassiev,
October 16, 1977, as reported in Le Figaro , October 24-2 5, 1981.
17
New York Times, November 13, 1981, p. 3.
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AfEi£^. The new Government provides support to some important
black guerilla groups in South Africa and Namibia, which is at variance
with United States positions. The South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO) was permitted to open an information bureau in Paris.
Steps such as this highlight a new tone in foreign policy, revealing a
spirit of independence not displayed under the Giscard d'Estaing
Government. The PS is living up to a heritage of support for certain
leftist and revolutionary causes, in much the same spirit that it
supported Allende in the 1970s. Mitterrand has said he will continue
to support certain causes.
On a more pragmatic, less ideological level, the new Govern-
ment is aiding Chad in removing Libya's troops. This is related to a
broader effort to preserve French influence in Africa, and to continue
support to governments and forces that historically had good ties to
earlier French regimes, such as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and the Central
19
African Republic.
Latin America
.
The challenge to the United States has been
direct. France has recognized the guerilla organization of El Salvador
as a legitimate partner to negotiations. There has been very strong
moral support by Socialists. An arms agreement has been concluded with
18
International Herald Tribune
,
September 12-13, 1981, p. 3.
19
New York Times, November 4, 1981, p. 4.
330
Nicaragua (which the U.S. terms a subversive center throughout the
region) to furnish weapons, helicopters and patrol boats to the
Sandinista forces. The rationale here - and in the large sale of
Mirage jets to India - is that Third World states should not be
compelled to be dependent on the superpowers. In both of these
instances, the USSR would be the normal supplier. I believe that the
Socialists see France as able to offer an intermediate option to those
countries that do not wish to be wedded to particular superpowers.
Socialists, disarmament, and the "defense consensus ". Under the
guidance of Charles Hernu, the PS is carrying out an 18 percent increa^
2
1
m defense spending. The Defense Minister goes on to note, correctly,
that "France is less thwarted by neutralism (than the NATO countries)".
There is little dissent to her nuclear weapons development because of
the so-called "defense consensus".. When, as we saw, the PCF reversed
on the force de frappe
,
there, was no longer a mass party opposed to
the weapon. But how durable is the new consensus? The new Government
is on record as favoring the U.S. proposal to station Cruise missiles
in Europe as long as the Soviets do not remove their SS-20s. In the
1980s, France may lack a peace movement as such. But the "defense con-
sensus" may be more illusory than appears. As has been documented in
20LeHonoe, January 9, 1982, pp. 1 and 3.
21
New York Times, November 15, 1981, p. 5
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these pages, there is a historical sentiment (for example, the pacifism
of the inter-war years) that is anti-war and anti-nuclear. This
sentiment exists, suhmerged, inside the PS. The enthusiasm generated
in other European peace movements has probably been diverted into the
general euphoria of renewal following the Mitterrand victory. But such
sentiment could change. Mitterrand has been critical of neutralist-
pacifist positions in West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands. On
the other hand, their Communist coalition partners have taken the lead
in organizing anti-American (not anti-Soviet) disarmament manisfesta-
tions in Paris. The suggestion here is that the latent pacifist
sentiment could be released by this campaign, upsetting the assump-
tions of the "defense consensus".
Final Considerations
The Communist-Socialist dynamic continues to unfold. Tours has
not yet been overcome, as CERES would have it, but the two Parties are
again in uneasy alliance. If anything, we have seen that communism has
been largely nationalized as a world force. And, if a generalization
is permitted, socialism has been internationalized. Despite the Jacobin
cry that 1789 remains unfulfilled, revolutionary politics is not now
on the agenda. This has been confirmed too often, as the East-West
struggle has superimposed itself over the old struggle of the workers.
Robert Pontillon, a veteran of the Resistance and now a PS national
secretary, has said that the "two superpowers are in Europe. The
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Russians are there by geography, the Americans were called in by
history". Geography is probably more immutable than history, but
whether or not the superpowers will disengage on the old Continent is
almost irrelevant. They are condemned to an uneasy interdependence,
particularly since the East-bloc is no longer insulated from the boom-
bust cycles of the capitalized West: one bloc condeimed to the contra-
dictions of the other. Perhaps it is this interdependence which will
allow the PS to sustain its alliance with what many in it continue to
view as a surrogate of another power bloc. If the Communists have
been nationalized, the risk is not so great. Marchais, speaking about
the vanguard role, once said that it did not come about by decree, nor
was it a demand for hegemony on the Left: it was the recognition of a
historic fact. But as Chevenement noted, this is dogma, not fact,
23hence irrefutable. Duverger has been generous. He credits the PCF
24
with an integration function. Despite everything, they have since
1920 restored a consensus. "They have revalued all values". By approp-
riating old values and symbols - Tricolore, Marseillais e - they have
reintegrated the working class into its own pa trie . In this sense he
is probably correct. They have compelled the once-excluded workers
to participate in the nation-building process, picking up where Jaures
i}ft off. They have played the parliamentary game, and in that sense
22 -
Reflexions
,
p. 3.
23
' Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres , p. 43
94
Le Monde, March 17, 1968, p. 9.
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contributed to making that game legitimate. But despite their
integrating function, they have not renounced their revolutionary
calling. And herein lies the ambiguity with which we began this
exploration.
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